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ABSTRACT

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) came into being due to a perceived
need for international judicial settlement, whereas the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) was created for the purpose of specifically promoting
international trade by reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade. Alternative
structures for each institution are also considered, as is the older dispute
settlement process of arbitration, by means of cases. It is a voluntary
submission by both parties to a dispute, when they have agreed on the
issues, but need external assistance to proceed further. As a type of judicial
settlement, it is binding, can permit third party or non-state involvement,
and is a precursor of international tribunals.
In the WTO, one aim is to use cases to test conceptual points. The specific
aspects of dispute settlement including the application of rules and
procedures, and implementation and processes, will be discussed. The
working procedures of the Appellate Body (AB) will be analysed in detail.
Another aim is to compare with the ICJ, wherever possible. Legal concepts
such as jurisdiction, judicial aspects of reasoning, the burden of proof, and
the standard of proof will be discussed. The Appellate Body‘s (AB‘s)
standard of review of panel recommendations and rulings will be analysed.
Compliance and enforcement are compared between the two organisations.
Economic and political considerations will also be touched on when
relevant to this study.
In the ICJ, the application of concepts such as judicial restraint and activism
will be assessed, including the degree of inconsistency found in different
cases. The implications of the different types of agreements between states
that can lead to or have led to the ICJ‘s jurisdiction will be examined, and
the impacts assessed. The ambiguity involving provisional measures will be
studied in detail. The ICJ‘s relationship to the UN Security Council will
also be assessed. The lack of monitoring or enforcement, and of no stated
compliance timeframe are considered. The thesis will end with various
future recommendations.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to do several things. The first is to give a
historical background to the basis of the research in this study (Section 1.1).
A brief introduction to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is given,
followed by developments which led to the creation of the International
Court of Justice (ICJ). The research objectives are then explained in Section
1.2, and the organisation of this study is set out in Section 1.3.

1.1 Background to the research
1.1.1 The World Trade Organisation
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is a set of agreements
governing state parties‘ trade conduct; it is not an international
organisation. 1 It became one since the preceding International Trade
Organisation‘s (ITO‘s) Charter was not adopted. Based in Geneva, it lacked
a legal charter or structure. The treaty obligations remained internationally
binding. Contracting parties could recommend abandoning the disputed
trade measures, and could permit one contracting party to suspend

1

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994),
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm
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concessions or obligations to any other, or retaliate, by suspending tariff
concessions. Rules addressed tariff concessions and dispute settlement.
GATT shortcomings included allowing contracting parties to retain GATTinconsistent legislation. Canada suggested a World Trade Organisation
(WTO) for legal matters in international trade, including the GATT, the
GATS and others.

There were 8 negotiation rounds in the GATT, of which the Uruguay Round
led to WTO agreements in each key area, including the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),2 the
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS),3 and the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).4 A problem in the GATT
dispute settlement system was that no objection from any contracting party
to the decision was allowed, when referring a dispute to a panel. Reports
therefore took into account the fact that the losing party must accept them.
Dispute settlement consensus was blocked often, so dissatisfied parties
2

Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), Annex 1C,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15/04/1994,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm0_e.htm
3

Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), Final Act of the 1986 —1994 Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations, http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#eAgreement
4

General Agreement on Trade in Services (1995), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26gats_01_e.htm
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avoided it and took direct action. A stronger dispute settlement
understanding (DSU) resulted (1984), preventing the widespread blocking
of panel establishment and reports by losing parties. It included detailed
procedures for dispute stages, and a framework for all covered agreements.
Appellate review of panel reports, and implementation surveillance were
introduced.

The European Community suggested an institution to implement the
Uruguay Round; the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation
was signed in Marrakesh in April 1994. 5 Major new international laws
resulted, including several agreements, and the Final Act. The latter
changed the GATT into the (WTO). The Montreal Rules (1989) led to the
WTO‘s Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement
of Disputes.6

1.1.2 The ICJ
The Hague Conferences of 1897 and 1907 led to a desire for a world court
for international issues.7 The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) was

5

Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 15/04/94, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994).
Understanding on Rules and Procedures governing the settlement of disputes (1994),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dsu_e.htm
7
Shaw, M. N., International Law,5th edn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003; Ch 19, p.961.
6
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neither permanent, nor a standing court. It could not therefore build a
jurisprudence.8 This negative criticism led to a draft Convention Relative to
the Creation of a permanent Court of Arbitral Justice at the 1907 Hague
Peace Conference.9 The Convention could not be adopted due to discord
over the number of judges on the Court, for example calls for one judge to
represent each state Court member.

After the First World War, in 1920, the Council of the League of Nations set
up, by appointment, an advisory committee of judges to work on a draft
Statute for a Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). One of its
objectives was also to develop international arbitration. Its sources were the
draft Convention of 1907,10 a plan for neutral states with a view to
compulsory jurisdiction, and the Root-Phillimore plan to elect judges.11
Although the draft Statute included compulsory jurisdiction, the major
powers opposed this in the Council and in the Assembly of the League. In
the latter, an ‗optional clause‘ was agreed instead. The amended Statute
began in 1921.
8

Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law ,6th edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003; Ch
32, p.677.
9
Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes (1907),
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/1907ENG.pdf
10
Ibid.
11
Root-Phillimore plan: joint election of the judges by the Council and Assembly of the League,
24/07/1920, draft before the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations.
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After the Second World War, in 1946, the PCIJ was replaced by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ). Continuing the PCIJ was opposed by
the committee at the San Fransisco conference, since the United States and
the Soviet Union did not want the Court to be related to the League of
Nations, and there was also the problem of amending the PCIJ‘s Statute to
conform to the newly created United Nations (UN). 12 However, the ICJ is
much more closely related to the UN legally. Actual case continuity was
preserved between the two courts, as was the PCIJ as the close model. 13 The
Statute is almost the same; as is the jurisdiction and jurisprudence. Article
92 (Art 92) of the UN Charter refers to it as the UN‘s principal judicial
organ. Moreover, from Art 93 of the UN Charter, all UN members are ipso
facto parties to the Court Statute.

1.2 Research objectives

The usual historical diplomatic methods of international dispute settlement
are first considered, as well as the established process of arbitration, which

12

Brownlie, Ibid.,Ch 32, p.678.
Sands P., Mackenzie R., and Shany Y., Manual on International Courts and Tribunals, West Sussex,
Reed Elsevier, 2006; ch 1, p.4.
13

12

predated international judicial settlement. After outlining the historic
context in which each institution was created (above), this study examines
the intended scope of laws in the jurisdiction of the WTO and in the ICJ
respectively.

A key objective will be to show, possibly via examples, the significance of
treaty law, for example Art 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT 1969). Another objective will be to show the significance,
as it has evolved in the practice of the two institutions, of the DSU for the
WTO and of customary law for the ICJ. Brownlie has identified defining
characteristics of custom as duration; uniformity and consistency of the
practice; generality of the same; and opinion juris et necessitatis.14

For the DSU, it is not always easy to see the influence of international law
in trade law, let alone the historic meaning of customary international law. It
will be illustrated that the WTO AB has decided to use this as referring to
the rules in the VCLT 1969. Moreover, the legal interpretations used by each
institution in specific cases will be investigated, and trends or
inconsistencies highlighted. At a comparative level, it will be shown how
14

Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 6th edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003; Ch
1, p.7.
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the WTO represents an innovation in the sense that trade law (as reflected in
the covered agreements to be explained) takes precedence over international
law, unlike in the ICJ which aims to continue the trend of the presumed
primacy of international law from the PCIJ. The tensions and
inconsistencies which have resulted will also be discussed for both.

Another objective is to explain the differences in the conception of
jurisdiction, with the WTO‘s exclusive jurisdiction to be contrasted with the
ICJ‘s preference for voluntary submission by the parties, recalling that the
latter is not the only international tribunal to which parties have recourse.
The WTO cannot usually decline a trade case on jurisdictional grounds,
whereas the ICJ can decline a case on such grounds, as will be shown. In
the DSU, the AB can overrule a panel‘s decision about a case on
jurisdictional grounds, whereas there is no analogous check on the ICJ. This
raises issues concerning the status of international law and the significance
of states submitting voluntarily to the ICJ‘s jurisdiction, and whether
therefore the system of national or state courts has enough power. These
points will be analysed with an example case.

Due to the nature of compliance in the DSU, compliance panels will be

14

compared with dispute panels, and the terms of reference compared to show
the impacts on the overall trade disputes between the parties. The sanctions
remedy will be considered, shortcomings shown, and alternatives assessed
in detail.

Everyday concepts will be related to each organisation. Ideas such as the
transparency of the proceedings, and whether there are any steps to make
improvements will be considered. Where there have been milestones in the
jurisprudence, these will be highlighted and the implications analysed.
Cases will be referred to in suitable detail to illustrate the point being made.
Where there are issues of fairness that impact on developing countries visà-vis developed ones, the discussion will be extended and suggestions made
for the future. To try to redress imbalances, domestic institutional rigidities
or difficulties will also be touched on, and what this might impact, for
example the reasonable period of time (RPT) for implementation in the
DSU. If alternatives represent a better allocation of institutional resources,
these will be put forward.

In terms of the structure of each institution, significant differences will be
explored. In the DSU, the role of panels and appellate review will be

15

examined in detail. The merits of alternative panel structures and
procedures will be compared. This is different from the structure in the ICJ,
where there is no scope for judicial review. The ICJ distinction between
jurisdictional scope concerning law and facts (panels) and law only (AB)
will be explained.

1.3 Organisation of thesis

This thesis contains five chapters. Chapter 2 lays the foundation. It begins
by considering, in turn, the types of judicial dispute settlement historically
available to state parties when attempting to resolve a dispute, as well as
arbitration. This lays the foundation for what existed when international
judicial settlement was increasingly sought, and explains particularly the
framework in which the ICJ was created. Arbitration is explained as a
process available to the parties in either the ICJ or the WTO. The chapter
then discusses the comparative benefits of each dispute settlement method.

Chapters 3 and 4 represent the main part of the work in relation to the two
institutions. First, Chapter 3 addresses different aspects of how dispute
settlement works in two broad areas. These are: rules and procedures, and

16

implementation and processes. Having set the stage, Chapter 4 then
undertakes a detailed comparison between the processes in the WTO and
the ICJ, under three different dispute settlement areas. These are jurisdiction
and scope, judicial aspects and burden of proof, and compliance and
enforcement.

Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the study, summarising the thesis.
Recommendations are considered for the future, first generally, then in the
five areas of dispute settlement covered in Chapters 3 and 4.

17

CHAPTER 2: THE METHODS OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW

2.1 Introduction

Usually, the methods of dispute settlement in international law are classified
in two different ways. The first broad category represents diplomatic
methods, and includes negotiation, mediation, inquiry and conciliation. In
this category, the parties remain in overall control of the dispute, and can
either accept or reject the suggested settlement. The other general category
is termed legal settlement, since the basis of settlement is international law.
The types here are arbitration and judicial settlement, and are employed
where a decision that is binding on the parties is needed. Judicial settlement
involves referring the matter to the ICJ or other standing court. Arbitration,
on the other hand, needs the parties themselves to institute the method of
resolving the dispute between them. 15 Having stated above the two general
categories, our next step is to consider each dispute settlement process in
turn.

15

Merrills, J.G., International Dispute Settlement, 4th edn, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005;
Ch 5, p.91.
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2.2 Negotiation
From Art 2(3) of the United Nations charter, ‗all members shall settle their
international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international
peace and security and justice are not endangered‘.16 A tribunal may be set
up, and might require the parties to negotiate in good faith, and could state
what aspects the parties must consider whilst negotiating.

Basic negotiation is between two parties, when there exists a dispute
between them. It will involve consultation and exchange of opinions.
Essentially, it is to do with the parties discussing the disagreement, in order
to understand it. It is the method by which they decide how to proceed
subsequently.

In general, diplomacy will refine a disagreement by articulating the parties‘
positions such that it could be considered to be a dispute. Therefore, one
purpose of negotiation is to potentially establish a situation where an
international court‘s jurisdiction may be required.

16

Charter of the United Nations (1945).
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By negotiating, the parties can separate the dispute into component parts to
achieve their ambitions. For example in the Lake Lanoux case, Australia
and Papua New Guinea disputed the Torres Strait. 17 In this case, the parties
tackled their differences under the following headings: the population of
the islands in the Straits, the islands as an entity, the seabed, and the rights
to fishing, conservation, and navigation. Generally, if the dispute cannot be
easily separated, the parties can devise a procedural agreement (‗without
prejudice‘) to reward one party for making a concession on a key issue.
However, any underlying problems will then likely resurface in future.

An international court can require a duty on the parties to negotiate in
certain specific circumstances, e.g. territorial delimitation. An example is
the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases.18 Here, the ICJ stated the duty on the
parties to negotiate fairly over the dispute concerning the sharing of fishing
rights. However, it should be emphasised that the need to negotiate does not
preclude other processes being used as well. Notably, this duty does not
assume that a dispute exists already, but could be designed to prevent a
future dispute from arising between the parties.

17

Merrills, J.G., International Dispute Settlement, 4th edn, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005;
Ch 1, p.13.
18
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Uk v Ice., FRG v Ice), Merits, 25/07/74, General list no.56, ICJ Report 3.
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In many instances, the duty to negotiate has been laid out in the terms of a
treaty, as a result of a dispute arising. For example, Art 41 of the 1978
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties.19
According to this:‗If a dispute regarding the application or interpretation of the present
Convention arises between two or more Parties to the Convention, they
shall, upon the request of any of them, seek to resolve it by a process of
consultation and negotiation.‘20

Negotiation can also be between many parties. Moreover, the obligation to
negotiate does not necessarily imply a duty to reach agreement; in fact,
negotiation represents the first step in dispute resolution, not necessarily its
conclusion. According to Art 66 of the United Nations Charter, if a dispute
is not resolved within twelve months in the way covered by Art 33, then
there are other methods to follow.21 In the event that Arts 53 or 64 are
relevant (jus cogens), any party can submit for a decision to the ICJ in
writing. Jus cogens means a mandatory norm of general international law,
19

E.g. Lavalle, R., ‗Dispute Settlement under the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect
of Treaties‘, 1979, American Journal Of International Law, No. 73, pp.407-430.
20
Merrills, J.G., International Dispute Settlement,4th edn, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005;
Ch 1, p.13.
21
Shaw, M. N., International Law,5th edn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003; Ch 16, p.858.
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from which no derogation is permissible. The alternative is that the parties
all consent to a process called arbitration.

Negotiation might not be possible, for example when one party denies
another international status. However, two parties might have productive
negotiations through discussion, that could lead to official recognition. One
example is represented by the detailed discussions between the US and
China, before the Peking government was recognized. 22

In practice, if the parties have no shared interest in resolving their
differences, negotiation will not succeed. For example, the parties might
adopt the tactics of stating very different agendas. Also, negotiation will not
suit a weaker party in dispute with a stronger party. Stronger here means
greater political and economic strength, and therefore having access to
better legal support and so a better understanding of the legal and historical
issues involved in the area.

22

Shaw, M. N., Ibid., Ch 8, p.368.
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Here, one might refer to Japan and Russia‘s long-standing dispute over the
legal jurisdiction of the Kuril Islands. 23

It is useful to consider what might happen if negotiation has failed.
Obviously, failure can only result in the event that negotiations actually
occurred. However, even where there have been no negotiations, the ICJ
can exercise jurisdiction. One procedure that can be used to accelerate the
process is to state a timeframe in which peaceful settlement should have
occurred. Consider the 1965 Convention on Transit Trade of Land-Locked
Countries, from which:-

‗Any dispute which may arise with respect to the interpretation or
application of the provisions of this Convention which is not settled by
negotiation or by peaceful means of settlement within a period of nine
months shall, at the request of either party, be settled by arbitration.‘24

To sum up, negotiation represents the first step in identifying and resolving
an international dispute.

23

http://www.amun.org/uploads/ICJn_samp_opinion.pdf
Convention on Transit Trade of Landlocked Countries (1965),
http://www.imli.org/legal_docs/docs/A87A.DOC
24

23

It can occur whilst other resolution methods are in progress. In international
law, there is an obligation on parties to negotiate as part of the peaceful
settlement of a dispute. If one party omits to negotiate, the ICJ can get
involved, directly or from the terms of a treaty.

2.3 Inquiry and fact finding

Where the nature of a dispute between two parties is rooted in different
factual accounts of an event, rather than a stated difference in terms of
international law, a historic approach has been to appoint an inquiry
commission containing well-qualified members, whose task is to find out
the facts.25

Thus, the 1899 Hague Convention set out the scope of an inquiry
commission.26 This included facts such as their use for disputes ‗involving
neither honour nor essential interests‘; that only factual and not legal issues
should be handled; and neither the existence nor the findings of the
commission should be treated as compulsory.

25
26

Shaw, M. N., International Law, 5th edn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003; Ch 18, p.923.
Art 9, Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (1899).
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Additionally, from Art 9 of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement
of Disputes (1907), the purpose of an inquiry is ‗to facilitate a solution of
….disputes by elucidating the facts by means of an impartial and
conscientious investigation‘.27

According to Collier and Lowe, even if there is a legal basis to the dispute,
the inquiry could help in resolving it.28 This could be seen as a form of
impartial detective work, to remove the risk of two separate national
inquiries which might conflict in their findings. Inquiry is appropriate
where the parties actively welcome the involvement of an impartial
commission. The Hague Conference of 1899 first discussed this process as
an alternative to arbitration, which had already existed for about one
hundred years.

One of the best known examples of a successful inquiry commission is the
Dogger Bank incident of 1904, during the Russo-Japanese war.29 This
inquiry was set up under the 1899 Hague Convention.

27

Hague Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes (1907),
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/1907ENG.pdf
28
Collier, J. and Lowe, V., The Settlement of Disputes in International law, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 1999; Ch 2, p.24.
29
Anglo-Russian Declaration of St. Petersburg, 25/11/1904.
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The incident was that the Russian Baltic Fleet fired on the Hull trawler
fleet, then fishing on the Dogger Bank in the North Sea. The United
Kingdom was the aggrieved party. The Commission‘s report was accepted
by Russia and the UK, and effectively resolved the dispute. This prevented
the UK from entering the war against Russia. As a result of this process, the
1907 Hague Convention further elaborated the inquiry process articles from
a total of 6 to 28.

To put inquiry into historic perspective, it is interesting to note that the
United States was party to 48 bilateral treaties from 1913 to 1940. Each
contained the possibility of a permanent inquiry commission. Collectively,
these treaties are referred to as the Bryan treaties.30 Commissions were
developed in the Hague Convention of 1907, but were not in fact used very
much in the years to follow.31 As a process, inquiry has not progressed in a
gradual way in that there was a forty year period in which it was not used at
all. However, as time went on, the commissions assumed less of an
exclusively fact-finding character, and more of a judicial role. This shows
the increasing influence of international law during the twentieth century.

30

Shaw, M. N., International Law, 5th edn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003; Ch 18, p.924.
31
Hague Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes (1907),
http://www.pca-cpa.org/upload/files/1907ENG.pdf
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For example, Britain and Denmark set up the Red Crusader inquiry in
1961.32 In this case, a Danish fisheries protection ship boarded the UK
trawler the Red Crusader, based on an accusation of illegal fishing. At one
point, the Danish ship fired at the UK trawler. Most of the subsequent
commission members were jurists, and interestingly for the first time in any
inquiry, none of the members were nationals of either party. In both this and
the Letelier and Moffitt case, the commission‘s findings made significant
legal rulings, as a basis for deciding the compensation. 33 However, within
the context of specific institutions which have developed since, this process
has been used. For example, the UN has employed this method, as has the
International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO).

Recent times have seen increased involvement in inquiry by the UN. This
can be seen in the fact that as recently as 1991, the General Assembly
issued a Declaration which re-defined fact finding as:-

32

Merrills, J.G., International Dispute Settlement, 4th edn, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2005;
Ch 3, p.53.
33
Dispute concerning responsibility for the deaths of Letelier and Moffitt, 11/01/92.
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‗any activity designed to obtain detailed knowledge of the relevant facts of
any dispute or situation which the competent United Nations organs need in
order to exercise effectively their functions in relation to the maintenance of
international peace and security.‘ 34

To complete this assessment of inquiry and fact finding, one clear reason
why inquiry has not been the adopted method is as follows. In a wide range
of disputes, it is not appropriate to solve the dispute by simply finding out
the facts.35 Also, this type of official third party involvement would not be
the process favoured by various states in certain circumstances.

In general, however, we can observe that where an episode has caught one
or more parties by surprise, an inquiry commission can be very useful in
settling the issue. One advantage of this method is that it permits a party to
make a compensatory payment without formally accepting its fault, and the
matter need not be prolonged. One case is Letelier and Moffitt, whereby the
two named persons were assassinated in 1976, in Washington DC.36 The US
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had alleged that this was carried out by Chilean intelligence. The inquiry
then resolved the matter to both parties‘ satisfaction.

2.4 Mediation and good offices

The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 set out the regulations by which
these methods would work. 37 The Conventions imposed a duty on parties to
use good offices or negotiation as much as possible, before resorting to
arms. Mediation is a part of negotiation, and tries to reconcile the two
parties. The mediator is actively involved and officially recognized as the
authority to find new ways to resolve the dispute, as well as help the parties
to communicate. The proposals trust the parties in that the mediator‘s
suggestions are based on information from the parties, not on any
investigation (unlike inquiry).

We can also identify a related approach to dispute resolution known as
‗good offices‘, which depending on the context, may be similar or different
to mediation.
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It is worth noting that Art 33(1) of the UN Charter does not specifically
mention good offices. However, according to Shaw, good offices are
relevant where a third party tries to get the disputing parties to negotiate.
The United Nations Secretary General has taken part in disputes through his
good offices.38 He can also undertake to use of his good offices with
officials of regional organisations. The use of his good offices or mediation
can be required in different ways. One can be due to power inherent in his
office. Or, a request can be made by the Security Council or the General
Assembly. Sometimes, the parties have requested the mediation of the
Secretary General themselves.

Unlike good offices, mediation means that the third party is actively
involved in the negotiations. 39 Mediation has been defined in the following
terms:-

‗mediation is the participation of a third State or States, a disinterested
individual or an organ of the United Nations with the disputing States, in an
attempt to reconcile the claims of the contending parties and to advance
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proposals aimed at a compromise solution.‘40

When the parties have not succeeded at negotiations, the mediator assumes
importance. This third party can ask the parties to restart negotiations, or act
as an intermediary if one or more of them is unwilling to communicate.
These possibilities are called ‗good offices‘. Either the parties could request
mediation, or the third party could assume the task. Again, the state parties
do not have to accept the mediator‘s suggestions. In a difficult dispute,
parties might make concessions more easily through a mediator than
directly. The mediation can be confidential if required.

Initially, a party who is willing to mediate needs to be found. A mediator
can be an international organisation, a state, or even an individual. 41 For
example, in the 1982 dispute over the Falkland Islands between Britain and
Argentina, initially Alexander Haig, the US Secretary of State, was
prepared to mediate. Subsequently, Senor Perez de Cuellar, the UN
Secretary General, was willing to put forward his good offices as an
alternative.
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In 1978, the Beagle Channel award almost led to war between Chile and
Argentina.42 Because of his vested interest, the Pope put forward Cardinal
Antonio Samore as a mediator. In this case, the good offices of the Pope had
been involved in Catholic South American countries for about 500 years,
and intended to prevent war.

One aspect of mediation is that it is more likely to succeed because the
dispute has reached a point whereby a change in the parties‘ position is
required as the next move. The mediator can facilitate this. 43 One should
realize that if mediation is to be the right process, the parties must agree to
the identity of the mediator. A potential mediator must have respected
qualities. Therefore, in the Beagle Channel dispute, the good offices of the
Pope offered an ideal channel for the mediation of his envoy. 44 More
generally, impartiality is a crucial part of the offices of the UN Secretary
General. The Secretariat has the power to take the initiative in a dispute. For
this reason, the Secretariat has the credibility to maintain the parties‘ trust in
dispute resolution.
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Let us consider where a state offers to mediate. This will typically be
because the state foresees settlement terms which are somehow favourable
to itself. Any historic closeness to one party need not prevent the state from
being the mediator, provided the communication exists with the other party.
Mediation fulfills certain tasks. One task is to recommence official
communication in a difficult case. For example in November 1979 in the
hostage crisis between the US and Iran, communication had ceased. A
group of intermediaries then had to restart official communications, the task
eventually being taken by Algeria, since this intermediary was trusted for
good offices and mediation. Another task a mediator fulfills is to convey
information, so that the two sets of proposals can be modified and therefore
reconciled. Thus, Algeria could modify Washington‘s proposals and give
significant importance to Iran‘s assets in the USA. 45

In general, if both parties are strong (politically or economically) and have
very different aims (about being dominant, for example), then mediation is
not likely to be the successful procedure. Also, mediation does not
necessarily require equal treatment.
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For example, if one state has invaded another, it might be sufficient to
recognize some other claims of that state, to require it to withdraw to its
previous limits in the present dispute.

In conclusion, if the parties do not co-operate with the mediator, mediation
or good offices will not resolve the dispute. The purpose of mediation is for
a third party to convince the disputing parties to change the positions in a
way they both find acceptable, so that they can resolve the dispute
themselves. Mediation can produce a degree of trust and therefore improve
co-operation between the parties, which can then lead to an agreement
between them. Whether or not mediation is likely to succeed will depend
partly on historic associations between the parties as well as between the
mediator and the parties. For example, regional affiliation as well as
religion can play a part, as we saw in the case of the Pope‘s prior
involvement in Catholic matters in two South American countries. 46

In practice, successful mediation frequently depends on its timing, and the
particular personality involved. There are no set terms on which the dispute
should be resolved.
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2.5 Conciliation

We can note the following definition of conciliation:‗A method for the settlement of international disputes of any nature
according to which a Commission set up by the Parties, either on a
permanent basis or an ad hoc basis to deal with a dispute, proceeds to the
impartial examination of the dispute and attempts to define the terms of a
settlement susceptible of being accepted by them or of affording the Parties,
with a view to its settlement, such aid as they may have requested.‘47

From the 1928 General Act on the Pacific Dispute of International Disputes
(revised 1949),48 commissions were to include inquiry and mediation
methods. A commission would have five members, one appointed by each
party, and the other three were to be taken from amongst the citizens of
third states. The process was to end within six months, and not be held in
public.

Conciliation is frequently used in international trade agreements, and also in
47
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treaties to protect human rights. An example of the former is the institution
of the WTO. Where many parties are concerned, because a commission
contains several different members, it would be better placed to form
conclusions regarded as fair by the parties.

One view of conciliation is that it is a kind of formalized negotiation, with
the commission providing the necessary assistance to the parties to resolve
their differences. To be effective, the commission must have taken a view as
to what kind of role it will play. Because it is required to study the detail of
a dispute, it has significant investigative power. It can obtain data from the
parties in various ways, and can require reports before formulating its
proposals. The commission might feel the need to establish its credibility,
and so might state the reasons for its conclusions. If the commission‘s
proposals are accepted, it produces a proces verbal, which is an agreement
stating the conciliation and the terms achieved. If the proposals are rejected,
the conciliation has failed.49
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Conciliation is a dispute settlement process which contains aspects of
mediation and inquiry. It was especially popular in the period between the
two world wars. It is relevant to cases where a dispute has been put forward
to an individual or a commission who is required to impartially establish the
facts and make settlement proposals. The settlement is not binding, unlike
an award or judgment.

Since 1945, the general use of conciliation has decreased significantly.
According to Shaw, conciliation began from treaties which enabled
permanent commissions of enquiry. 50 Switzerland has been the prime user
of this method. States can make an agreement to set up an ad hoc
commission. Some treaties contain conciliation, which is often used to settle
trade disputes. For example, the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties
(1978),51 or the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea(1982).52 The latter is
often used in trade disputes. The France-Switzerland Treaty of 1925 applied
the idea of Commissions of Reconciliation, from which we can trace the
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idea of conciliation in international dispute resolution. 53 From there,
conciliation through treaties reached a maximum influence by the second
world war. In 1940, there were 200 treaties. 54

The VCLT 1969 establishes the circumstances under which treaty
obligations can be settled by recourse to conciliation. The annex to the
Convention enables the UN Secretary General to refer to a list of suitable
lawyers who can act as conciliators. Any such commission has twelve
months to report its conclusions. Also, from Art 33 of the UN Charter,
commissions can have an important role in conciliation.

In 1990, the UN Sixth Committee began work on Draft Rules for the
Conciliation of Disputes between States. 55 This work was completed in
1995, containing revisions to the Model Rules, which were then approved
by the General Assembly. Now, there are 29 articles on the entire process of
conciliation, but they still are not binding on the parties.
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The importance of these rules depends on how frequently conciliation is
used. Overall, conciliation has not proved to be a very widely used method.
One reason is that the treaties in which it has been used contain restrictions
that have prevented more widespread use. The fact that conciliation is a
time-consuming formal procedure would tend to discourage its use in
smaller disputes. From a practical viewpoint, disputes are usually resolved
along lines preferred by powerful states. Therefore, since a conciliation
commission has no political authority, many states might prefer to avoid
this method. This argument can be generalized to larger disputes also.

Historically, conciliation has been most appropriate where the principal
issues are legal, and the parties prefer a fair compromise. Perhaps one
would expect conciliation to succeed where the dispute has continued for
some time. It would seem that the process is likely to succeed where the
parties hope and expect a resolution, but prefer an external body with some
authority to suggest the terms. Because there is not so much time pressure,
the parties may feel that the right solution will be reached.

The UN General Assembly can appoint commissions for reconciliation.
Such commissions are usually used for bilateral or multilateral treaties.
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Additionally, states can opt to use an individual conciliator. There is an
example in the case of Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania in 1977, when these
countries requested the services of a Swiss diplomat, Dr. Victor Umbricht. 56
Under World Bank guidance, he was asked to produce proposals as to the
intended distribution of assets belonging to the former East African
Community.

Unlike in the bilateral treaties, for multilateral treaties conciliation has
remained popular. The Pact of Bogota (1948) allows for conciliation. 57
Also, the European Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes
(1957)58 enables conciliation in a way based on the Franco-Swiss treaty
(1925).59 Conciliation developed from inquiry, and includes this method and
mediation in its process. It is a flexible procedure in that it can be used in a
range of circumstances.
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In general, conciliation is well suited to disputes where the framework of
rules and regulations is preferred by the parties. Therefore, it is appropriate
to the intended terms of future interactions of the parties. A weak party can
achieve a better settlement with the use of an official commission, than on
its own. Therefore, if one party is economically or politically weak
compared to the other parties, it may be more comfortable with conciliation.
Conciliation is better suited to situations where there is no immediate threat
to regional security, and is therefore appropriate for, e.g., regional trading
arrangements.

The decline in the use of conciliation over the years for trade disputes most
likely goes hand in hand with the increasing influence of the GATT and then
the WTO. Recently, there have been more formal attempts to revive
conciliation, e.g. by the UN and via the Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
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2.6 Arbitration

According to Collier and Lowe, ‗arbitration is the name given to the
determination of a difference between States (or between a State and a nonState entity) through a legal decision of one or more arbitrators and an
umpire, or of a tribunal other than the ICJ or other permanent tribunal.‘60

In this process, the disputing parties are required to set up the terms of the
dispute themselves. This requires the use of a tribunal, a procedure which is
almost 200 years old. About 100 years ago, the nature of arbitration
changed. The input of jurists in terms of international law came to be relied
on in arbitral decisions. Sometimes, a well-qualified single arbitrator can be
appointed, usually a jurist. In 1986, however, the Secretary General of the
UN was asked by France and New Zealand to arbitrate in the Rainbow
Warrior case.61 In this case, an unreasoned ruling was used to settle the
case.
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There are different ways of constructing arbitration tribunals. In a collegiate
structure, the arbitrators can appoint the chairman, as can the parties.

A head of state can be put forward as a single arbitrator. He can then
delegate his power to nominated relevant international experts. According
to the procedure used by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA), each
party chooses two arbitrators from a panel, of which only one can be a
national of the party‘s own state. These arbitrators subsequently select an
umpire. If they cannot agree, a third party will choose. The third party is
previously agreed between the parties. In modern treaties, the tribunal
frequently used is an odd-numbered group of people (three or five),
empowered to decide by a majority vote. The Heathrow Airport case
between the US and the UK (1992-3) is one example of a dispute where a
three member tribunal was employed. 62

By negotiation, the parties appoint the constituents of a collegiate tribunal.
Each party appoints at least one national arbitrator, and they decide the
neutral members by consent.
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In many cases, the identity of the arbitrators is decided after producing the
arbitration agreement, which contains the procedure for setting up the
tribunal. Because they can act as swing voters, the neutral arbitrators can be
very important. Due to the scope for disagreement about them, arbitration
treaties can permit the President of the ICJ or other impartial body to
appoint them. In the event of disagreement, the European Convention for
the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes (Art 21) contains guidelines.63

The parties decide what issues the arbitrators will address, and how the
arbitration will proceed. The detailed procedures address issues such as
where the arbitration is to be held, and how it is to be paid for. Others areas
covered include the structure of the written pleadings, the oral stage, and the
time limits.

The compromis is a special agreement, which can be part of a treaty. 64 It
contains reference to the parties‘ agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration,
where the issues in question already exist.
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There is an understanding that international law will form the basis of
arbitration, although the parties can agree to specific principles to be
incorporated by the tribunal. These will be stated in the compromis, and the
proceedings must then use these rules. The compromis covers, for example,
how evidence will be obtained, will experts be appointed, will there be
visits, what languages will be employed, and what will be the nature of the
decision, including whether it will be published. Usually, arbitration is
conducted in private.

The International Law Commission (ILC) produced optional Model Rules
on Arbitral Procedure, which the UN General Assembly adopted in 1958. 65
The Rules cover the dispute and the intended framework of the arbitration,
the compromis, the composition and power of the tribunal, and general
procedures, including whether differing opinions are permitted. The arbitral
award represents a binding settlement on the parties. More specifically, if
the tribunal has not taken shape by three months after the initial arbitration
request, or decision on arbitrability, the President of the ICJ will, on request
from either party, appoint the remaining arbitrators. If the President is
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unable to act, for example because his nationality is the same as one of the
parties, the Vice-President will confirm the appointments. The procedural
rules can be taken from an existing procedure. For example, in the
Heathrow Airport arbitration the parties decided to adapt rules from the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).
One party can require the other to produce detailed information, as the US
asked of the UK in the pre-hearing period of the remedial phase in the
Heathrow case.

The advantage of the parties agreeing to the scope of the arbitration is that
there is much less chance that a subsequent disagreement will arise. Once
parties have accepted an award, it is implicitly accepted as valid in
procedure, and therefore binding. No subsequent challenge can occur by the
parties. There is an exception to this. If a fact later comes to light which is
such as to have conclusively influenced the award, a party can request a
reopening of the award.66 Also in general, it is important to bear in mind
that the agreement of any affected third party is an essential part of a
successful arbitration. It is important for the tribunal to clearly understand
its remit, so that the scope of the dispute remains clear to all. In the last 60
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years or so, arbitration has developed especially where one party is a State,
and the other party is a non-State, e.g. a company. One such dispute was
Saudi Arabia v Aramco.67

It can be concluded that in international dispute resolution, arbitration
represents a formal procedure, along agreed lines, to award damages against
the offending party, as decided by an arbitration panel. It also allows one
party to be a state, and the other to be a non-State. Because of this, it has
enabled commercial disputes to be resolved, for example where one party is
a company. For many years now, arbitration has been a more transparent
process, where international lawyers have been the arbitrators. The parties
can however request the proceedings to remain private. One advantage of
arbitration is that since the parties have subscribed to the terms of any
arbitrable dispute (e.g. via treaty), the scope for ill-feeling based on an
award is less likely.
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2.7 The relative merits of each method of dispute settlement, and their
future potential
2.7.1 Negotiation
Firstly, we consider negotiation. From the viewpoint of the ICJ, it is always
preferable to settle a dispute by negotiation in the first instance. However, if
there already exists a dispute where there is a significantly different legal
stance between two parties, the Court considers that it can adjudicate even
in the absence of negotiation. Also, international law is not such that
adjudication can commence once negotiation has ceased. In other words,
both can exist at the same time, with the hope that negotiation or other
methods will resolve the dispute before adjudication does.

2.7.2. Mediation; good offices; inquiry and fact finding
On the third party role in mediation, we have previously noted that a
mediator can facilitate better negotiation. In general, a mediator can be
assisted by the risks of a dispute getting out of hand, e.g. leading to
preparations for war. This is especially the case where the parties seem to be
lacking an obvious peaceful way forward. To make sure a mediated
settlement proceeds as planned, a third party can increase its involvement to
see it through, possibly using other established dispute settlement
procedures. For example in 1975, in the Iran vs Iraq dispute, Algeria
48

mediated the negotiation of the peace treaty, but also ensured its
representative was present when the agreed mixed commissions were
instituted, and even during their actual discussions. With the commissions,
we see an aspect of inquiry and fact finding as part of the settlement
process. It is important to recall the other aspect of mediation, namely good
offices. Here, as we have seen, people in high office, for example, the UN
Secretary General or the Pope, have been able to use personal
representatives successfully because their office lent great credibility to the
mediation in the parties‘ eyes.

It is possible to make some specific proposals in connection with mediation
and good offices. In the context of bilateral trade relations, for example
between Arab states, as more states lean towards WTO membership, a
specific dispute may arise. In such instances, the Secretary General of the
Arab League could lend his good offices to act as mediator in such a trade
dispute.

Let us now make some observations about the nature of inquiry and fact
finding. As time goes on, with the increased globalisation of many forms of
traffic and transactions, the scope for mistakes being made increases.
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Therefore, in line with the growth of international organisations, e.g. ICAO,
there should be more established procedures to establish blame and decide
reparation (including compensation) where one state or non-state party is
aggrieved.

2.7.3 Conciliation; mediation; arbitration
The next process we revisit is conciliation, whereby a commission issues a
report containing some proposals, as opposed to a decision. In this context,
let us note the example of the 1986 boundary dispute between Egypt and
Israel in the Taba area.68 Here, the attempt was for an ad hoc commission to
settle the issue. In the event, the conciliation could not succeed. The final
agreement was actually an arbitration, but contained details about the
intended conciliation whilst the arbitration proceeded. Thus, conciliation
and arbitration were envisaged as the ways forward, but only the arbitration
could succeed.

From the 1975 Convention on the Representation of States in Their
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Relations with International Organisations of a Universal Character,69 and
the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties,70
the use of a conciliation commission cannot be negated at the outset.
Incidentally, the 1975 Convention also refers to the fact that the relevant
international organisation can ask for an advisory opinion from the ICJ.

In recent times, conciliation has become popular again, perhaps due to its
flexibility. For example, an impartial state can facilitate the terms of a
conciliation between warring factions within another country in that region.
This can be seen in Saudi Arabia‘s role as conciliator in the ending of
Lebanon‘s civil war in 1990. Here, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia set up a
commission in Taif, to oversee the Taif Accord. Partly due to the
establishment of this commission, it was possible to successfully end the
civil war in Lebanon.

In recent times, we have seen the possibility of conciliation used in
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association with mediation, for example in the field of international military
strategy with the creation of a Dispute Settlement Mechanism for the
CSCE. The CSCE has been superseded by the Organisation for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). There is further evidence to show that in
the modern world, conciliation is most effective when used in conjunction
with another dispute settlement process. For example, from a 1992 meeting,
the Stockholm Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration 71 includes the
possibility of a panel of conciliators and arbitrators, nominated by the states
parties.72 This would be called the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration,
and be based in Geneva. It would define its own rules, and could be a
source of conciliation for disputes referred by consensus or by a single
party. A commission would be appointed on a case by case basis, with each
party contributing its choice of one member, in a total number of probably
three. If the commission‘s findings are not acceptable to the parties, then its
report goes to the OSCE Council.

2.7.4 Arbitration
The next process to consider is arbitration. It should be stated that this is not
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an absolute procedure, and can reflect aspects of conciliation in some cases.
For example, consider the case of the sinking of the Rainbow Warrior ship,
between France and New Zealand. The parties had not stated how they
wanted the matter to proceed. The UN Secretary General became involved.
He suggested his own method, different to the parties‘ opposing views, on
the imprisonment of the French agents, as well as a pragmatic approach to
compensation and other matters. No real reference was made to the parties‘
rights in international law.

Such practicalities as imprisonment procedures could not have been
handled exclusively by an arbitration with its emphasis on the parties‘
rights. In general, we find that conciliation and arbitration constitute a
significant element of many bilateral and multilateral treaties, and therefore
could be said to form the backbone of many matters in international
relations. Additionally, it should be pointed out that if there is shown to be
serious procedural error in an arbitration, the ICJ has the power to annul the
award.

2.7.5 Comparative discussion
If we now consider the entire range of dispute settlement procedures
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available, it is useful to refer to Art 33 of the UN Charter. The procedures
available to the parties range across ‗negotiation, inquiry, mediation,
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.‘ As noted by
Collier and Lowe, the processes become increasingly more formal in the list
order from diplomatic to judicial settlement means. 73 Also, the extent of
third party involvement increases, as does the openly stated importance of
international law.

2.7.6 Future potentials
It is now proposed to discuss the likely future potential of the various
settlement processes we have already discussed. In negotiation, presently
any dispute between two states can have a tendency to go unresolved for
many years (although Art 66 of the UN Charter prescribes other methods
after twelve months). Different types of mediation usually will occur,
whether by a powerful third state or possibly the UN. Perhaps a better
implementation procedure is to establish more regional treaties, which state
certain timeframes within which a given dispute should have been
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satisfactorily resolved. Then, if this is not the case, it would be sensible to
advocate the setting up of a regional conciliation commission within the
treaties, which is set up such that it has the power to require compulsory
arbitration if the parties have not resolved their differences.

Arbitration, as we discussed, is a legal method of settling a dispute, which
the parties subscribe to. It does not represent a judicial settlement by a
permanent court. It would be useful where the eventual terms of settlement
are not clear to the parties. Because it is a lengthy procedure, it is usually
slow. To make it more efficient and transparent (without undermining the
confidentiality of the final decision), an inquiry commission could be
employed to accelerate the proceedings. This should also improve the way
in which any affected third party claims are assessed.
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CHAPTER 3: AN EXPLANATION OF THE DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES IN THE WTO AND THE ICJ

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the main purpose is to make a general comparison between
the WTO and the ICJ. The predecessor to the WTO was the GATT, which
began in 1944. The WTO replaced the GATT on 1 January 1995. By
contrast, the ICJ is the permanent court instituted by the UN, and dates from
the 1940s. Its charter includes a large number of laws from that of its
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ). Here, the
intention is to analyse each institution under the two areas of rules and
procedures and implementation and processes, and to finish with an overall
conclusion. Section 3.2 reviews the rules and procedures in the WTO,
followed by those in the ICJ in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 covers the
implementation and processes in the WTO, including discussion of the
RPT. The Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents case is used to illustrate,
including how the AB works. 74 Section 3.5 covers implementation and
processes in the ICJ, and Section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
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3.2 The rules and procedures within the WTO

The WTO derives many of its processes from the GATT rules. In general,
there was a historic presumption that diplomatic consultation would provide
the main method to deal with disputes. 75 As the GATT practice developed, it
became more common to use a rules and judicial approach to dispute
resolution. The result of giving more emphasis to dispute resolution within
GATT led to the addition of several procedures being added to various
Codes in the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations. 76 The legal document that
represents the WTO‘s approach to dispute settlement is the Uruguay Round
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
Disputes, usually referred to as the DSU.77

The procedures are handled by the following bodies. The Dispute
Settlement Body (DSB), according to which panels are formed, and which
accepts panel and AB Reports.
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According to Leitner and Lester,78 appellate review represents one of the
most significant aspects of the DSU, and was used a lot in the WTO‘s first 8
years. Statistically, 72% of panel reports had been appealed. Art 16.4
demands that a panel report is adopted or appealed within 60 days of
circulation. Practically, this time period has varied between 3 and 90 days.
Art 7.1 of the DSU mandates the use of panels. 79 The DSB is charged with
the task of implementing rulings. It also imposes sanctions on parties that
do not follow dispute settlement rulings. In practice, the General Council of
the WTO fulfills the role of the DSB. However, to increase its autonomy,
the DSB has a separate chairman, and its procedures are separate to the
procedures of the General Council.

Part of the DSU is the creation of an AB, whose task is to inspect panel
decisions.80 The 7 AB members have to have legal and international trade
expertise, as well as having no particular governmental sympathy. To
reinforce the independence of the panel, the members are appointed as
individuals, not as part of any WTO state member.
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The AB gives members the opportunity to register disagreement with the
application of any GATT principles invoked during panel proceedings. 81
The parties are given the chance to test legal issues from GATT articles. To
this end, three of the members are allocated to hear specific cases. The AB
is given the power to change or overturn the legal conclusions reached by a
panel report.

In general, the spirit of the DSU is that it covers any dispute that arises from
the multilateral WTO agreements referred to collectively as ‗the covered
agreements‘. Additionally, Art 11 describes how (in standards of review) the
panel and AB are required to objectively consider the facts of the case. One
important goal of the DSU is to try to cancel a measure between parties
which contradicts a principle used in the covered agreements. Failing that,
the next preferred goal is a solution accepted by the parties. 82 The DSB is
tasked with informing the appropriate WTO Councils and Committees
about progress in disputes concerning any provisions in the agreements. 83
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Where there is a conflict between WTO agreements and specific additional
rules and procedures, the latter have greater importance in the DSU. The
DSU is guided by the customary rules in international law as stated by the
VCLT 1969.84 Significantly, in the context of the status of international law,
where there is a conflict between a covered agreement and some other
agreement in international law, the DSU Panels and the AB must give
primacy to the covered agreement. This should be seen as a contradiction to
the general trend over the years in the development of the WTO, whereby
rules of international law have been given increasing significance.

The first step in the DSU is for one member to request consultations with
the other member(s). The receiving member(s) is/are required to respond
within 10 days, and to begin consultations in good faith within 30 days of
receipt. The DSU enables parties to opt for good offices, conciliation or
mediation, and this choice can be commenced or ended at any time. 85
Usually, this task would fall to the WTO Director General, with the
assistance of a neutral third party.
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It should be stated that the request for a panel is not the first stage, indeed
60 days must pass after the consultation request before the complaining
party can request a panel (20 days in a matter of urgency). Interestingly,
with the agreement of the parties, the diplomatic methods mentioned can
continue despite the commencement of a panel procedure.86

The WTO members can opt for arbitration, as a binding alternative
method.87 Then, the parties can state the matters involved and the
procedures being adhered to. Following an arbitration award, the
enforcement will be via the WTO. The DSB or the WTO can then impose
sanctions if necessary.

The DSU panel must be initiated at the next DSB meeting, unless the parties
explicitly decide not to use a panel. 88 The usual number of panel members
is three, taken from a list held by the Secretariat. In the event that the parties
cannot agree on the choice of members within 20 days, the Director General
will appoint them. Nobody who is a national or member of a customs union
of any of the parties can serve. 89 Usually, the parties are given 20 days from
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panel creation to agreement on its terms of reference. 90 The reason why a
panel is used is in order to complement the DSB in dispute resolution. 91 The
second panel is the opportunity for parties to present their rebuttals. 92
Within 6 months, the panel must produce a draft report for the parties. A
third party can be asked to submit opinions at the second meeting also. 93
After consultation with the parties, an interim report is produced, beyond
which a final report is produced for the DSB. The DSB has 60 days to adopt
this report, unless the parties oppose it, or the DSB must wait until after a
party‘s appeal. In general, there is an emphasis on the transparency of panel
proceedings, e.g. each party‘s responses are made available to the other
parties.94

One important point concerning the DSU is the perspective on developing
countries, where the intention is to achieve equal treatment with developed
countries.95 The need to enable developing countries to defend their legal
rights on a similar footing as other countries, e.g. by legal assistance, has
been addressed in Art 27 of the DSU, as well as by the Advisory Center on
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WTO, founded in July 2001. 96 Separately, the parties‘ rights to
confidentiality are protected by Art 14.1 on panel discussions. Also, panel
discussions and documents submitted to it are to be confidential. However,
a member has the right to request a party to produce a non-confidential
summary of panel submissions to the public.97

This discussion has focused on the role of the AB and panel process in the
DSU, where the rules and procedures require active participation in
consultations by the parties. Due to this, the scope for serious noncooperation is reduced.

3.3 The rules and procedures within the ICJ

In order to be credible the ICJ needs to be sure of its jurisdiction, 98 as well
as that the claim is reasonable in terms of laws and facts. 99 The mechanisms
for dispute settlement within the ICJ are governed by the ICJ Statute,100 and
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the Rules of the Court,101 of which the latter have evolved more recently,
partly to deal with shortcomings. At the highest level, according to Art 66 of
the UN Charter, if a dispute remains unresolved for 12 months, then other
procedures are to be followed. 102 Since the ICJ is an organ of the UN, it is
bound to follow these procedures. If the dispute involves Arts 53 or 64 (jus
cogens), then any party can submit a written application to the ICJ. This is
referred to as the voluntary jurisdiction of the Court (as opposed to its
compulsory jurisdiction). The alternative, non-ICJ, way forward would be
to agree to arbitration. In the ICJ, 15 judges are elected for 9 year terms.

State parties can begin a case by informing the ICJ Registrar. The Registrar
will then inform all relevant parties (Art 40, Statute). Formally, at the
United Nations, the UN Secretary General will inform the UN Members. 103
In particular, Art 38(1) lays out what law is to be referred to in deciding
cases. First, some reference to historic development is made here to set the
context for the preceding analysis. The Rules of the ICJ were instituted in
1946, but revised in 1972 and 1978.
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Intriguingly, Art 38(2) enables the Court to give a decision ex aequo at bono
at the parties‘ request (‗according to justice and right‘). Although it may
seem to give the ICJ wide powers of interpretation, this principle has in
practice enabled parties to influence proceedings by requiring the Court to
follow a specific directive. Thus, one theme within the ICJ seems to be to
prefer the parties to submit to it through participative choice. Additionally,
Arts 79 and 80 of the 1978 Rules were varied in December 2000. By 2001,
the ICJ had also adopted 9 Practice Directions, the intent of which was
essentially to restrict the parties to stated pleadings procedures, to accelerate
proceedings.104 Thus, practical pressures had come to the fore.

The first step in the proceedings is an application by the claimant state party
to the ICJ‘s Registrar. This includes a statement of the jurisdiction presumed
by the party, and is sent to all Court members and the respondent party. As
regards written pleadings, these are initially contained in the memorial,
where the claimant argues legal points and states facts. The facts are
accepted by the ICJ unless challenged by the respondent. 105 This serves to
prevent a one-sided statement of events.
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The respondent files a counter-memorial, stating merits and covering law
and facts. Next, the claimant replies, following which the respondent gives
a rejoinder to the reply. The next stage after written pleadings is oral
pleadings, and then the consideration and finally the judgment of the Court.
In the oral stage, the order of statements is a repeating sequence of claimant
followed by respondent. Witnesses are allowed, but in practice oral
evidence has been rare.

However in many cases, the respondent might question the Court‘s
jurisdiction, for example. Such an objection can be made up to the deadline
for the counter-memorial. In this instance, the ICJ holds a preliminary
hearing. If it finds that it does not have jurisdiction, the case ends.
Otherwise, the case proceeds. At the end of the hearing, the judges confer
privately. 106 One or two of the judges then draft the judgment. This is
modified, until all agreeing judges approve. According to Art 58, the
judgment is stated in open court. However, judges are permitted to give
dissenting judgments (Art 57). In fact, a majority decision of 8 to 7 judges
is permitted.
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Where there is a tie, the President‘s vote decides the outcome. Broadly, the
Statute and Rules together invest the ICJ with a range of powers affecting
rules and procedures for dispute settlement. In the proceedings, the parties
can be required to summon witnesses or experts. Any other evidence
regarding facts where the parties disagree can also be demanded.
Specifically, Art 30(2) of the ICJ Statute enables the appointment of
assessors to accompany court sittings, and is designed to make sure that
decisions incorporate current scientific knowledge, and to eliminate
technical deficiencies. Art 50 of the Statute allows the ICJ to commission a
special inquiry (expert opinion), e.g. as demonstrated in the Corfu Channel
case.107

From Art 41 of the ICJ Statute, the ICJ can state provisional interim
measures to protect the rights of one of the parties. This usually occurs on
the request of the party. Interestingly, Art 66 of the new Rules allows a
request for interim measures to be made at any time.
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Also, if new facts come to light, the ICJ can change its previous decision. In
this way, the ICJ may be sending a signal to parties to maintain their
confidence as the proceedings continue. As a recurrent theme, when
granting such measures, the Court should establish its jurisdiction. For
example, in the Nuclear Tests case, Judge Gros‘s dissenting opinion held
that Art 53 applies to interim measures, so that the ICJ must decide whether
it has jurisdiction first. 108 Art 74 of the Rules require that, when the Court
receives a request for provisional measures, it must set a date for a
hearing. 109

In one instance, in March 1999, the applicant requested the indication of
measures without a hearing, which was accepted by the Court based on Art
75 of the Rules. 110 In this case, one could argue that the Court was acting
somewhat outside the principle of audiatur et altera pars (the doctrine that
the other side should be heard also). Moreover, the ICJ can instigate broader
measures than those applied for, or even reject the application. This is done
via an order, which is binding. In the reasoning of Goldworthy, the purpose
of interim measures of protection is to enable the ICJ to function by
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enabling the proceedings to continue, and moreover to prevent a final
judgment from being frustrated due to any irreversible change in the parties‘
positions.111

Art 79 of the Rules concerns preliminary objections: e.g. in a case before an
international court, an objection that, if upheld, would make further
proceedings impossible or unnecessary. An example is an objection to a
court‘s jurisdiction. Presently, these need to be decided on before the Court
can consider the merits of the dispute. A preliminary objection can prevent
any discussion of merits, as may be warranted. This separation of the long
established procedure of having a joint objections and merits stage was first
brought about in 1972. One objection could be, for example, that the
contentious issues are outside the domain of international law, so the parties
perhaps should not waste the Court‘s time. Also, a third party may have the
right to intervene in a case.112 The ICJ must decide this on the party‘s
request, but acceptance does not therefore make this state party a party to
the dispute. If all parties agree, this may then become the case. The
character of the dispute settlement may then evolve differently, or one could
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argue, more correctly.

Usually, the full Court hears cases. Exceptionally, Arts 26 to 29 of the ICJ
Statute permit the use of a chamber with fewer judges for certain types of
cases, for efficiency, or for a specific case. Part of the 1972 revision to the
Rules was a desired increase in ad hoc chambers.113 Two types of cases
were newly catered for: firstly, special categories; and secondly, for
particular disputes. On the one hand, as few as 3 or 5 judges can now hear a
case. The ad hoc system enables any party to a difficult case to nominate
their own chosen judge, normally of their own country, if there is no judge
of that country on the bench.114 This has the effect of making the party feel
more involved in stating and arguing the direction of the case. Notably, ad
hoc judges have a fully participative status, on an equal footing with the
permanent members. A maximum of 17 judges can take part.

The first case to use ad hoc chambers was Gulf of Maine (1981).115
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The amended Rules require consultation with the parties on a chamber‘s
composition, but the decision lies with the ICJ in secret ballot. States can
appoint judges to a chamber; this has been a practical effect of the amended
procedure. To the credit of this innovation, judges of a wide range of
technical expertise have thus been employed. One interesting result of the
use of such chambers has been the successful settlement of disputes, which
had been less the case for decisions of the full ICJ.

3.4 The implementation and processes within the WTO

Significantly, there is a new appellate procedure that replaces part of the
council approval processes in a panel report. Now, a WTO member is given
an RPT in which to implement recommendations and rulings. 116 If the
parties cannot agree on implementation and processes within 45 days of
adoption of the panel report, the original complaining party can refer to
arbitration. 117 In practice, members of the AB act as arbitrators, in a
personal role. Also, it is no longer possible to block a dispute settlement
panel report.
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Now, a consensus is required to block a dispute, but not to approve one. The
panel process has less power, whereas the AB is supposed to achieve more
uniformity in its rulings. Moreover, the DSU covers the implementation
(including compensation) stage, in the case where the losing party does not
completely apply the requirements of the dispute recommendations. Here,
the parties negotiate compensation, whilst the full implementation will be
pending (Art 22.2). This is useful in that it keeps the process dynamic, as
opposed to grinding to a halt.

Also newly in the DSU, is the separation of procedures for complaints
concerning violation from those concerning non-violation. In the latter case,
a country is required to negotiate and compensate to offset benefits not
received. This serves to increase the fairness through participation in the
process. Art 19 of the DSU states that a panel or the AB will recommend
that a member brings a relevant measure in line with the DSU agreement.

It can be seen that the use of the AB, which examines and frequently
corrects the reasoning of a panel, serves to increase respect for the authority
in the DSU. Generally, there is now a presumption for a party to perform its
obligations. For example, Art 22 concerns compensation and the suspension
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of concessions, but clarifies that neither of these is to be preferred to full
implementation. Again, this reinforces the above observation that the
processes are dynamic. From AB reports, it appears that principles of
international law generally apply to the WTO (and Agreements).

3.4.1 The reasonable period of time (RPT)
One key part of the implementation required of a WTO member is the RPT
in which to comply with DSB rulings, if it cannot immediately for reasons
acceptable as valid. The RPT is characterized as follows:-118

Either
(i)

A period agreed by the Member, provided the DSB approves; or if
there is not DSB approval, then

(ii)

A period agreed by both parties, within 45 days of the adoption of
the panel report, or if there is no such agreement, then

(iii)

A period arrived at by arbitration, within 90 days of report
adoption.
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These three possibilities again make for a more fluid process than
otherwise. If (i) is not accepted by the member who prevailed, then that
member can prevent the consensus needed for DSB approval. A similar
condition applies to (ii). It can be seen that as one goes through these
options, the control of the process gradually shifts from the ‗winning‘
member, to the parties, and then away from the parties. This is good in that
the lesser the chance that the parties will agree, the greater the need for
DSU supervision. One advantage of option (ii) is that the parties can
organise the structure of the RPT between them. For example, this enabled
the parties in India – Quantitative Restrictions to agree implementation in
stages over one year. 119

In option (ii) Art 21.3.(c) above, the parties have 45 days to reach
agreement, before opting for arbitration. But if the 45 days are entirely
unsuccessful, that leaves only 45 days for the entire arbitration process. As a
short period, this is a weakness in the process. More generally, there have
been times when 90 days have expired, and only then have the parties
requested arbitration.
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Another weakness in the process appears therefore to be a lack of
enforcement of timeframes. One good aspect of Art 21.3 arbitrations is the
autonomy allowed to the parties to organise times and rules by agreement.

Option (iii) is now discussed. The DSU has stated that arbitration should
last no more than 90 days, but this may be criticized as too short, and
parties frequently agree to formally disregard it. As for the time permitted
for implementation for an arbitration report, the DSU states a guideline for
the arbitrator that this period should be usually within 15 months from the
report adoption date.120 This represents a weakness in that no procedural
guidelines are offered as to how to depart from the usual. As an example,
the Arbitrator stated in EC - Hormones that the correct interpretation of Art
21.3(c) is that the period should be the shortest period possible within the
legal system of the Member concerned. 121 A lack of clarity has meant that
arbitrators have not shown consistency in what is a RPT for adoption of the
report. Additionally, the party which is trying to demonstrate that particular
circumstances justify a shorter or longer time has the burden of proof under
Art 21.3(c). This refers to a party‘s duty to prove a disputed assertion or
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charge. Shifting the burden of proof means transference of the duty to prove
a fact from one party to the other; e.g. as the case progresses, when one side
has made a prima facie showing on a point of evidence, requiring the other
side to rebut it by contradictory evidence.

The Art 21.3(c) position seems logically correct. Related to this point, an
arbitrator can induce a party into quicker compliance by observing its speed
of implementation post-report, and taking this into account in the
calculation of RPT. Thus, this is a strength in that it can produce faster
compliance.

Certain key factors may determine the time permitted for implementation.
These have been stated by Art 21.3(c) arbitrators as: complexity; whether
legislation is needed, or will other administrative changes suffice; the
degree of domestic opposition; and how relevant are any issues affecting
members from developing countries (from Art 21.2). Complexity is related
to legislation, in that complicated issues may necessitate legislation.
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According to Van den Bossche, one of two key issues in the area of
implementation and enforcement is:(i)

Arbitration in the area of the RPT for implementation.

In the DSU, the arbitration period cannot exceed 90 days from adoption of
reports. In terms of procedure, an Art 21.3(c) arbitration award is not
adopted by the DSB. Instead, it is circulated to WTO members and posted
on the WTO website. 122

3.4.1.1 Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents case
In the Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents case,123 the arbitrator set a new
precedent, according to which the longer the proposed implementation
period, the greater the burden of proof on why that should be the case. 124 As
mentioned by Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis, the particular type
of attendant circumstances can play a role in what is acceptable as the
RPT.125
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One relevant issue is whether implementation should occur through
administrative or legislative change, with the former usually being faster.
For this case, the general area of WTO agreements is in patents. Here,
WTO members are required to have patent protection for all inventions, in
all technological fields.126 One objective of the TRIPS Agreement127 is to
prevent differing treatment of patent protection according to which industry
is affected, by focusing on international intellectual property obligations. 128
The duration of patent protection is to be at least 20 years from the
application filing date. 129 Within this, certain limited exceptions are
specifically relevant in this case.130 There are three compulsory
requirements to be met for Art 30. Firstly, the exception must be ‗limited‘;
secondly, it must not ‗unreasonably conflict with normal exploitation of the
patent; and thirdly, it should not ‗unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
expectations of the patent owner‘. In this case, the WTO panel found that
allowing stockpiling of pharmaceuticals in expectation of the expiry of the
patent term was not limited since it was a ‗substantial curtailment‘ of the
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patent holders‘ rights.

In terms of TRIPS, the panel (considering Art 27) required exceptions to
Canadian patent protection law in order to comply with Art 30 (permissible
exceptions from patent protection) and Art 27 (protection against
technological discrimination). Ultimately in this case, the matter proceeded
to an Art 21.3 (c) arbitration due to the definition of RPT. The European
Communities and Canada could not reach agreement, and the arbitrator
called upon was James Bacchus. As stated in his summary, Canada believed
that it would fulfill its TRIPS obligations by revoking the regulations (not
laws) that enabled the stockpiling exception. But ‗this will be a very
sensitive political matter in Canada‘, requiring a maximum of 11 months for
consultations and compliance with regulatory policy. Thus Canada proposed
a RPT of 11 months from the panel report adoption date for
implementation. The European Communities (EC), however, maintained
that to fully implement the DSB, Canada needed to repeal Section 55.2(2)
of its Patent Act (i.e. legislative, not regulatory change), which the Panel
found to be inconsistent with Art 28(1) of TRIPS. Further, the EC
considered that the repeal could be performed in a time period rather shorter
then the indicative maximum period of 15 months in Art 21.3(C), DSU.
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In terms of the means of implementation,131 the arbitrator found that Section
55.2(2) of Canada‘s Patent Act was not consistent with the requirements of
Art 28.1, TRIPS Agreement.132 Consequently, the Panel required Canada to
bring this section into conformity with Canada‘s TRIPS obligations. But
crucially, the arbitrator was properly concerned under Art 21.3(c) with the
timeframe, not the substance of the implementation which led to the
arbitration. Were the latter to be the case, Art 21.5 would apply. Thus, the
EC request to consider the nature of Canada‘s proposed implementation was
rejected. As for the RPT, this must be judged solely based on Canada‘s
proposal. Significantly, from Art 21.3, a RPT is available only if immediate
implementation is impractical, with the latter expectation being the norm.
Thus, additionally from Arts 3.3, 21.1 and 21.4 of the DSU, the RPT is the
shortest period possible within the Member‘s legal system. Finally, as
regards Canada‘s proposed timeframe of 11 months, Canada bore a greater
burden of proof in demonstrating why. Since the change proposed was a
regulatory one, and a simple one, Canada‘s timeframe was rejected as too
long. Thus, the award was that the RPT was 6 months from the Panel
131
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Report adoption date on April 7th 2000, i.e. to end on October 7th 2000.

As a general point, before any changes can be made to the DSU, a full
consensus is needed (WTO charter). As summarized by Jackson, the overall
process can be characterized in 5 steps:-

1. Bilateral consultations between the disputing parties only.
2. Conciliation process, helped by experts, most likely from the secretariat.
3. Panel processes and AB rulings. The panel process is formally separate
from the conciliation process.
4. A policy body examines the panel or AB reports, but approval is to be
almost automatic.
5. Sanctions, including compensatory measures. Jackson finds that
experience shows that this step is a non-essential one, but that the quality
of the panel reports as seen by international community members is
more significant.133

From van den Bossche‘s analysis, the second of two key areas in
implementation is:-
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(ii)

Monitoring by the DSB.

The DSB monitors the implementation of all the required recommendations
and rulings until it is complete. Any member can raise any implementation
issue in the DSB at any time.134 This gives the process a good degree of
accountability.

Beginning

6

months

after

establishing

the

RPT,

implementation then joins the agenda of each DSB meeting until each issue
is resolved. In this regard, it is not obvious why 6 months should first pass,
and it would have been better if this period were less, whilst the
implementation issues would still be fresher in the participants‘ minds. Not
less than 10 days before each such meeting, the Member must furnish to the
DSB a status report on implementation progress. This is a good aspect of
procedure, since the DSB can then approach the meeting pre-informed
about implementation issues that remain.

The third area is:(iii)

‗Sequencing‘.

Since the complainant and respondent may disagree on whether failure to
implement has occurred, Art 21.5 of the DSU enables the use of a
‗compliance panel‘, which must circulate its report within 90 days of the

134

Art 21.6, DSU.
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matter‘s referral to it. The ‗problem of sequencing‘ refers to an
inconsistency in the DSU, whereby there is a contradiction in the
timeframes for the Art 21.5 procedure and the timeframe for the
authorization for the suspension of concessions and other obligations from
the DSB. The practical method adopted here has been that the parties
usually agree that the procedure of WTO consistency of implementing
measures is ended before an Art 22.6 authorization for retaliation measures
is granted. Formally, since a March 2002 European Communities
communication, but broadly

since 1999, members have agreed that

completing the Art 21.5 DSU proceeding must occur before using Art 22
DSU. Art 22 contains a non-compliance procedure, and covers what
happens if the losing party has neither implemented the WTO ruling within
the RPT nor negotiated compensation within 20 days after the end of the
RPT. From Art 22.6, the DSB shall when requested, `grant authorization to
suspend concessions or other obligations within 30 days of the expiry of the
RPT‘, unless there is an alternative consensus, or the losing party refers the
requested suspension to arbitration. If arbitration proceeds, then the original
panel (if possible) is to decide whether the request is ‗equivalent to the level
of nullification or impairment‘135 and give its decision within 60 days after

135
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the end of the RPT.136 When the arbitrators give their decision, the DSB,
when requested, is asked to sanction a suspension of concessions
accordingly. 137

The fourth area concerns:(iv)

Disagreements on implementation.

Art 21.5 DSU enables that if there is a conflict about WTO law then the
issue should be resolved according to the dispute settlement procedures
established in Arts 4 to 20 of the DSU, but especially referring back to the
original panel. To avoid the AB overruling the panel as does happen, a
monitoring function by the AB would certainly expedite or facilitate a more
correct process, in that the latter would act as the panel‘s watchdog.
Alternatively, the DSB could appoint a separate team to oversee and
regularly report back on the deliberations of the panel.

Finally, there is:-

136
137
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(v) Arbitration and suspension of concessions, or other obligations.
As we have seen, if the respondent does not implement the DSB rulings
within the RPT as agreed by the parties or alternatively, as decided by an
arbitrator, the complainant can request that the respondent begins
negotiations to agree acceptable compensation. 138 Perhaps a better approach
in terms of monitoring would be to require that steps are taken within the
RPT, to avoid further delay after the request for negotiations. Perhaps the
RPT could be further subdivided into manageable subperiods. The next step
is that if compensation cannot be agreed within 20 days of the expiry of the
RPT, the complainant can request from the DSB the suspension of applied
concessions, under the WTO covered agreements. 139 Twenty days certainly
seems rather brief, given the much longer periods involved in the other
processes. This means that the complainant can ask for authorization to
retaliate very quickly, without the compensation negotiation running a
reasonable course.

138
139
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Compensation and retaliation are seen as temporary measures, i.e. less
preferred options to full implementation. In practice, this method has
however served to accelerate implementation of requirements by members.
The DSB has 30 days from the expiry of the RPT to decide on this. If the
respondent disagrees with the punitive suspensions proposed, or wishes to
dispute whether procedures have been correctly followed, the matter can
then proceed to arbitration before the DSB decides.140 One could argue that
a more activist approach by the DSB would be more suitable, to save time,
costs, and the discussion of potentially less pertinent issues.

Consider the hypothetical scenario that the original panel conducts the
arbitration, or that the Director General appoints an arbitrator. Since in
practice the AB has frequently overruled the line of argument taken by the
panel, perhaps the former should carry it out. Of course, this raises resource
allocation issues. The arbitration itself must conclude by 60 days after the
end of the RPT. Perhaps 90 days would be more reasonable. One specific
issue concerns appeals. In the AB Report in relation to European
Communities – Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton-Type Bed Linen

140
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from India – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by India,141 it was held
that, when there is an unappealed finding in a panel report that is then
adopted by the DSB, that then must be taken as a final solution to the
dispute in that claim, and the particular component of a measure that is the
subject of the claim. 142

3.4.2 Working procedures of the Appellate Body
The AB now has two methods of resolving issues via new working
procedures. These are:-

(i)

If it faces a new type of problem in a certain case, it can tackle it
case-by-case by means of Rule 16(1) of its Working Procedures.

(ii)

If the problem is of a familiar type, Art 17.9 DSU allows it to
effectively change its Working Procedure.

As of 2006, relatively few changes had occurred to AB Review. 143
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In terms of changes to AB Working Procedures, Art 17.9 DSU refers:‗working procedures shall be drawn up by the AB in consultation with the
chairman of the DSB and the Director-General, and communicated to the
Members for their information.‘

Specifically, one important area is litigation, particularly matters concerning
notices of appeal. Since these did not previously clarify what was in appeal,
the AB amended rule 20(2)(d) of the Working Procedures to assist with the
required format. Another important area concerns third party rights. Third
party rights in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism are limited,
particularly at panel stage.144 In particular, Art 10.2 DSU allows a third
party the right to be heard by the panel, and make written submissions to it.

Over time, various panels have granted additional rights to third parties.
This is not good from a compliance or monitoring viewpoint, since such
rights would be better overseen or at least sanctioned by a higher body, e.g.
the AB. For example, in the EC-Sugar (2004) case,145 the panel decided on
16th January 2004 to allow all third parties to attend with observer status for
144
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the whole first meeting, to make a written submission to the panel, and to
view the submissions of the parties and other third parties at the meeting, as
well as to orally state their views at a special session of the meeting. In
general, one must conclude that a third party cannot predict what detailed
rights it may be awarded in a case. There could additionally be a credibility
problem for the panel in this regard, since the AB may find the particular
third party rights inconsistent.

3.4.3 Summary of WTO implementation and processes
In the DSU of the WTO, the AB oversees the dispute settlement process,
reviewing panel rulings and overruling or changing rationale where it finds
necessary. A key characteristic of the process is its fairly dynamic and
participative nature, preferring a partial resolution to no implementation
whatsoever.

To focus on one aspect of the process, namely timing, the RPT represents
the cornerstone. If there is an increasing degree of regulation as the period
increases because of a lack of agreement on the implementation timeframe,
the process can remain dynamic. Not enough time, however, is given to the
arbitration option, and leaving it as a last resort does decrease efficiency
due to a lack of monitoring. If a dispute goes to arbitration, under Art
89

21.3.(c), the burden of proof is with the party requesting a different RPT, so
quicker compliance can be achieved in this way.

As seen in the Canada-Pharmaceutical Patents case,146 the circumstances
of the case can play a role in what is acceptable as the RPT, including
whether implementation implies simpler administrative or more lengthy
legislative changes. Another issue arising in relation to timing is that of
sequencing, where an inconsistency in the rules has been resolved
practically by the parties, who agree that the implementing of measures is
done before an Art 22.6 authorization for retaliation measures is sought
where required. One other aspect is monitoring. Implementation issues are
only discussed, beginning 6 months after establishing the RPT. Had this
period been less, efficiency would have been better.
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3.5 The implementation and processes within the ICJ

The exact role of the court has varied depending on the details of the case.
For example, in the Icelandic Fisheries Jurisdiction cases,147 the Court
found that British and German vessels could fish in areas that Iceland
claimed. Thus, the parties were to undertake negotiations in good faith so
resolve their dispute concerning fishery rights in the areas. The ICJ also
stated the factors which the parties were to take into account in their
negotiations.

There is no stated timeframe in which to refer a dispute to the ICJ. A case
can be commenced either by a single party‘s application, or by the parties
using a special agreement.148 Such notification can be made by one, more,
or all of them. The Court has in practice noted facts that have been made
public, mainly through the media, as long as care was employed and the
reports were multisourced. 149 One course of action open to the Court is to
require the observance of an existing agreement 150, or for the parties to

147

Fisheries Jurisdiction (Uk v Ice., FRG v Ice), Merits, 25/07/74, General list no.56, ICJ Report 3.
Art 40(1), Statute of the International Court of Justice (1945),
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0
149
Nicaragua v United States (Merits), 27/06/1986, ICJ Report 14.
150
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial
Guinea intervening), (Provisional Measures), 15/03/1996.
148

91

comply with a given dispute settlement process.151

The ICJ has on a number of occasions confirmed that its judgment will be
limited to upholding such submissions by the parties as can be supported by
sufficient proof from pertinent facts. The burden of proof lies with the party
wanting to assert some fact(s). In relation to evidence, the court‘s basis is
that the decisions will take into account all facts or events up to the close of
the oral proceedings, on the merits of the case. Broadly, the application of
implementation can include an order to negotiate. Also, the parties can
jointly modify the ICJ‘s decision.

Once written proceedings have been commenced, the President summons
the parties‘ agents to find out the parties‘ views on procedural issues.152
There are 2 rounds when the case application was unilateral; or 3 if joint.
According to Judge Higgins, the usual period requested by parties between
each round is between six and ten months.153
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In general, if a state party does not have a judge on the bench, it can
designate an ad hoc judge for the case.154 Such judges rank on a par with
permanent judges.155 A party that intends to appoint an ad hoc judge must
inform the court as soon as possible, furnishing nomination details by 2
months before the counter-memorial submission date.156 The right to file
written issues usually ends when the last written pleading has been filed.157
Therefore, all documents should be annexed and submitted by then. Several
weeks then elapse. One of the changes applied after the report of the Rules
Committee (1997), was the introduction by the ICJ of the practical idea that
if the parties would reduce the amount contained in annexes, the court
would be more understanding about allowing the late introduction of some
documents.

The oral phase can be at an interlocutory stage (in the event of an initial
objection to ICJ jurisdiction, or a third state‘s request to intervene, or an
application for interim measures). As a second possibility, it can be at the
merits stage, where the case is heard.
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Unusually, it could be after the judgment, where a party requests an
interpretation or revision. Overall, there are 2 phases in the oral pleadings:
the first-round exchange, then the second round (reply) stage. An interval
between phases is required to enable the reply to be prepared; which is in
turn normally shorter than the first round. The Rules Committee was asked
to investigate how to increase the efficiency of the ICJ. The Court‘s
decisions based on the report were announced by President Schwebel to the
UN General Assembly in October 1997. One proposal adopted was to
permit phases of different (consecutive) cases in appropriate preliminary
and admissibility cases. Thus, when the oral phase of one case ends, the
next case enters its oral phase.

Additionally, the court may hear a case in plenary, with a quorum of 9
judges, or in chambers.158 The purpose of the chamber was to accelerate
decisions where difficult international law issues did not arise. The ICJ
Statute thus enables both permanent and ad hoc chambers, which deal with
specific cases. Parties can request the ICJ to form an ad hoc court at any
time before the written stage of proceedings.159 Although the procedure for
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chambers is similar to that of the full court, Art 92 of the ICJ Rules contains
specific procedures for written and oral chamber pleadings. Once the court
has found out the parties‘ views on how to compose the chamber, it will
then elect an ad hoc one.160 Judge Shahabudeen formally criticized Rule 17,
paragraph 2.161 His view was that if the parties are permitted a significant
input into the choice of chamber members, the Court Statute (which should
prevail over the Rules in the event of a conflict) is violated, and runs
counter to the ICJ as a court of justice. Separately, as pointed out by Sands,
Mackenzie, and Shany, unlike in the WTO, there is no AB.162

A general area to consider is that of remedies. This particular competence of
the court derives from Art 36 of the Statute, whereby there exists ‗the
jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning…the nature and
extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international
obligation‘, in compulsory jurisdiction cases (paragraph 2). 163 But in other
areas, for example declaratory judgments, specific performance and
160
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injunctive relief, Art 36 states no guidance. A declaratory judgment, for
example, is a binding adjudication that establishes the rights and other legal
relations of the parties without ordering enforcement. Therefore, the ICJ has
used general principles of procedural law. For example, the court has on
occasion made a declaration that some specific implementation acts are
required. Conversely, a declaratory judgment can have the effect of being
preventive of future further wrongdoing. In this regard, the court has
decided that where jurisdiction exists in a dispute on a specific issue, there
is no need for a separate jurisdictional basis when addressing remedies.164

Provisional measures are a specific form of remedy. Such a request can be
made at any time during proceedings, in writing, and stating what measures
are requested, as well as the likely consequences of not granting them.165
The court can itself also decide whether or not provisional measures are
appropriate.166 Any such request receives priority, and precedence over all
other cases.167
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Provisional measures can be granted, without the court finally deciding
whether it has jurisdiction, but there needs to be a basis on which
jurisdiction might exist. The point is to safeguard some rights which might
exist, but would not be required after the case has been decided. Measures
can also be granted where doing so, if circumstances merit, would prevent
the dispute from worsening. The parties can initiate oral proceedings, and
submit their observations to the court. The actual measures decided can
differ from the requested ones, and any decision is open to subsequent
review, if a change can be observed.168 The court may choose to require
information on the implementation of the measures.169

3.5.1 LaGrand and Avena cases
From Art 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR
1963), consular information, i.e. including the right to contact one‘s
consulate, is an individual right of foreign nationals that exists when they
are arrested or confined whilst abroad.170
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According to Hoppe,171 In LaGrand and Avena, the ICJ ordered review and
reconsideration where Art 36 rights had been infringed and the legal process
had run its course. 172 In the legal history of the ICJ, the LaGrand case173
represents the first time that measures were explicitly stated as binding by
the court, and that the United States had not complied, but it remained
unclear as to whether the binding authority was the UN Charter Art 94(1),
or the ICJ Statute, Art 41. The ICJ issued a substantial judgment in June
2001.174 The Court found that the VCCR 1963 gives rights to individuals,175
i.e. not only to a country. Additionally, the US violated the VCCR 1963 by
not considering it. The ICJ analyzed the US‘s actions at Supreme Court,
Federal (including the State Department), and state levels (Governor of
Arizona).

As discussed by Addo,176 a distrust in expected conformity might have been
partly why the order for provisional measures took no input from parties.
Also, this may explain why state discretion in implementation methods may
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be restricted in future, for example where issues such as in LaGrand, the
right to life in international human rights law, even at the preliminary stage,
is at stake.

The LaGrand case concerns the execution of two German brothers in the
US state of Arizona. The case was filed just a few hours before Walter
LaGrand was due to be executed. From the facts of the case, in 1982,
Arizona State Police arrested Karl and Walter LaGrand, after their
attempted armed bank robbery in which they killed an employee and
seriously wounded one other. The US authorities had not informed consular
authorities about the arrests or imprisonment. In fact, German official
knowledge of these issues did not occur until 1992. Germany made attempts
to save their lives, but Arizona executed Karl LaGrand on February 24 th
1999. Then, on March 2nd 1999, the ICJ issued a ruling proprio motu (of its
own accord)177 as a response to a request for provisional measures, for the
very first time, whereby the ‗US should take all measures at its disposal to
ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision of the
ICJ.‘ The ICJ stated urgency as the reason for this action. The USA was, at
that time, party to the Vienna Convention‘s Optional Protocol Concerning
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the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.178 Art 1 of this states:‗disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention
shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ and may accordingly
be brought before the court by an application made by any party to the
dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.‘

Nevertheless, Walter was executed on March 3 rd, but Germany remained
committed to the case. The ICJ‘s judgment of June 27th 2001 stated that the
USA had breached its obligations to Germany and the LaGrand brothers
under the Vienna Convention, since it had not informed the brothers of their
rights, and since their convictions and sentences had not been allowed
review and reconsideration. On the part of the US, developments in this and
other cases led it to formally denounce the Optional Protocol on March 7th
2005. The view of the US Supreme Court was that the ICJ, in its Art 36
findings, overlooked aspects of procedural rules in an adversarial court
system, which in turn led to the Supreme Court‘s rejection of the ICJ‘s
viewpoint on the VCCR 1963.
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For the future, unless there is a change in how parties perceive provisional
measures, they will have limited effectiveness.

From Art 80, Rules of Court, a counter-claim can be considered by the
Court, only if it falls within the court‘s jurisdiction, and ‗is directly
connected with the subject-matter of the other party‘s claim.‘179
Furthermore, there is the matter of amicus curiae briefs. In a contentious
proceeding, any intergovernmental organisation can unilaterally file a
Memorial with the ICJ Registry, in connection with any case presently
before the court.

The ICJ‘s judgment is read as a public statement and becomes binding on
the day of reading.180 Since the 1976 Resolution on Practice, the following
staged procedure has been instituted for elaborating a judgment:-

(1)

A meeting before oral arguments, to exchange views on written
pleadings and decide which points require explanations (Art 1).

(2)

After the close of oral arguments, there is to be a period to enable the
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judges to study the oral arguments (Art 2).
(3)

A meeting to discuss the case (Art 3).

(4)

An additional period for each judge to prepare a written note (Art 4).

(5)

The court meets in The Hague, several weeks or months later, to
discuss the judgment. Each judge gives his/her opinions, in ascending
seniority order.

(6)

Formation of Drafting Committee, consisting of usually the President
and 2 elected members, chosen from those who represent the
‗majority opinion‘ (Art 6). They use a very detailed Note, contributed
to by every court member.

(7)

A 3-stage process to ready the text of the Court‘s decision (Art 7).

(8)

The Court moves to a vote on the draft; each judge can demand a
separate vote on each point (Art 8).

Where there is a motion for interpretation or revision,181 the decision takes
the form of a judgment.182 ICJ judgments are final and binding on the
parties, and not able to be appealed.183
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Let us conclude this section. The implementation means at the disposal of
the ICJ potentially allow quite a lot of flexibility in the processes available
to affect outcomes in cases. This could be by encouraging negotiations,
making an opinionated statement, or requiring compliance with a previous
order. There are written rounds followed by oral phases. In specific cases,
the parties can designate ad hoc judges. Parties may apply to the Court for a
range of remedies, of which provisional measures are one type. This
particular remedy led to a restatement of the Court‘s power due to the
impact of the VCCR 1963, especially in cases such as LaGrand.184 Here, the
issue of individual rights came to the fore. Finally, the ICJ‘s judgment is
binding on parties.

3.6 Conclusion to chapter

As regards rules and procedures, first we consider the WTO. The DSB
governs panel formation, and the acceptance of panel and AB reports.
Appellate Review is a significant innovation in the WTO‘s DSU. It is in the
remit of the DSB to implement AB rulings, and to impose sanctions on noncompliant parties.
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LaGrand (F.R.G. v. United States), 27/06/01, ICJ Report 466.
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The AB must investigate panel decisions, and is empowered to overturn the
legal reasonings used or conclusions reached. In the DSB (DSU panels and
the AB), interpretational priority must be given to WTO covered
agreements, not international law per se. A panel ruling becomes DSU law
when the DSB adopts it.

In the ICJ, the ICJ Statute and Rules of the Court govern dispute settlement
rules and procedures. The basis case structure is written memorials
followed by oral pleadings; consideration; then court judgment. The ICJ can
be required to consider whether it has jurisdiction in the case. The final text
of the judgment must be approved by all agreeing judges; a judge can
express and officially document the reason for dissent; majority decisions
are allowed. Provisional measures can be stated by the ICJ, from Art 41
Court Statute. Since the 1972 revision to the Court Rules, the number of
cases heard by ad hoc chambers has increased, and assists an affected party
by allowing their choice of judge to participate. Moreover, parties to the
case can appoint judges, thereby expediting cases where greater technical
expertise was required.

Moving to implementation and processes, a significant innovation in the
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WTO is the RPT in which to implement recommendations and rulings. A
sole dissenting member cannot anymore unilaterally block a panel report.
The AB is more empowered to curb panel misinterpretations. Although Art
22 covers compensation and suspension of concessions, the clear preference
is implementation to trade distortion. Arbitration is available to resolve RPT
disputes, and any member can raise an implementation query in the DSB.

In the ICJ implementation and processes, a big difference is no stated
timeframes for the processes. The burden of proof in a dispute is initially
with the party that wants to assert a fact. Implementation by the ICJ can
include an order to the parties to negotiate in the dispute. Joint variation of
the Court‘s decision is also available. Since 1997, the ICJ has attempted to
improve efficiency of the proceedings by co-operation with the parties.
Permanent and ad hoc chambers are now available in cases where complex
international law is not at stake. A request for provisional measure can be
made at any time during the proceedings, and is then given priority, due to
what might be at stake in the present or immediate future.
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CHAPTER 4: A COMPARISON BETWEEN AND
ANALYSIS OF THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
PROCEDURES IN THE WTO AND THE ICJ

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, different aspects of dispute settlement are considered under
three headings, namely first jurisdiction and scope; secondly judicial
aspects and burden of proof; and thirdly compliance and enforcement. In
each area, the WTO processes are described and analysed first, followed by
the analogous processes in the ICJ. In each area, an attempt is made to
relate the international trade theory or international law theory with the
empirical evidence. Wherever appropriate, actual cases are mentioned to
illustrate or contradict points made. Also, wherever appropriate, references
are made to treaty law, and attention is drawn to any changing trend in
cases. Economic and political aspects are also considered.

4.2 WTO and ICJ: jurisdiction and scope
4.2.1 WTO
In one of its contexts, jurisdiction refers to a court‘s power to decide matters
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resented to it and to enforce its decisions.185 The WTO has broad
jurisdictional scope. It is also compulsory and exclusive. In the simplest
terms, the DSU has jurisdiction over any disputes between WTO members,
that may arise under the covered agreements (Art 1.1 DSU).

The covered agreements appear in Appendix 1 of the DSU, and include the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation (WTO Agreement),
GATT 1994, and 13 other multilateral agreements dealing with trade in
goods, the GATS (trade in services), the TRIPS Agreement (intellectual
property) and the DSU (dispute settlement). The only multilateral trade
agreement that is not a covered agreement is the Trade Policy Review
Mechanism, which is Annex 3 to the WTO Agreement. Measures initiated
by a member‘s regional or local government are within the DSU‘s
jurisdiction. Any claim that does not refer to a covered agreement is outside
a panel‘s terms of reference. In the event that two parts of the same measure
are covered by more than one WTO Agreement, the panel can decide which
applies.186 According to Art 1.2 DSU, there are certain special rules and
procedures which override the DSU where there is a difference between the
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Garner, B.A., editor-in-chief, Black’s Law Dictionary, St. Paul, Thomson West, 8th edn, 2004,
p.868.
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EC – Measures affecting asbestos and asbestos-containing products, 12/03/01, WT/DS135/AB/R, AB2000-11.
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two. According to the AB, the particular, additional rules and procedures of
a covered agreement complement the generally applicable rules and
procedures of the DSU.187

The WTO jurisdiction is compulsory in that a member is obliged to accept it
by law. Thus, membership of the WTO alone makes acceptance of
jurisdiction compulsory. Despite this, a panel‘s jurisdiction depends upon
the subject of the dispute, ratione materiae, and the parties to the dispute,
ratione personae. There is no need for a separate agreement enabling it. The
jurisdiction is also exclusive to the DSU; there is no other dispute settlement
process.188 In general, both panels and the AB have jurisdiction. Generally,
a panel is responsible for determining its jurisdiction, and ‗the scope of its
terms of reference is an essential part of this determination.‘189 The AB has
the power to consider a claim that a panel exceeded its terms of reference,
even where the claim was not made in the Notice of Appeal.190
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Guatemala – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico, 24/10/00,
WT/DS156/R.
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Palmeter D. and Mavroidis P.C., Dispute settlement in the World Trade Organisation, Cambridge,
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United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by Malaysia, 22/10/01,AB-2001-4, WT/DS58/AB/RW.
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United States – Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of 2000,27/01/03, WT/DS217/AB/R,
WT/DS234/AB/R.
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According to Oesch, WTO panels have jurisdiction to review a member‘s
domestic law.191 Usually, the jurisdiction is to be abstract, i.e. without
referring to application in a specific measure. The main matter for
discussion is what specific jurisdiction exists. The chief provision in the
WTO Agreements that requires members‘ domestic laws and their
administration to conform with WTO obligations is Art XVI:4, whereby
‗each member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreements.‘ This is to be contrasted with the panel jurisdiction in Art 22.7
arbitration. This provision should be interpreted in the context of Art 27 of
the VCLT 1969, according to which a party cannot invoke internal law
provisions for failure to perform a treaty. Legislation, not its specific
application as such, needs to be changed to conform with WTO law. As a
result, a WTO member may request the constitution of a panel to review
another member‘s domestic laws. From Art XVI:4, WTO adjudication can
be applied as jurisdiction to review domestic law and its practice, to
ascertain WTO conformity. Specifically, the AB confirmed that panels may
hear claims directed against domestic legislation as such under Art XXIII of
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Oesch, M., Standards of Review of WTO Dispute Resolution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003,
Ch 2, p.188.
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GATT 1994 and the DSU.

Art 1.1 DSU constrains DSU scope to ‗disputes brought pursuant to the
consultation and dispute settlement provisions of the agreements listed in
Appendix 1‘ of the DSU, and disputes regarding rights and obligations
under the WTO Agreement or the DSU. There are two types of complaint
that members may bring. Firstly, violation complaints, which allege another
member‘s failure to fulfill obligations under a covered agreement. Secondly,
non-violation complaints, according to which it is alleged that a member
has applied a measure that is not necessarily in conflict with a WTO
provision, but does impair or nullify some benefit that arises directly or
indirectly under a covered agreement, or that curtails the achievement of an
objective of a covered agreement.192 Generally, jurisdiction can arise for
two reasons. The first is due to agreement provisions that specifically
require action. For example, in the TRIPS Agreement, Art 25.1 requires
members to take steps to protect new or originally created industrial
designs. Thus, if a member either does nothing or passes laws that are
inadequate, that is contrary to WTO provisions.
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Art XXIII:1(b), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1994),
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm; Art XXIII:3, General Agreement on Trade in
Services (1995), http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/26-gats_01_e.htm; DSU, Art 26.1.
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Art 6 explains the creation of dispute settlement panels, whilst Art 7 gives
the terms of reference for the panels. WTO panel formation is a near
certainty, since Arts 6.1, 16.4 and 17.14 state that a panel shall be formed
and a report adopted unless the DSB decides, by consensus, not to. When a
complainant refers a matter to the DSB, this becomes the subject of a
panel‘s terms of reference. A ‗matter‘ has 2 parts, namely:(i)

the governmental measure at issue, e.g. a law or regulation, and

(ii)

the legal basis in a covered agreement of the complainant‘s claim.

The terms of reference establish the panel‘s jurisdiction by accurately
defining what claims are at issue in the present dispute. From Art 7, panels
are to:-

‗...examine, in light of the relevant provisions in (name of covered
agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter referred to the
DSB by (name of party) in document…and to make such findings as will
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assist the DSB in making recommendations or in giving rulings provided
for in that/those agreements(s).‘

Art 6.2 of the DSU requires the complaining member to identify, in its
request for the establishment of a panel, the specific measures at issue. The
AB has clarified that a measure can be any act of a Member, whether or not
it is legally binding, including a government‘s non-binding administrative
guidance.193 Art 13.1 requires a member to respond ‗promptly and fully‘ to
any information request. However, the AB has emphasized more strictly
that members, including those party to the dispute, have a full legal
obligation to provide information requested.194 As an exception, according
to the specific principle of due process, the AB would have ‗subject-matter
jurisdiction‘ to consider a new claim that arose during or after
proceedings.195 This occurs where the panel exercised judicial economy or
did not fully address the claims.
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DSU, Art 26.1, footnote 47.
Canada - Measures affecting the export of Civilian Aircraft (Canada – Aircraft), 20/08/99,
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Panel or AB report adoption is a virtual certainty in the DSB, since
respectively, Arts 16.2 and 17.14 require that these will be adopted, unless
the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the report. Art 17.6 restricts the
AB‘s jurisdiction to legal issues in a panel report, as opposed to the panel‘s
factual findings, and interpretations by a panel.196 The AB can decline to
consider a claim (or argument) that a member could have made at the panel
stage, on the basis that it would fall outside the scope of Art 17.6.197 Art
17.13 empowers the AB to uphold, amend or reverse the legal findings and
conclusions of panels. However, a panel‘s assessment of evidence relates to
facts as opposed to law, and is therefore outside the scope of appellate
review.198

In terms of the scope or limitations of WTO jurisdiction, there is a
significant difference between a state‘s legislation that mandatorily
challenges WTO law, and that which might do so in a given situation. The
latter is not necessarily within jurisdictional scope, whereas the former is.
This idea dates back to GATT 1947, and has been reinforced by the AB.199
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More specifically, Art XVI:4 of the WTO Agreement requires that ‗each
Member shall ensure the conformity of its laws, regulations and
administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the annexed
Agreements.‘ There is, overall, very little scope for members to challenge
the DSU.

In practice, Art 11 DSU has been invoked as to the bounds of panel
jurisdiction. There is an important law/facts distinction to be made in this
regard. According to Oesch, there is no jurisdiction in international law to
define or interpret domestic laws ‗as such.‘200 To clarify, the international
legal principle jura novit curia has no domestic application. This principle
means that a matter is for consideration by the Court, rather than by the
parties. Therefore, this particular panel jurisdiction is based on facts, not
law. DSU Art 21.5 addresses timeframes, which can be considered in the
context of limitations. Where there is a dispute regarding existence or
consistency with a covered agreement of measures that were taken to
comply with recommendations and legal rulings, such a dispute is decided
as part of the DSU, with recourse to the original panel wherever possible.
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Oesch, M., Standards of Review of WTO Dispute Resolution, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003,
Ch 10, p.201.
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The panel will in turn circulate its report within 90 days of referral to it.

In Turkey – Textiles, the panel was faced with determining whether some
challenged measures should be viewed as on the part of Turkey, or seen as
part of the customs

union between Turkey and the European

Communities.201 This was approached by using customary international law
rules as applied to state responsibility. The factual background is as follows.
Turkey was an exporting member under an old Multifibre Agreement
(MFA), and was subject to quota restraints in the main industrialized
importing markets. It had no restraint of its own, and decided to impose
quota restrictions against exports from developing countries commencing
January 1st 1995, on the reasoning that it was compelled to do so because of
its customs union agreement with the EU. India challenged, a panel held in
India‘s favour, and Turkey appealed. The panel proceeded on the legal basis
that it was empowered to decide whether a customs union complied with
Art XXIV.
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Turkey–Restrictions on imports of textile and clothing products, 23/10/99, WT/DS34/AB/R, AB-1999-

5.
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Regarding its own jurisdiction, the panel said that it could be argued that
compliance of a customs union with Art XXIV falls within the AB‘s
purview, but that the panel could adjudicate ‗..any matters arising from the
application of these provisions relating to customs unions, free-trade areas
or interim agreements leading to the formation of a customs union of free
trade areas.‘

The AB held as follows. Art XXIV may justify a measure that is
inconsistent with certain other GATT provisions. However, in a case
concerning a customs union, this defence is only available when two
conditions are met. First, the party obtaining the benefit must show that the
measure is commenced upon formation of a union that fully meets the
requirements of sub-paragraph 8(a) and 5(a) of Art XXIV. Secondly, the
party must show that the formation of the union would be frustrated if it
were not permitted to introduce the measure. The AB criticized the panel
for not addressing whether the regional arrangement between Turkey and
the EC was actually a customs union according to requirements laid out in
paragraphs 8(a) and 5(a) of Art XXIV. The AB ruled as follows. A system of
certificates of origin would have provided an alternative until the
quantitative restrictions applied by the EC are required to be terminated.
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Thus, Turkey was not required to apply the quantitative restrictions to form
a customs union with the EC. Therefore, Turkey did not fulfill the second of
the two necessary conditions that must be fulfilled to be entitled to the
benefit of defence under Art XXIV.

The next type of dispute to consider is arbitration. From Art 21.3.(c), the
arbitrator‘s subject-matter jurisdiction is restricted to defining a reasonable
period of time for compliance. Art 22.7 describes the scope of arbitrational
jurisdiction. In the event that the member objects to the level of suspension
put forward, or objects that certain paragraph 3 principles and procedures
have not been correctly followed where a complainant has requested
authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations from paragraph
3(b) or (c), the matter proceeds to arbitration. The original panel will carry
out this process, if the members are available, or by an arbitrator appointed
by the Director General. It is to be finished within 60 days of the expiry of
the RPT (scope).
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One key limitation is that the arbitrator cannot examine the nature of the
concessions or other obligations to be suspended.202 Thus, concessions or
any other obligations cannot be suspended during the process.203 The
arbitrator can decide whether the principles and procedures that are
applicable to suspension have been complied with. From Art 22.6,
arbitrators do not have jurisdiction to decide on whether suspending WTO
obligations violates intellectual property rights treaties. That is determined
by the parties to the treaties.204 An arbitration body constituted under Art
25.2 DSU asserted that it could decide issues about its jurisdiction on its
own.205 This was based on the premise that jurisdiction was contained in the
Art 25.2 joint arbitration request.

4.2.2 ICJ
Although the ICJ derives its status from the UN Charter, that same Charter
does not give it jurisdictional superiority over any other international
tribunal.
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From Art 95:‗Nothing in the present Charter shall prevent Members of the United
Nations from entrusting the solution of their differences to other tribunals
by virtue of agreements already in existence or which may be concluded in
the future.‘

Where the ICJ perceives several titles of jurisdiction, if these can all coexist, the process of consideration of actual jurisdiction will be in the order:
particular first, becoming more general; from narrow to wide. Once the
reason is established, further consideration is not needed. Parties to the ICJ
Statute accept the whole jurisdiction established by the UN Charter and
Court Statute. This includes aspects of the ICJ‘s jurisdiction:

- To settle disputes about its jurisdiction (Art 36(6));
- To indicate provisional measures of protection (Art 41);
- Under Art 53 if a party omits to appear or defend itself;
- In intervention matters under Arts 62 and 63;
- About requests for interpretation and revision of a judgment under Arts 60
and 61, Statute.
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Jurisdiction means the power of the Court to do justice between the state
parties, including deciding the case with final and binding force. The ways
to enable the Court‘s jurisdiction are mainly described in Art 36 of the
Court Statute.206 The ICJ has jurisdiction under Art 36(1) of the Court
Statute to consider all cases referred to it by parties (rationae personae),
and concerning all matters (rationae materiae, also referred to as subject
matter jurisdiction) mentioned in the UN Charter, or in treaties or
conventions in force.

The analysis here will be limited to the ICJ‘s

contentious jurisdiction delineated in its Statute; advisory jurisdiction is not
considered.

In general, as assessed by Rosenne, the ICJ has jurisdiction when two (or
more) states are parties to its Statute or have accepted its jurisdiction, and
are or may be inferred to be under an obligation to each other, by which the
case is to be decided.207 Fundamentally, the ICJ‘s jurisdiction is based on
the consent of the parties. At one end of a range of ways, this can even be
inferred by the parties‘ conduct. The consent may be expressed in a number
of different ways. One is by using suitable provisions in an international
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Collier, J. and Lowe, V., The Settlement of Disputes in International law, Oxford, Oxford University
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treaty or convention (Art 36(1) and Art 37), e.g. where the treaty contains a
‗compromissory clause‘ allowing for it.208 For example, in 2004, the ICJ
decided on Mexicans on death row in the USA since both parties were
parties to the protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes
attached to the VCCR 1963.209 Another way is via special agreement (Art
36(1)). A third way, forum prorogatum refers to the establishment of a
state‘s consent to jurisdiction via acts subsequent to initiating proceedings
(also from Art 36(1)).

Forum prorogatum refers to the voluntary choice of the parties. This
represents a variation whereby unilateral proceedings could have been
initiated. For example, in 2003 France retrospectively agreed to proceedings
initiated by the Republic of Congo some months before. This also obviates
the special agreement. The fourth way is jurisdiction to decide a case ex
aequo et bono (Statute, Art 38(2)). The fifth way is the optional clause
(misleadingly also called compulsory jurisdiction).
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To facilitate the above, there are four main types of agreement to enable
referral to the ICJ. These are:-

(1) the special agreement (compromis);
This refers to a single case; a single instance. It originates in international
arbitration, discussed elsewhere. Jurisdiction is established, and the Court is
seised of the case, by the original notification of the agreement to it. The
ICJ employs normal rules of interpreting treaties, especially with reference
to the VCLT 1969, without delving into whether the parties to the dispute
are parties to the VCLT 1969.210

(2) a compromissory clause in a treaty or in an ancillary document to a
treaty;
This may also originate in arbitration. Instances include ‗matters specially
provided for,‘ categorising future cases, e.g. a dispute based on the
interpretation or application of the bilateral or multilateral treaty containing
the clause.
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Clauses usually permit unilateral referral to the Court. The clause governs
both the jurisdiction and the seisin. The ancillary instrument can be an
optional protocol, open only to parties to the treaty.211 If the unilateral
initiation of proceedings by the party applying is accepted, the clause
establishes a type of compulsory jurisdiction, based on Art 36(1). In the
case of a multilateral treaty, other parties can intervene, under Statute, Art
63. Art 36(1) and (2) jurisdictions differ in an important way. In the former,
the ICJ may only apply the specific treaty in question. In the latter,
jurisdiction permits or requires use of customary international law rules
which exist outside any specific treaty, in the event that the treaty is outside
the scope of jurisdiction in the particular case.212

(3) a general treaty for the pacific settlement of disputes either between two
states or for a region;
(4) a framework agreement.
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According to Rosenne, these represent variations which can overlap.213

Art 35, Statute lays out the criteria for states to access the Court.214
Paragraph 1 enables access by state parties to the Statute. Paragraph 2 is
aimed at states not party to the Statute. The relevant conditions for access
are governed by special provisions in treaties in force on the
commencement date of the Statute, to be decided by the Security Council.
The caveat is that there will be no case in which the conditions place the
parties in a position of inequality before the Court. In turn, the ICJ can only
consider a dispute when the parties have recognized that a dispute exists. In
outline, the ICJ adjudicates cases based on international law existing on the
decision date, which then remains until judgment.215 For this, the Court
must establish that the dispute is of a legal nature, by being able to be
settled by the principles and rules of international law.216 Other nonelements may also be present. The Court can consider the dispute even
when other dispute resolution methods are being applied by parties.
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The ICJ does not have jurisdiction to decide points not included in the
parties‘ final submissions.

As elaborated by Rosenne, the title, source, or basis of jurisdiction is
derived from a number of factors: the UN Charter, The Court Statute and
the Rules of Court; and the specific instrument(s) containing the parties‘
agreement to submit the case to the Court.217 Jurisdiction itself is closely
associated with the idea of seisin, which describes the formal step by which
the ICJ‘s jurisdiction is initially engaged.218 The ICJ may be unable to
exercise its jurisdiction if the seising was not in conformity with what the
parties had agreed. The legal reason for this is as follows. Jurisdiction is
determined by the particular law in operation between the parties, as
opposed to the Statute or Rules. Whereas, the validity of the step that seises
the Court is governed by the Statute and Rules (subject to any provisions
agreed by the parties regarding how to initiate proceedings under a certain
jurisdictional title.
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The Court‘s jurisdiction extends inter alia over the validity of the seisin.
This was elaborated in the Nottebohm (Preliminary Objection) case:‗The Court has jurisdiction to deal with all its [the claim‘s] aspects,
whether they relate to jurisdiction, to admissibility or to the merits.‘219

Moreover, the Court must itself decide whether it has jurisdiction; ‗it is a
legal question, in view of relevant facts.‘220 Art 36(6) Statute gives the ICJ
competence to do this, in the event of a disagreement. Partial removal of
jurisdiction is possible in this instance, but not entire. For example, in the
Nicaragua case, brought by Nicaragua against the USA in 1984, the ICJ
conceded the US argument that a reservation covering multilateral treaties
applied, but that it still had jurisdiction based on customary international
law.221 It would however be outside its scope for the Court to consider a
state party‘s political motivation. Thus, the scope of jurisdiction may be
intentionally limited in this type of instance by a reservation to a treaty, for
example.
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Also, where jurisdiction exists in a dispute, there is no separate
jurisdictional basis required to consider remedies.222

The traditional way to challenge jurisdiction is by raising one or more
preliminary objections, which are now covered in depth in Art 79, Rules of
Court. These require a decision before the ICJ can consider the merits of
the dispute. Preliminary objections are only relevant where one state has
accepted the Court‘s optional jurisdiction, and brings a dispute against
another party on the basis of the respondent‘s Art 36(2) declaration. Where
the ICJ‘s jurisdiction is challenged on more than ground, it can decide to
base its decision to decline jurisdiction on the ground which it judges is
more direct and conclusive.223

Art 36(2), ICJ Statute - ‗the optional clause,‘ has significantly increased the
ICJ‘s jurisdiction. From the clause, specifically:-
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‗The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they
recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in
relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of
the Court in all legal disputes concerning:(a) the interpretation of a treaty;
(b) any question of international law;
(c) the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach
of an international obligation;
(d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an
international obligation.‘

According to Shaw, this provision‘s intention was to increase jurisdiction by
more states gradually accepting it.224 Declarations based on Art 36(2) are
normally conditional, and depend on reciprocity to function. The
declarations will therefore need to agree. Where conflict exists in the
declarations, the jurisdiction will exist based on the common ground
declared.225
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In practice, most optional clause declarations by states have so many
reservations that in practice, this method of seising the Court has been
rather infrequent, partly because one party can challenge the jurisdiction
based on the applicability of its own reservation. Compulsory jurisdiction
(optional clause jurisdiction) is covered in Art 36(2) and (5). This is a
special form of conventional jurisdiction (treaty jurisdiction), which is
based upon stated, written agreement of the state parties. In Art 36(2)
declarations, time limits placed on jurisdiction rationae materiae have been
significant. Typically, for a dispute to be within scope, the Court must
establish the significance of the exclusion date of the exclusion clause. If
both parties‘ declarations contain a limitation ratione temporis (conditional
on a reference to time), the later of the two dates defines the scope in the
case.

Separately, consent can also be given after a dispute arises via a special
agreement between the parties.226 This is the most common way of agreeing
to the ICJ‘s jurisdiction after a dispute has arisen.
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This is similar to an arbitral compromis because it allows the parties to
delineate the issues within the dispute, and to state the basis on which the
Court should decide (subject to the Statute). This imparts a high degree of
flexibility in scope, as seen for example following a special agreement
between Indonesia and Malaysia in 2002.227

The issue of timeframes is very important. The ICJ may be required to
assess preliminary objections regarding its jurisdiction. This occurs before
consideration of the merits.228 Preliminary objections must be made within
three months of the applicant state‘s Memorial. Objections to jurisdiction
must be decided at the preliminary stage. Of course, during the course of
proceedings, it can also be very important to gather facts as carefully as
possible. In the earlier (related) admissibility and jurisdiction case, the ICJ
found at the provisional measures stage that, prima facie, it has jurisdiction
based on Art IX of the Genocide Convention.229 Bosnia reserved the right to
add to its submissions to invoke other jurisdictional titles.
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The ICJ made several references to the intent of the Convention, including
that its intent was to create a universal regime. But according to Gray, the
ICJ was ambiguous about the scope of the relevant compromissory clause,
i.e. Art IX.230

In the earlier case, the first set of preliminary objections were about the
ICJ‘s jurisdiction rationae personae, i.e., whether Bosnia had the
entitlement to bring a claim. Yugoslavia contested Bosnia‘s claim to
statehood, and claimed it had violated the right to self determination of
ethnic groups in Bosnia. The ICJ did not focus on these aspects. It took the
view that, since Art IX enabled the Genocide Convention for any UN
member, Bosnia became a state party from the time of admission to the UN.
The terms of accession or independence were not relevant.

The next relevant issue was that of jurisdiction rationae temporis.
Yugoslavia argued that if the Genocide Convention was not operative
between the parties until the Dayton Agreement, it could not have prior
effect, so Bosnia could not bring claims for events prior to December
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1995.231 The Court said in response that it had jurisdiction, since the
Genocide Convention and Art IX had no clause to limit scope rationae
temporis. The greatest challenge was over jurisdiction rationae materiae,
i.e. did a dispute exist under Art IX?232 Yugoslavia responded to Bosnia‘s
contention that Yugoslavia had breached the Convention by stating that the
claim was outside the scope of Art IX, as follows. The struggle was a civil
war, over which it had no jurisdiction at the time. Therefore, it had no
responsibility for events in Bosnia. The ICJ responded that the Convention
was applicable in any conflict; so the obligations of prevention and
punishment on states existed irrespective of territorial sovereignty.

There was ambiguity in the drafting of Art IX. Whether Yugoslavia had
participated must wait until the merits stage. The ICJ made the following
specific statement:-

231
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‗It was apparent that the parties differed with respect to the facts of the case,
their imputability and the applicability to them of the Genocide Convention;
moreover they were in disagreement with respect to the meaning and scope
of several provisions including Art IX. Therefore there was a dispute under
Art IX.‘

Where there are political issues at stake, the world‘s eyes watch more
closely. Also, a number of legal and other aspects can be brought into play,
as underlying themes as well as in discoveries or arguments as the case
unfolds. This has clearly been true in the Hague International Tribunals case
on the Application on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide

(Bosnia

and

Herzegovina

v.

Yugoslavia

(Serbia

and

Montenegro).233 Overall, this was the first case in which the ICJ‘s
jurisdiction was seised by a state alleging that another state had violated its
commitments under the Genocide Convention. The ICJ‘s eventual judgment
was made public on February 26th 2007. Other dispute settlement processes
had been in play, for example diplomatic negotiations. The scope of subject
matter jurisdiction was substantial.
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4.2.3 General jurisdiction conclusion
The DSU of the WTO has very broad jurisdictional scope, which is
compulsory, exclusive, and derives from membership. It mainly regulates
the WTO covered agreements. The initial panel must circulate its report
within 90 days of the dispute‘s referral. Art 17.13 enables the AB to uphold,
amend or reverse the panel‘s legal reasoning. Unlike in ICJ disputes, parties
cannot in any way ‗opt in‘ to the DSU. In the WTO, the usual procedure is
for a member to bring a complaint; in the ICJ, this is only one possibility.

The South Centre asserts that the DSU panels and AB have more authority
than other WTO bodies.234 Consequently, there is a lack of higher checks on
adopted reports. For this, one might suggest more external surveillance
panels, or AB appointment criteria.

The ICJ‘s power to be seized of a case comes from the UN Charter, the
Court Statute, the Rules of Court (amended in 1978), and the instrument
containing the parties‘ submission. Unlike in the WTO, ICJ jurisdiction
requires consensus from the parties, in one of a number of ways. These
234
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incorporate reference to international law, including specific customary law,
or treaties and conventions, including the VCLT 1969. Parties can submit to
jurisdiction explicitly, or implicitly, via actions retrospectively agreeing to
the other party‘s submission. To establish jurisdiction, the ICJ must be
seised according to defined criteria which it assesses. It can state reasons
why it opted to decline jurisdiction. Whether or not the states are parties to
the Court, access will only be granted on equal terms. Jurisdiction only
extends to points in the parties submissions. Art 36(2), ICJ Statute, contains
the optional clause, which expanded jurisdiction by giving the ICJ a wider
scope in terms of treaties, international law, and facts in relation to
international obligations. This, for example, has enabled jurisdiction to be
not necessarily confined to a territorial basis.

Also to be considered are specific rules governing jurisdiction. For
example, where the issue is rationae temporis, whereby the parties declare
jurisdiction based on their preferred timeframes, the later of the two dates is
defining.

135

4.3 Judicial aspects of dispute settlement and burden of proof
4.3.1 WTO
From a practical viewpoint in terms of the consistency of judgments, M.
Matsushita, a former AB member, has stressed that panels and the AB
decide cases significantly on precedents. This is despite there being no
stated doctrine of ‗stare decisis.‘235 This is the principle that a court should
follow its own precedents, as well as those of other courts of the same or
greater authority. However, panels are not formally bound by previous AB
decisions, as stated by the panel in India – Patents (EC). 236 Matsushita,
Schoenbaum and Mavroidis 237 study Higgins‘s approach to international
law.238 According to Higgins, WTO law can be fully described by the WTO
Agreement. This refers to all primary WTO law, i.e., including all the
specialized agreements annexed to the Agreement establishing the WTO, as
signed in Marrakesh in April 1994.
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In a general sense, it seems that any WTO adjudicating body cannot choose
a legal interpretation. Instead, it is bound to interpret the WTO covered
agreements in terms of Art 3.2 DSU:…`to clarify the existing provisions of those agreements in accordance with
customary rules of interpretation of public international law.‘

Moreover, the WTO Agreement refers to two different sources of law,
namely the covered agreements, and international agreements that are
reflected in the covered agreements. In terms of the latter, Art 16(1) of the
WTO Agreement refers: the WTO should be guided by decisions,
procedures, and customary practice followed by the Contracting Parties to
GATT 1947. Van den Bossche, though, takes a broader definition of
sources.239
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In addition to the Marrakesh Agreement (which contains several annexes,
including e.g. annex 2: understanding on rules and procedures governing
the settlement of disputes), he identifies WTO dispute settlement reports,
acts of WTO bodies, agreements finalised within the WTO, customary
international law, general legal principles, other international agreements,
the subsequent practice of members, teachings of the best qualified
publicists, and, for greater historic context, negotiating history.

We should also mention the 27 Ministerial Decisions and Declarations,
which with the WTO Agreement constitute the Final Act adopted at
Marrakesh at the end of the Uruguay Round of negotiations (April 1994).240

From the above, WTO dispute settlement reports consist of panel and AB
reports. In theory, adopted reports only bind the parties in the dispute at
hand.
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But in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II,241 the AB gave weight to legal
precedent in previous GATT panel reports, since they were thought to have
created legitimate expectations among WTO members, something that
might be called ‗recent customary WTO law.‘ In practice, AB rulings are so
important that panels usually follow them, as does the AB itself.

As pointed out by Jackson, the WTO Agreements need to be analysed in
terms of the general principles of international law for interpreting
treaties.242 In this area, the most relevant is widely thought to be Art 31 of
the VCLT 1969. For example, Art 31.3 states that an adjudicating body must
take subsequent practice into consideration. Where a state member has not
ratified the Vienna Convention, e.g. the USA, it would not apply. However,
subsequent practice is categorized as an interpretative element (not as a
source of law), so it can carry legal force.

As referred to above, another very important area in judicial terms for the
WTO is customary international law. The AB has decided that this refers to
the rules in the VCLT 1969.

241
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For example, from Art 31.2, any relevant rules of law applicable to relations
between the parties should also be taken into account in treaty
interpretation.243 As stated in Korea - Measures Affecting Government
Procurement,244 …`customary rules of international law apply to the WTO
treaties and to the process of treaty formation under the WTO.‘ Also, as
stated by the AB in Japan – Alcoholic Beverages II:`There can be no doubt that Art 32 of the Vienna Convention, dealing with
the role of supplementary means of interpretation, has also attained the
same status [of a rule of customary international law]. Thus, subsequent
practice in terms of interpretation can imply that a rule can gain customary
law status.‘

In terms of the factual sources of WTO law, and specifically at the basic
level of international legal rights, Art 6 DSU recognizes the right to a panel,
and subsequent access to a standing AB comprised of independent judges,
which from Art 17 will hear and decide on appeals from panel cases within
2 to 3 months. Some basic rules in WTO law should be elucidated. As
described by Van den Bossche, dispute settlement is one of 6 main areas of
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WTO law. 245 The most important of the principles of non-discrimination is
the most-favoured nation (MFN) treatment obligation. In a nutshell, if a
member permits some special treatment to one country, it must permit the
same to all other WTO members. Another principle is the national treatment
obligation, according to which a member may not discriminate against
another country‘s products, services or suppliers of services.

There is a judicial preference for members to actually perform obligations
in the DSU. For example, Art 22 concerns compensation and suspension of
concessions, and makes it clear that ‗neither compensation nor the
suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full
implementation of a resolution.‘ Geping distinguishes two branches of
theorists in this area.246 The first are the ‗self-contained regime proponents,‘
who believe primarily that the DSB will follow the covered agreements,
especially as stated by Art 7 DSU. However, inconsistent panel practice
implied an opposing theory; that of ‗incorporation.‘ Here, the main thesis is
that some clauses in the covered agreements and the DSU, point to the need
to apply some non-WTO agreements to dispute settlement. Examples are
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the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS), which in turn refers to some important international conventions
including the Paris, Berne and Rome conventions; and the Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits.247 However, it
should be realized that the WTO treaty, general international law, and other
non-WTO treaties contain conflict rules. For instance, if there were to be a
conflict between the WTO Agreement and one of the multilateral trade
agreements, e.g. GATT, GATS, TRIPS, or DSU, it must be resolved in
favour of the WTO Agreement. This point is emphasised by Pauwelyn. 248

Surprisingly, there are no rules for burden of proof stated in the DSU.
Pauwelyn considers the concept, and finds that it is limited to factual
issues.249 The legal principle jura novit curia has been thought to be
applicable, namely that the international tribunal would not be restricted,
e.g. in US – Wool Shirts and Blouses, from which we can conclude the
general rule that in dispute settlement, the burden of proof is on the party
(complainant or respondent) that asserts the affirmative of a specific claim
247
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or defence.250 Specifically, from a factual point of view, the AB has upheld
the rule that the party who asserts a fact, whether it is the complainant or the
respondent, must provide proof thereof. From this, for example, the party
that claims a violation of a provision of the WTO Agreement (complainant)
must prove that claim. Also, the party that invokes in its defence a provision
that is an exception to the allegedly violated obligation (respondent) must
bear the burden of proof that the conditions in the exception are met.

More specifically, Grando has differentiated two categories of provisions
for burden of proof. 251 The first is those that establish an exception to a rule.
The second is those that exclude the application of other provisions. In the
first type, the complainant must prove that the defendant has violated a
general rule. If this is established, the burden is shifted in that the defendant
then has the burden of proving that it has fulfilled the requirements of the
provision that establish an exception to the rule. In the second type, the
complainant has the burden of proving that the defendant does not fall
under the situation or has not complied with the needs of a provision that
excludes the application of the general rule. Thus, the burden of proof for
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an exception is on the defendant, whereas for a provision that excludes the
application of another, the burden is on the complainant.

In terms advanced by Matsushita, Schoenbaum and Mavroidis, burden of
proof is to do with which of the disputing parties is responsible for proving
the (il)legality of the conduct being discussed.252 The Panel report in US –
Section 301 Trade Act253 described the legal position of the AB, according
to Van den Bossche. 254 From this:`…both parties agreed that it is for the EC, as the complaining party, to
present arguments and evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie case in
respect of the various elements of its claims regarding the inconsistency of
Sections 301-310 with US obligations under the WTO. Once the EC has
done so, it is for the US to rebut that prima facie case. Since, in this case,
both parties have submitted extensive facts and arguments in respect of the
EC claims, our task will be to balance all evidence on record and decide
whether the EC, as party bearing the original burden of proof, has
convinced us of the validity of its claims….
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In case all the evidence and arguments remain in equipoise, we have to give
the benefit of the doubt to the US as defending party.‘255 Thus, for the
burden of proof to shift, the balances of arguments must tip in favour of the
complainant. There is a separate issue, namely that of how to find the
correct legal meaning of provisions in the covered agreements. The AB
discussed this in detail in EC – Tariff Preferences:`Consistent with the principle of jura novit curia,it is not the responsibility
of the European Communities to provide …legal interpretation to be given
to a particular provision in the Enabling Clause; …the burden of the
European Communities is to adduce sufficient evidence to substantiate its
assertion that the Drug Arrangements comply with the requirements of the
Enabling Clause.‘256

Van den Bossche interprets this as meaning that the burden of finding how
and which WTO law rule to apply is on the panel and AB.257 Also in EC –
Tariff Preferences, the AB initiated the idea of legal responsibility to raise a
defence in dispute settlement.
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In relation to the specific nature of the Enabling Clause, the AB held:-

`Although a responding party must defend the consistency of its preference
scheme with the conditions of the Enabling Clause and must prove such
consistency, a complaining party has to define the parameters within which
the responding party must make that defence.‘

Thus, the complaining party must show with which Enabling Clause
provisions the scheme is inconsistent.

In terms of disputes concerning implementation, Art 21.5 reviews are now
considered. As in other panel proceedings, the party that asserts a fact has
the burden of proving it, and the party which asserts an affirmative defence
has the burden of establishing it.

Specifically, burden of proof may be considered in the context of Art 22.6
DSU arbitrations. In principle, the burden of proof here is analogous to that
in any other WTO proceedings. 258 The following view was expressed by
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abitrators in the report on US – 1916 Act (EC) (Article 22.6 – US)259:-

`WTO Members, as sovereign entities, can be presumed to act in
conformity with their WTO obligations. A party claiming that a Member
has acted inconsistently with WTO rules bears the burden of proving that
inconsistency…the same rules apply where the existence of a specific fact
is alleged…it is for the party alleging the fact to prove its existence.‘

4.3.2. ICJ: judicial aspects and burden of proof
Unlike the WTO, there is no AB. Broadly, the ICJ adjudicates cases on the
basis of international law. This includes the application of international
treaties to which the states are parties, international customary law and
general legal principles 260 According to Sands, Mackenzie and Shany, the
ICJ additionally relies on judicial decisions and the output of top
international jurists.261 In the Nottebohm (Preliminary Objection) case, the
ICJ stated that the administration of justice is governed by the Statute and
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Rules of Court. 262 According to Rosenne, the ICJ usually applies Art 31 to
33 of the VCLT 1969 when considering the Statute.263 Specifically, the
Rules of Court derive their power from Art 30 of the Statute. Where a
matter cannot be decided based on the Statute or Rules, the ICJ retains the
authority to decide the issue in conformity with the administration of
international justice. Parties can agree for the ICJ to decide a case ex aequo
et bono, i.e. on the basis of equitable considerations. 264 The legal effects of
judgments are covered in Arts 59 to 61, and Art 63(2) of the Statute.
Specifically, Art 59 states that `the decision of the Court has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case.‘ Art
41(1) covers provisional measures.

From a factual source viewpoint, the definition of the ‗precise nature of the
claim‘ is demanded by the Rules of Court (Art 38(2)). One important area to
consider is that of remedies.
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The ICJ‘s power to award remedies stems from Art 36 of the Statute,
according to which ‗the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes
concerning …(d) the nature and extent of the reparation to be made for the
breach of an international obligation,‘ in cases of compulsory jurisdiction
by virtue of paragraph 2. In terms of the specific case of provisional
measures, they do not have the status of res judicata. This means that they
can be rescinded or amended at any stage if a change in the situation
justifies this.265 The case is seen as dynamic in this sense.

The ICJ‘s work is not always cut out. For example, Art 36 states nothing
about declaratory judgments, specific performance and injunctive relief. To
consider judicial scope, in the case of declaratory judgments, the Court has
held that if it promulgates a rule of customary law or interprets a standing
treaty, its judgment has continuing applicability. Therefore, legal continuity
is implied in these two senses, beyond the present case.
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In general, the ICJ will apply the principle actori incumbit probatori: the
party which makes a specific claim will be required to establish the points
of fact and law on which a decision in its favour might be forthcoming. For
example, in the Genocide judgment, the Court confirmed that the burden
lay on Bosnia and Herzegovina to establish facts claimed by it. 266
Additionally, in this case the Court set a high standard of proof, namely that
Bosnia and Herzegovina needed to show, beyond any doubt, that there was
a continual supply of assistance from Serbia and Montenegro. There was no
legal basis for such a high standard of proof on the complainant. According
to Teitelbaum, the ICJ decision not to find responsibility for genocide on the
part of Serbia and Montenegro was due to its refusal to accept indirect
evidence, or to draw inferences.

The Court has specifically referred to the judicial need to follow the Geneva
Conventions. According to Meron, there were (in 1987) 164 states parties to
the Geneva Conventions.267 In the Nicaragua case, the ICJ held that the
United States could not entice people or groups involved in that conflict to
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act in violation of common Art 3. 268 Here, Meron notes that the judicial
principles of good faith and pacta sunt servanda are historically well
entrenched in international law. 269 In the same case, and at a more general
level, the Court stated that the UN Charter does not subsume or supervene
on customary international law, and furthermore that `customary
international law continues to …apply, separately from international treaty
law, even where the two…have an identical content.‘

In legal procedural terms, Teitelbaum likens the ICJ to a civil law setup in
the context of fact-finding, whereby it can demand whatever evidence is
thought to be relevant. 270 The Corfu Channel case may be used as an
example.271 Here, the United Kingdom was subjected to the burden of proof
because it was the plaintiff. However, in the Minquiers and Ecrehos case
which the Court heard following a special agreement, both parties were
subject to an equal burden of proof. 272 The ICJ was called upon ‗to appraise
the relative strength of the opposing claims.‘
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Here, there is a general point to realise about the burden of proof. It will be
guided by the particular issue at hand, not by the procedural position of
either party. In other words, whether a party is applicant or respondent in a
case commenced by application, or in either role when the case is
commenced by special agreement, is not the defining factor. This would
seem to be prima facie reasonable.

In terms of the standard of proof, it ‗may be drawn from inferences of fact,
provided they leave no room for reasonable doubt.‘ The ICJ Statute and
Rules do not indicate which evidence will be valued more or less highly;
nor do they state what level of proof a party must meet. Instead, the Court is
to apply its discretion, and weigh evidence based on the nature of the
claims. This would seem to detract from the importance of judicial
precedent.

In the judgment concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo
(Democratic Republic of the Congo) v. Uganda (19/12/2005), the ICJ was
more particular about the burden of proof for various claims made by the
parties:-
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‗…It (The Court) will identify the documents relied on and make its own
clear assessment of their weight, reliability and value…‘ Additionally, the
ICJ added a ‗substitution of authority requirement‘ as meaning a higher
standard of proof, more than sufficient or clear and convincing, but more, as
expressed by Teitelbaum, of a ‗beyond any doubt standard.‘ The Court
thereby set a standard of proof for an illegal occupation, that was devised by
its own narrowly stated definition. Moreover, the Court has stated that it
will formally take note of any refusal (to provide documentary evidence, for
example).

4.3.3 Judicial aspects and burden of proof: conclusion
In summary, when considering the judicial aspects of dispute settlement, the
types of issues to consider would be, for example, the interpretation of laws,
what laws are being applied, the consistency of application, and the scope
of applicable laws to consider. When assessing the factual aspects of dispute
settlement law, the type of issue to consider would be, for instance, what the
sources of law have been or continue to be.

Considering WTO law, Matsushita found that cases were decided by the AB
mainly on judicial precedent in practice. Separately, other commentators
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found that the WTO Agreement was the main determinant of WTO law. As
regards legal interpretation of WTO agreements in general, from Art 3.2
DSU, the method refers to customary interpretation of international law.
Regarding ICJ disputes, international law is the basis of adjudication. This
includes treaties, customary law, and general legal principles. Where the ICJ
Statute or Rules are not clear, the ICJ decides the matter based on
international justice. In terms of burden of proof, the party that makes a
claim must prove the legal and factual points to tilt the judgment in its
favour. The ICJ follows the Geneva Conventions. It can seek any evidence
it requires, guided by the issues at hand.

Some authors assert that the ICJ also relies on judicial decisions and the
output of top international jurists.

In the Nottebohm (Preliminary

Objection) case, the ICJ stated the importance to justice of the Statute and
Rules of Court.273 The ICJ considers Arts 31 to 33 of VCLT 1969 in relation
to the Statute.274 Art 41(1) covers provisional measures.

The Court applies actori incumbit probator, i.e. the party which makes a

273
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154

specific claim will be required to establish the relevant facts and law. For
legal principles, the ICJ looks to the Geneva Convention. Customary
international law continues to be applicable. For the standard of proof, the
ICJ Statute and Rules do not state which evidence will have precedent, or
the level of proof a party must meet; the Court applies discretion.

4.4 Compliance and enforcement
4.4.1 WTO
Essentially, the nature of enforcement is to do with the type of complaint.
Non-typical types could be classified as non-violation and situation
complaints. The majority of WTO disputes, however, are associated with
claims under Art XXIII:1(a) GATT 1994, on the postulate that a member has
not fulfilled its obligations under a covered agreement. 275 According to
WTO law, any enforcing countermeasures are a temporary measure, since
the DSU prefers specific performance of obligations.276 The purpose of
countermeasures is to induce compliance. 277 In practice, countermeasures
have not been resorted to often.278
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From a timeframe viewpoint, an Art 21.5 compliance proceeding is
different from an original dispute settlement proceeding in two significant
ways. Firstly, an original panel has up to 6 months to issue its final report,
whereas an Art 21.5 panel has in principle merely 90 days. Secondly, from
Art 21.3, an original proceeding allows a reasonable period of time for
implementation; not so in an Art 21.5 proceeding. Compliance should occur
within a reasonable period of time, as defined by both parties or by
agreement, or multilaterally, i.e. through arbitration.

If there is subsequent disagreement about whether compliance has occurred,
the original parties then submit a new dispute to a compliance panel, and
then to the AB. If the final judgment is that compliance has not occurred,
the injured party has the right to impose countermeasures. It must submit a
request for authorization to impose countermeasures, in which case it must
ensure that the proposed level of countermeasures does not exceed the
injury suffered (Art 22.4 DSU). One argument that has been advanced
against the regime here is the following. 279
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Evidence shows that WTO-incompatible trade violations that persist should
be analysed in terms of the likelihood of severe punishment. Thus, if there
were the possibility of a punishment some factor greater than the violation
committed, the urge to escape such severity might induce far better
compliance.

If the parties cannot agree on the level of proposed countermeasures, the
dispute goes to an Arbitrator, usually constituted by the original panel. This
panel will decide on what level of countermeasures to impose. Surprisingly,
there is no stated procedure in the DSU to follow, in the event that,
subsequently, the offending party claims to have amended its measures to
comply.

The majority of WTO disputes have been violation complaints. From Art
3.8 DSU, infringement of obligations under any covered agreement is taken
initially to amount to a case of nullification or impairment. First, there must
be a WTO ruling that there has been an inconsistency (Art 3.2 DSU). Then,
The WTO adjudicating bodies can make recommendations and suggestions.
In most cases, the body recommends that the losing party amend its
measures to comply, without specific instructions. WTO adjudicating
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bodies can also suggest ways in which the member comply. Art 19.1 DSU
reads:‗Where a panel or the AB concludes that a measure is inconsistent with a
covered agreement, it shall recommend that the Member concerned bring
the measure into conformity with that agreement. In addition to its
recommendations, the panel or AB may suggest ways in which the Member
concerned could implement the recommendations.‘

Thus, the member has significant leeway in how to comply with a
recommendation. The procedure is as follows. On recommendation by a
WTO adjudicating body, the DSB will request the WTO member to bring
its measures to comply with its obligations. Thus, a recommendation is the
initial step intended to achieve enforcement after a ruling has been issued. A
recommendation, since it is part of the DSU, is binding on the member.

The next area covered will be suggestions. These are not binding, but give
guidance on what to do. A specific suggestion can also be requested by the
aggrieved party. Panels have taken the position that they are under not
legally obliged to suggest, even when requested to. In connection with
export subsidies, there is a specific obligation in the Agreement on
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Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) that they must be withdrawn
as soon as possible.280 A suggestion will nevertheless be issued, but the
period of time for implementation can vary. Specifically, the AB‘s report on
US-FSC (Article 21.5 – EC)281 clarified that the argument that citizens have
a right to an orderly transition is not valid vis-à-vis the obligation to an
illegal subsidy immediately.

The AB has ruled that a panel requested to decide on the consistency of a
farm subsidy under the Agriculture agreement and the SCM, cannot
adjudicate only under the former. Specifically, in EC – Export Subsidies on
Sugar), the AB found this to be a wrong exercise of judicial economy, since
the complaining party does not have the opportunity to benefit from Art 4.7
SCM, to request an immediate withdrawal of the relevant subsidies. 282

Compliance panels assess whether compliance occurred within the RPT.
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The arbitrator took a new, more strict view of the time to comply in Canada
– Pharmaceutical Patents.283 As immediate compliance is the ‗preferred
option under Art 21.3, it is for the implementing member to bear the burden
of proof in showing…if it is impracticable to comply immediately…that the
duration of any proposed period of implementation, including its supposed
component steps, constitutes a reasonable period of time. And the longer the
proposed period of implementation, the greater the burden will be.‘

There has arisen the issue of whether legislative action is needed by a
violating member to accelerate compliance. In Canada – Autos, the
complainant asserted that since Canada was able to act to remove a
prohibited subsidy within 90 days, as required by Art 4.7 of the SCM, this
fact impacted how long it would take Canada to implement the DSB‘s
recommendations and rulings. 284 However, the arbitrator overruled this
presumed specific rationale for swifter compliance as follows:-
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‗Canada‘s ability to take ‗extraordinary action‘ to withdraw the export
subsidy ‗without delay,‘ in accordance with the provisions of Art 4.7 of the
SCM Agreement and pursuant to the recommendation of the DSB, is not
relevant for determining the RPT under Art 21.3.(c) DSU for
implementation of the recommendations of the DSB relating to Art I:1 of
the GATT 1994 and Art III:4 of the GATT 1994 and Art XVII of GATS.‘
Further, the arbitrator stated that factors pertaining to a member‘s domestic
legal system, that were unrelated to a calculation of the shortest time
possible, are not relevant to deciding the RPT under Art 21.3.(c) DSU. As a
result, conversely no RPT lengthening to accommodate the timeframe to
reform the Canadian customs regime was allowed either.

Interestingly, the arbitrator employed the concept of ‗good behaviour‘ in
compliance as a factor in the RPT in US – Section 110(5) Copyright Act:-285
‗An implementing member must use the time after the adoption of a panel
and/or AB report to begin to implement the recommendations and ruling of
the DSB….

285

United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act – Recourse to Arbitration under Article 25 of
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If it is perceived by an arbitrator that an implementing member has not
adequately begun implementation after adoption so as to effect ―prompt
compliance‖, it is to be expected that the arbitrator will take this into
account in determining the reasonable period of time.‘

One important WTO rationale for swift Art 21.5 compliance is the desire to
reverse economic harm due to inconsistent measures. If there is no
indication of implementation within the RPT, the complainant can request
authorization to suspend concessions. However, there may be some
implementation, and the complainant might not agree that the other party
has implemented its WTO obligations sufficiently. The complainant can
then request the establishment of a compliance panel. 286 The practical
expectation in the DSU is that where there is a disagreement on compliance,
the parties must initially try to find a practical solution, to avoid a unilateral
outcome.

286

Art 21.5, DSU.
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Following on from the panel and AB reports in USD – Certain Measures287,
the ruling was that to suspend concessions without multilaterally assessing
whether compliance had occurred under Art 21.5 would be a violation of
both 21.5 and Art 23.2(a) DSU. Also, Art 23.2(c) clarifies that suspension is
to be in response to a member‘s failure to implement the recommendations
and rulings within a RPT.

A compliance panel may be instigated under Art 21.5 DSU. One interesting
point emerging from compliance panel rulings is that they can demarcate
their own wide terms of reference, for example covering all points raised by
the appealing party. This was confirmed in Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5
– Canada).288 The compliance panel insisted that its jurisdiction was not
limited by the assertion that the original panel did not address a claim.
Rather, the panel said that the scope of its review was defined by Art 21.5
and the panel‘s specific terms of reference, which extend to the relevant
provisions of covered agreements referred to in the panel establishment
request. This assertion seems to limit the influence of the offending party in
dictating the course of proceedings, since it would prefer a narrow scope.
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The AB elaborated its view in its review of the panel report in this case:-

`…Art 21.5 proceedings are limited to those ‗measures taken to comply
with the recommendations and rulings‘ of the DSB…In principle, a measure
which has been ‗taken to comply with the recommendation and rulings‘ of
the DSB will not be the same as the measure which was the subject of the
original dispute, so that, in principle, there would be two separate and
distinct measures: the original measure which gave rise to the
recommendations and rulings of the DSB, and the ‗measures taken to
comply‘ which are – or should be – adopted to implement these
recommendations and rulings.‘

This theoretical standpoint was then elaborated:`…Indeed, the utility of the review envisaged under Article 21.5 DSU
would be seriously undermined if a panel were restricted to examining the
new measure from the perspective of the claims, arguments and factual
circumstances that related to the original measure, because an Article 21.5
panel would then be unable to examine fully the ―consistency with a
covered agreement of the measures taken to comply‖, as required by Art
21.5 of the DSU.‘
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Moreover, since the AB‘s report on US – Shrimp289, it appears that a
Compliance Panel‘s mandate does not extend beyond the new measure
required to comply with the AB‘s findings. Nevertheless, the compliance
panel will assess the compatibility of the new measure with WTO treaty
provisions invoked by the complaining party in the original action, or any
other provisions invoked by the complainant. Still, compliance panel
reports can be appealed.

In the WTO remedy arena, the right to request countermeasures emanates
from Art 22.2 DSU. Importantly in WTO law, Art 22.1 DSU states that
suspension of concessions or other obligations is a temporary measure until
WTO compliance has been achieved. Art 22.8 is a clear statement of the
position:-
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United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of
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―The suspension of concessions or other obligations shall be temporary and
shall only be applied until such time as the measure found to be inconsistent
with a covered agreement has been removed, or the member that must
implement recommendations or rulings provides a solution to the
nullification or impairment of benefits, or a mutually satisfactory solution is
reached. In accordance with paragraph 6 of Art 21, the DSB shall continue
to keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted recommendations
or rulings, including those cases where compensation has been provided or
concessions

or

other

obligations

have

been suspended

but

the

recommendations to bring a measure into conformity with the covered
agreements have not been implemented.‖

Any compensation, envisaged to be non-monetary, should be in line with
the covered agreements 290, and needs to be on a most favoured nation
basis,291 since the offending party would otherwise give the appealing party
an advantage relative to other members. From the appealing party‘s
economic angle, compensation would not negate the welfare loss, including
in a particular industry, caused by the non-compliance that started the
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dispute. In case compensation could not be agreed (as has almost always
been the case), the aggrieved party will request the right to suspend WTO
concessions or other obligations.292 The suspension possibilities are (i) tariff
concessions or (ii) other obligations.

In respect of arbitration, the EC observed in the light of ad hoc solutions
arrived at after EC - Bananas III, that it appeared that members ‗now
broadly agree that completing the procedure established under Art 21.5
DSU is a pre-requisite for invoking the provisions of Art 22 DSU…`293 Art
22.7 DSU refers to arbitration. When the parties make a request for
arbitration of the amount of the suspension of concessions, the process
moves on from the appealing party‘s original request to the DSB for the
authorization to suspend. The DSB should be promptly informed about the
results of the arbitration, but takes no independent action unless asked. The
DSB will, if requested, grant authorization to suspend concessions,
provided the request is in line with the arbitration decision. Broadly, Art 22
DSU covers the suspension of concessions or obligations.

292

Art 22.2, DSU.
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According to this, arbitrators may not examine the nature of the proposed
suspension. They do not have the jurisdiction to decide how or whether to
counterbalance between the measure proposed to implement the suspension
and that which has caused the impairment. Therefore, they cannot approve
specific measures adopted. Also, there is no appeal against an Art 22.6
arbitration decision. Thus, this leaves a high scope for economic distortions.

Now,

some

specific

remarks

about

the

procedure

involved

in

countermeasures. Initially, the member wanting to impose countermeasures
must first produce a list of concessions intended for suspension. In practice,
this has (with almost no exceptions) been tariff concessions. The member
must follow the procedure from Art 22.3 DSU, according to which it must
initially seek suspension in the economic sector which corresponds to the
WTO violation. To facilitate this, the multilteral trade agreements were
divided into three groups within Annex I of the WTO Agreement: GATT,
GATS, and TRIPS. If the member believes this would not be practical or
effective, the next option is in another sector covered by the same
agreement. If that too is not feasible, the choice can be a different sector
covered by a different agreement (cross-retaliation). If this is the choice
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taken, the member must justify its decision. 294 The request must go to the
relevant Councils or sectoral organisations as well as to the DSB. 295 This
scenario magnifies economic distortions because the violating industry goes
unpunished, whereas another bears the burden. The parties may request
arbitration if they cannot agree on the proposed type of retaliation.

As expounded by the Arbitrators in EC – Bananas III (Article 22.6 – EC),
the first cross-retaliation case, they need not be bound by the choice of
sector arrived at, in this case by Ecuador. They retain the authority to
broadly judge how the aggrieved party chose its sector, and whether it was
objective in this. As explained by Palmeter and Mavroidis,296 this arbitration
was novel in that it permitted a suspension of intellectual property rights
concessions in return for a goods sector violation. Here, the arbitrators
observed that distortions in third-country markets would be averted if
Ecuador would suspend the rights only for supply intended for its domestic
market. it is also possible to retaliate under another agreement. This is
where the aggrieved member finds it impracticable or ineffective to adhere
to the same agreement, and the circumstances are sufficiently serious. The
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seriousness is decided by the arbitrator.

The mechanics of countermeasures are covered in Art 22.6 DSU. The
aggrieved party submits a list of proposed countermeasures. The offending
party must then respond. In the first case, the offending party agrees. The
aggrieved party must submit a request for suspension of concessions to the
DSB in a timely fashion. This is a last resort measure, covered in Art 3.7
DSU. The four procedural possibilities envisaged are:-

(i)

a mutually acceptable solution, clearly to be preferred.

(ii)

If (i) does not materialize, the first objective is to be usually the
withdrawal of the relevant measures.

(iii)

If immediate withdrawal according to (ii) is not practical, then the
parties should agree compensation – to be temporary.

`…the possibility of suspending the application of concessions or other
obligations under the covered agreements on a discriminatory basis vis-àvis the other member, subject to the authorization by the DSB of such
measures.‘

If the offending party disagrees, it is then a compulsory submission to the
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arbitrators, who decide the level of concessions to be suspended
(retaliation). Moreover, the arbitrators may not impose a punitive level of
damages as a threat or device to induce compliance (Art 22.4 DSU). As
regards timeframes, the arbitrators have stated in EC – Hormones (US)
(Article 22.6 – EC) that countermeasures should be calculated from the end
of the RPT. The yardstick employed is usually the volume of lost trade. 297
Thus, one criticism of WTO compliance procedures could be that there is
no backdated remedy. Thus, a determined offending party can aggravate the
loss to the AB by procrastinating in procedural methods.

In practice, the EC has significantly not complied with sanctions authorized
by the DSB. In European Communities – Measures Concerning and Meat
Products (Hormones),298 the dispute panel and AB decided that the EC meat
ban violated the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS).299 The RPT of 15 months for the EC to
bring its food safety measures into WTO compliance was not adhered to.
The view that the sanctions regime is not tough enough prevailed in the US
297
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due to this case. The US Congress enacted the ‗carousel provision‘,
whereby the products targeted for sanctions were rotated every 6 months, to
try to reduce EC inertia. An empirical survey by Charnovitz 300 tentatively
finds that sanctions, when used, have not been too effective. One significant
shortcoming of the WTO approach has been highlighted by Bourgeois.301
The present remedy is to retaliate by permitting a restriction on imports
from the non-complying member. Instead, the offending party could
compensate the aggrieved party by offsetting its violating action, e.g. by
lowering duties on imports from the aggrieved party. This could perhaps be
summarized by saying that two wrongs do not make a right, or more
significantly as pointed out by Bronckers and van den Broek, retaliation is
opposed to the WTO‘s key trade precepts about liberalizing, not restricting,
trade.302
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4.4.2 ICJ
The focus turns first to compliance with decisions. The ICJ is not concerned
to monitor this:-

‗…once the Court has found that a state has entered into a commitment
concerning its future conduct it is not the Court‘s function to contemplate
that it will not comply with it.303

The ICJ has no guidance on what to do in the event of non-compliance.
However under Art 78 Court Rules, the ICJ often asks for information in
connection with the enforcement of its orders. Also, Al-Qahtani points out
that the ICJ can take some enforcement initiative. 304 For example, Art 61(3)
Court Statute enables that `the Court may require previous compliance with
the terms of the judgment before it admits proceeding in revision.‘ This is
dovetailed by Art 99(5), Rules of Court 1978, whereby `if the Court decides
to make the admission of the proceedings in revision conditional on
previous compliance with the judgment, it shall make an order accordingly.‘
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The state under obligation may be termed the judgment debtor. It may
decide how to fulfill the obligation; the precise facts of the case and
expediency in which is a better political choice can help determine this. The
state in whose favour the obligation is assessed (judgment creditor) can
however challenge this. Non-compliance with an ICJ decision may be
viewed as an internationally wrongful act; a breach of obligations ex
contractu, and also of a duty required by customary international law. To
induce the offending party to comply, the aggrieved party has recourse to
the measures available to it, as it feels, within international law.

In terms of empirical evidence of compliance, the finding by Shaw is of
only somewhat satisfactory. 305 Various factors will impact the situation. For
example, good underlying relations between the parties will increase the
chances.

There is the important area of compliance with decisions of ICJ Chambers.
This is discussed by Valencia-Ospina. 306 Firstly, these judgments are
binding on the parties. From Art 94 UN Charter, the parties can request the
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Security Council to take measures to enforce the judgment if compliance
does not occur.

Initially, the issue of enforcement is considered. Once the ICJ has given its
judgment, it must be taken as final, with no recourse to appeal. 307 Arts 2 and
94(1) of the UN Charter require member states to comply with ICJ
decisions.

The

Security

Council

has

the

discretion

to

make

recommendations or take other decisions, which it can do to give effect to
the ICJ judgment. It can take these measures under Chapter VI of the UN
Charter. Art 59 and 60 of the ICJ Statute confirm this obligation. There is
also a general principle of international law whereby, when states have
agreed to submit a dispute to an international tribunal, they agree to comply
with its decision. 308 That decision may state a need to negotiate to resolve
the dispute.

Importantly, from Art 94(2), if a party does not implement an ICJ judgment,
the aggrieved party may have recourse to the UN Security Council, ‗which
may, if it deems it necessary, make recommendations or decide upon
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measures to give effect to the judgment.‘309 One central issue which this has
raised is whether the Security Council (UNSC) must follow the ICJ
decision, or does it have scope to amend it. It has not yet done the latter.

Most ICJ empirical evidence points towards a good record for compliance
with final judgments. Many cases have not required compensation: for
example, declaratory judgments, where enforcement has not been required.
Rosenne asserts that international tribunals lack enforcement mechanisms,
including the ICJ.310 On this view, apart from an undertaking by parties to
comply, enforcement itself must be political. The UN Charter is grounded in
an assumption that if the reason for non-compliance is taken before the
relevant political organ, that will initiate an entirely new proceeding, to be
settled politically. The dichotomy between legal or political domain is
perhaps too great to induce good compliance.

The enforcement of decisions of the Court regarding interim measures is
historically controversial. Rosenne, for example, maintains a basic
difference between compliance with incidental and interlocutory decisions;
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and compliance with final decisions. 311 The first two types are initially
considered. With the exception of a decision indicating provisional
measures, non-compliance does not allow the ICJ to impose sanctions
proprio motu. In the second case, non-compliance still does not usually
allow the ICJ to impose any sanctions. In general, on one hand, a line of
thinking says that the terms of Art 41 in this regard, `the Court may indicate
provisional measures which ought to be taken,‘ and `notice of the measures
suggested shall be given.‘ Thus, the order in this context is not an ICJ
judgment (Arts 59 and 94, Court Statute), implying that the parties are not
bound by the order for measures. The opposite line of reasoning, as
recounted by Collier and Lowe,312 is that Rules 73-8 of the Court Rules
refer to the word ‗decision‘ in this context.

It is useful to consider the Bosnia case in this context. 313 Here, the UN
Security Council employed Resolution 819 to decide certain measures that
omitted the word ‗genocide,‘ which could in the opinion of Tanzi be taken
as measures intended to reinforce the provisional measures indicated by the
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ICJ in its Order of 8th April 1993.314 Interestingly, this practical assertion
does not require the application of Art 94(2) in the matter of compliance
with provisional measures, although that was the exclusive basis under
which the Bosnian government approached the Council. Specifically, AlQahtani further advances the idea that since the ICJ has no executive arm,
its direct enforcement powers are limited. 315

When analyzing a case in terms of provisional measures, the exact degree
of compliance would need to be assessed in light of the subsequent
proceedings on the merits (unless the case is discontinued). Schulte
categorises cases of non-compliance with provisional measures in three
ways.316 The first type are those of defiance, where the state flatly declines
to accept the decision as binding or to implement it. The second type is
those cases where both parties accepted the provisional measures, but what
is disputed is whether the stated commitments have been backed up by
sufficient actions. Here, the Court‘s authority may be undermined, but has
not been challenged. The third category contains only two cases as at 2004,
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namely Breard (VCCR 1963)317 and LaGrand.318 Here, there was doubt as
to the binding nature of provisional measures; there were also domestic
structures which were seemingly at odds with the state party‘s (lack of)
intent to comply.

The empirical evidence on compliance with provisional measures is:
significantly less compliance than for judgments. In terms of institutions,
some specialized international agencies‘ constitutions enable enforcement
procedures for some types of ICJ decisions. Examples include the
International Labour Association and the International Civil Aviation
Convention.

By consensus, the binding force of indications of provisional measures
under Art 41 was not conclusively established until LaGrand (see chapter 3,
p.71). Here, one significant conclusion from part of the ICJ judgment
hinged on the statement that the US clemency procedure could not
adequately replace a review procedure that should have occurred within the
judicial process, not defined independently of it as stated by the party.
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Another aspect is raised by this case, mentioned by Schulte. 319 This is the
issue of how a state is addressed by the Court, namely in its entirety. On this
definition, a state cannot point to its domestic legal setup as a justification
for non-compliance, as the US did in LaGrand.320 All actions by public
officials at any level can be attributed to the state; nor can the state escape
accountability by invoking its legal system. The Court examined Art 41
Court Statute, and noted that:-

‗Art 94 of the UN Charter does not prevent orders made under Art 41 from
having binding character.‘

In general, an ICJ ruling does not necessarily imply a specific compliance
way. For example, in LaGrand compliance occurred by means of the
respondent‘s choice. However, factually in LaGrand, the means chosen
were found by the Court to be inadequate. Objective circumstances or
necessity may validly determine non-compliance, but not a political stance
that defies international law and the ICJ‘s authority.

319
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Thus, in order to conclude that non-compliance with a decision can be taken
as an act of aggression, the state must be perfectly clear on what it must do
to comply. Also, there is no stated timeframe for compliance in international
law.

Moreover, from a UN viewpoint, the UN Charter does not permit the threat
of or actual armed force to enforce compliance with an ICJ judgment,
unless in conformity with the Charter. In relation to the post-adjudication
phase, Art 94(2) Charter gives the aggrieved party the right to unilateral
measures, before recourse to the Security Council. This right is not
necessarily to the exclusion of other rights available.

The ICJ is the main legal body of the UN. There have been occasions when
the Court‘s pronouncements have taken on a greater political significance,
where the UN is separately involved. In 1992, in the aerial incident at
Lockerbie in Scotland involving Libya, the UK and the USA, there was an
attempt to use the ICJ proceedings to frustrate the Security Council‘s action
under Chapter VII of the Charter. In its orders of 14 th April, the Court stated
that all 3 states, as members of the UN, are obliged to act on the Security
Council‘s decisions under Art 25 UN Charter. The Court then stated that its
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own proceedings were at a different stage, namely that of provisional
measures. It elaborated that prima facie, the parties‘ obligation extends to
the decision in resolution 748 (1992). Therefore, the rights claimed by
Libya under the Montreal Convention (updated 1999) were overridden by
any protection by the indication of provisional measures – this was due to
the parties‘ obligations towards the UN resolution being more important
than the Montreal Convention due to Art 103 of the UN Charter.321 Further,
the rights enjoyed by the UK/USA under resolution 748 would likely be
impaired by an indication of the measures requested by Libya. The UN
thereby imposed sanctions against Libya. As a general point, the ICJ has
shown an aversion to get involved in the UN Security Council when the
latter is actively seised by the same dispute. Conversely, the UN has
overstepped very little in enforcing ICJ decisions.

4.4.3 Compliance and enforcement conclusion
In the WTO, as explained, any enforcing countermeasures are a temporary
measure, since specific performance of obligations is a higher obligation. If
the final judgment is that compliance has not occurred, the injured party has
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the right to impose countermeasures. In most cases, the body recommends
that the losing party amend its measures to comply, without specific
instructions. If there is no indication of implementation within the RPT, the
complainant can request authorization to suspend concessions. The practical
expectation in the DSU is that where there is a disagreement on compliance,
the parties must initially try to find a practical solution, to avoid a unilateral
outcome.

In WTO arbitration, the DSB should be promptly informed about the results
of the arbitration, but takes no independent action unless asked. The lack of
specific jurisdiction on proposed countermeasures leaves a high scope for
economic distortions. Thus, one criticism of WTO compliance procedures
could be that there is no backdated remedy. Any past wrongs not punished
weaken an already weak member – e.g. one with an undiversified economy.
One broad conclusion must be that trade retaliation is opposed to the
WTO‘s key trade precepts about liberalizing, not restricting, trade. The level
of deterrence is not very high. Fairly, enforcement would be better viewed
as a multilateral matter.

At the WTO institutional level, the DSB leaves compliance monitoring to
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the aggrieved party; this is hardly a fair or directly credible process. Also,
there could be recognition for partial compliance to date, to assist the
parties in eventual reconciliation in connection with the dispute. The ICJ
does not have defined direct enforcement tools. Since the ICJ has no
executive arm, its direct enforcement powers are limited. 322 Noncompliance with an ICJ decision may be viewed as an internationally
wrongful act; a breach of obligations ex contractu, and also of a duty
required by customary international law. With the exception of a decision
indicating provisional measures, non-compliance does not allow the ICJ to
impose sanctions proprio motu. Historically, the binding force of
indications of provisional measures under Art 41 was not conclusively
established until LaGrand.

Unlike in WTO (trade) law, there is no stated timeframe for compliance in
international law. Also, the ICJ has no punitive tools for non-compliance,
unlike the WTO.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

5.1 General summary

Certain ‗diplomatic‘ methods of dispute settlement predate the WTO and
the ICJ. They are non-judicial, relying largely on the parties‘ abilities to
resolve the dispute without a formal settlement or judgment. As
international law evolved, the use of these methods has declined. The
diplomatic methods may be used complementarily.

Of them, negotiation is a process that is still initially favoured by the UN. A
mediator can facilitate it. The particular dispute and parties will determine
the best methods to employ, to avoid judicial settlement. Two methods,
inquiry and fact finding, have dropped out of modern usage, but the ICJ
would benefit from independent verification methods. During the twentieth
century, the diplomatic methods made no reference to the parties‘ rights
under international law, which had been developing. Generally, the more
flexible a method, the more it might be adapted to the changing needs of
parties over time. Across all the methods, diplomacy is perhaps the least
formal, with judicial settlement being the most.
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The other type of settlement is called legal settlement, based on
international law. The two alternatives are arbitration (via a panel) and
judicial settlement (in a court), used to achieve a binding settlement where
diplomatic methods are either inappropriate or have failed.

Arbitration refers to the situation where the parties request a specially
convened tribunal, since, after diplomatic methods have failed, they prefer
judicial settlement. They perceive that the dispute can be resolved, in order
to aim for the award of reparations/damages. A panel is usually convened.
Such voluntarily demarcation of the dispute issues by the parties should
increase the chance that settlement will be adhered to. It requires the parties
to commence an agreed method of dispute resolution, whereas judicial
settlement typically might involve referring the dispute to the ICJ (or other
international court). The main outcome is usually the panel‘s award of
damages against the offending party. It is a recognised procedure within
both organisations; in the DSU, it would follow the WTO rules for the
procedures.

Brownlie has pointed out that international law does not obligate parties to
settle disputes, whereas the formal or legal procedures depend on the
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parties‘ consent.323

Historically

used

diplomatic

methods

include

negotiation, mediation, inquiry and conciliation. In the case of inquiry, over
time the commissions moved from purely fact finding to making judicial
pronouncements, reflecting the increasing influence of international law.
Mediation or good offices have given prominence to third parties occupying
certain offices, e.g. that of the UN Secretary General, as a conduit for
dispute settlement processes. Conciliation is also less used, ceding ground
to rules-based regimes such as GATT and the WTO. It originated from legal
issues contained in treaty law, which gave rise to permanent enquiry
commissions. Conciliation began out of inquiry, and incorporates inquiry
and mediation.

The WTO succeeded GATT in 1995, and this framework is addressed by the
DSU, which is guided by customary rules in international law (VCLT
1969)324.
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The DSB governs panel formation and the implementation of rulings, and
can impose sanctions on a party that has not followed DSU rulings. It also
accepts panel and AB Reports. In the ICJ, the ICJ Statute and the Rules of
Court are relevant. Where there is a conflict between them, the Statute has
precedence. If the parties do not want to refer the dispute to the ICJ, they
can opt for another tribunal or arbitration. The ICJ must establish its
jurisdiction, as well as the reasonableness of the claim in terms of law and
facts. In general, the burden of proof falls to the party which is wanting to
assert a fact. The emphasis in this thesis is a comparative evaluation
between the dispute settlement procedures in the WTO DSU and the ICJ.
Certain ideas are similar between the two, and others are quite different.
The conclusion aims partly to emphasis these areas.

Considering rules and procedures, in the DSU, Appellate Review is new and
pervasive. It may counterweigh the otherwise one-sidedness in the WTO‘s
exclusively compulsory jurisdiction, by being a higher check on panels;
appeals on many reports have led to appellate review. This might not reflect
well on the quality of panel reasoning, since many decisions have been
amended by the AB, which has working procedures of its own. The ICJ has
updated its Rules of Court, with a number of changes in 1972 and 1978. Art
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41 of the ICJ Statute enables the Court to state interim provisional measures
to protect the rights of the requesting, aggrieved party. There are written,
then oral proceedings, consideration and finally judgment. The ICJ can set
out the issues for parties to consider in negotiations; state what agreement
(e.g. treaty between the parties) must be followed; or state that a specific
dispute settlement process should be adhered to.

In the DSU, if the parties do not agree that implementation and processes
are on track 45 days after panel report adoption, the original complainant
can request arbitration. The panel decides the RPT for implementation. In
recent times, if the offending party prefers longer, then the burden of proof
falls on it under Art 21.3.(c), to demonstrate why. One issue under panel
scrutiny is whether implementation can occur by administrative or
legislative change, the latter usually taking longer. Issues such as developed
or developing country may enter the calculation.

There could be active monitoring of compliance within the RPT, which
might reduce the likelihood of eventual punitive measures. This panel can
resort to arbitration, which must end within 90 days of original report
adoption. If the offending party does not follow the rulings of the original
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panel, or (by consensus since 1999) additionally, a compliance panel‘s
rulings also have not been adhered to, or if the offending party has then
failed to negotiate compensation, then under Art 22, the aggrieved party has
less preferred choice of requesting authorisation to suspend trade
concessions or other obligations. These are seen as temporary, since they
are trade-distorting.

Regarding DSU implementation disputes, an Art 21.5 Compliance Panel
can be requested. Here also, the party that asserts a fact has the burden of
proof to prove it, and the party that asserts a defence based on an exception
must establish that. There are no stated timeframes for implementation and
processes within the ICJ. Whatever the reason, it might explain why dispute
linger for so long. The burden of proof lies with the party which wants to
assert a fact(s): the complainant. Implementation can include an order to
negotiate, and the parties may jointly agree to vary the ICJ‘s decision. There
are written, then oral phases in the proceedings.

The court can sit in chambers, to expedite the case where complex
international law does not arise. Any intergovernmental organisation may
file an amicus curiae memorial with the ICJ on an ongoing case.

190

The WTO‘s jurisdiction is compulsory and exclusive jurisdiction in trade
law disputes for members. From Art 27, VCLT 1969, a member cannot
invoke internal laws as justification for failure to perform a treaty, taken as
a WTO covered agreement. This distinction caused a tension in the ICJ with
the US government in the LaGrand and Avena cases, whereby the ICJ
issued a future requirement by the USA to undertake changes to prevent that
state passing responsibility for domestic decisions to the relevant governor
in LaGrand.325 In the WTO, the panel will delineate its own jurisdiction, but
the AB can delineate this. Also, the AB can amend its jurisdiction in the
light of facts, whereas the panel‘s terms of reference are given. A panel‘s
weighing of evidence is based on fact, whereas that of the AB is based on
law and facts.

Jurisdiction in the ICJ is quite different. It may be mutually voluntary, or by
special agreement, for example. Another tribunal might be appropriate
instead. In the WTO the AB can overrule a panel on legal grounds, but there
is no such process for ICJ judgments. In the DSU Art 22 (arbitration),
jurisdiction is limited to finding a RPT for compliance. The ICJ considers
jurisdiction in the order: narrowest to widest, i.e. it prefers to establish
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jurisdiction for a lesser rather than a greater reason. Where a reservation in
a treaty prevents jurisdiction, overriding customary law can provide it (e.g.
the Nicaragua case).326 Art 36(2), ICJ Statute contains an optional clause
which expanded jurisdiction by increasing the scope with regard to treaties,
international law, and facts in relation to international obligations. Where
there might be a basis for jurisdiction, Art 66 of the Rules still permit a
request for provisional measures to a requesting party. The usual procedure
to initiate a case in the WTO is for a member to bring a complaint, whereas
there are a number of ways in which the ICJ can be seised of a dispute.

The next area is the judicial aspects of dispute settlement. DSU, Art 3.2
states that any WTO adjudicating body must clarify the existing provisions
of the WTO agreements in line with customary rules of interpretation of
public international law.
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Authors such as Van den Bossche have taken a broad view of DSU sources
of law, adding general legal principles (for example, good faith), other
international agreements (for example a regional trading arrangement such
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)),327 the subsequent
practice of members, and negotiating history (including GATT also).
Subsequent practice means interpretative element, not legal source.

In the ICJ, for interpretation it is usual to apply Arts 31 to 33 of the VCLT
1969 in relation to the Statute. One ambiguity lies in where a matter cannot
be decided based on the Statute or Rules, the ICJ can decide the matter ‗in
terms of international justice.‘ Provisional measures have no res judicata
status, and can be rescinded or changed. The standard of proof can be
drawn from inferences of fact, provided they leave no room for reasonable
doubt. The Court has varied this standard over the years. The Court Rules
do not state the level of proof, so the Court uses its discretion in relation to
facts.
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For the burden of proof, there are no stated rules in the DSU. The burden of
proof is on the party (whether complainant or respondent) which asserts a
specific claim or defence to prove it. Also, a party that invokes an exception
provision in its defence must prove that the exception conditions have been
met. Once any proof is made, the burden then shifts to the other party. Also,
if the arguments are equally balanced, the defendant would get the benefit
of the doubt, until that party conclusively shifts the burden back to the
complainant (e.g. US – Section 301 Trade Act).328

Compliance in the DSU concerns essentially whether or not a member has
fulfilled its obligations under the WTO agreements. Countermeasures refer
to the suspension of tariff concessions, deriving from Art 22.3 of the DSU,
whereby the aggrieved member must initially seek to suspend in the
affected sector. The second choice is a different sector. The DSB may prefer
temporary compensation to sanctions. The

DSU categorises any

countermeasure as temporary, because the initial violating action is to be
temporary. Countermeasures are requested from Art 22.2, and are rare. They
should not exceed the injury caused, and backdated ways to calculate injury
have been proposed but not adopted, which remains unfair to the offended
328
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party; but then sanctions hurt both parties. In the DSU, an Art 21.5
compliance can widen the scope to include backdated counterclaims by
each party, whereas the ICJ has no compliance review tools.

An arbitration panel is resorted to if the parties cannot agree the level of
countermeasures (Art 3.2 DSU). A recommendation by the DSU to the
offending member is then usual. From Canada – Pharmaceutical Patents
onwards, the arbitrator has been stricter about a shorter RPT. 329 Greater
sensitivity to weak institutional structures in members might assist in
calculating the RPT fairly. The implementing member bears the burden of
proof about why the RPT should be different.

After EC - Bananas III, it became practice that compliance procedures
under Art 21.5 should be completed before recourse to arbitration under Art
22, over which the DSB takes no action unless requested. 330 There is no
appeal against an Art 22.6 arbitration decision. The compliance record for
ICJ decisions is good, but the Court does not monitor compliance. There is
no guidance in the event of non-compliance.
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However, the ICJ often requests information information about compliance
under Art 78 Court Rules. The evidence for compliance with provisional
measures (now binding) is less than for final orders. Unlike WTO trade law,
international law does not contain timeframes for compliance.

Regarding enforcement mechanisms in the ICJ, the UN Security Council
can make recommendations, or take other actions under Chapter VI, UN
Charter. This is clarified in Arts 59 and 60 of the ICJ Statute. Also, from Art
94(2) UN Charter, if an offending party does not implement an ICJ ruling,
the aggrieved party might recourse to the Security Council. The party can
request the Security Council to take enforcement measures, absent
compliance. An executive arm in the ICJ would have enabled a meaningful
internal compliance function, rather than relying on the Security Council.
Where the political significance of an order ICJ has been greater, the
Security Council has been more willing to become involved.

5.2 Recommendations for the future
5.2.1 Rules and procedures
The ICJ is the main legal body of the UN and is therefore ultimately
accountable to the UNSC, whereas the DSB of the WTO, after a case is
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subjected to Appellate Review, is not externally accountable in the WTO.
This makes for a lack of transparency; so the DSB‘s status in the WTO
could be improved. Generally, WTO rulings could fall prey to legal
fashions, instead of following conventions from international commercial
law. Consequently, the legal arguments underpinning the AB‘s decisions
could be made more transparent.

The ICJ is slow to make decisions and so many disputes are not referred to
it, but one could argue that each dispute is adjudicated on the merits.
Conversely, the WTO is based on a defined rules system. Therefore, the
WTO needs a review process to scrutinise its rules in the light of specific
disputes, to see whether the rules need to be updated. The ICJ has twice
updated its Rules.

5.2.1.1 WTO
The AB does not actively monitor dispute settlement processes. One
remedy this would be to add a monitoring committee, to increase
accountability in the WTO. Another aspect of internal accountability is
between member states. Until 2000 or so, countries in a dispute would
privately agree on panellists. Other (affected) members should be informed,
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to prevent collusive power abuses. Secondly, there should be a procedure to
decide which members are directly affected. It could then be debated
whether/which state parties should have a say in panel selection.

There are two institutions within the WTO for accountability. These are the
Trade Policy Review Mechanism and the DSU, but transparency is not
mentioned in the DSU. This has meant that such issues have been largely
left to panels and the AB. This should be changed by means of amendments
to the DSB; the WTO has been accused of secrecy. A committee to monitor
and evaluate the WTO‘s policy initiatives might help. A transparency lack
can be analysed in terms of fairness and/or efficiency. As a general
postulate, putting equity under consideration, states with more legal
resources are better positioned to develop procedures to synchronise with
the demands of the DSB. In this regard, a lack of transparency will likely
adversely affect developing countries over time. Basic transparency can be
further assessed. Firstly, we can consider access to documents. In line with
a WTO members‘ preference to limit the number of documents in exempt
categories, the General Council adopted some de-restriction (1996).
However, working documents, timetables and agendas, and Secretariat
notes are restricted. Yet access to these is an important aspect of being
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influencing proceedings.

One issue is the efficiency argument of making panel and AB proceedings
public as they occur. The argument is as follows. Many panel decisions
have been overturned by the AB, partly because panel decisions often refer
to previous rulings as law, whereas each case has its distinctive
characteristics. By widening public access, the panel deliberations can be
criticised, and should lead to a better choice of panellists. This would free
up AB panel review time. Other stakeholders in the DSU would benefit
from public access to documents. Opening submissions to criticism would
enable a more transparent legal process, and therefore fairness, since legal
precedents could be debated as the case proceeds. An efficiency gain results
because it would reduce appeals on legal grounds. AB rulings are deficient
in that they are adopted subject to the proviso only of negative consensus.
There should be a case-by-case review; the General Council and Ministerial
Conference should be more activist.

A second issue is that of due process, for example the communication
between WTO bodies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and
more generally, civil society groups. Here, a basic concern is that these
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groups‘ ability to influence proceedings is lacking. This would be assisted
by real-time access. Another matter is the lack of an accepted method for
verifying arguments raised in proceedings. To improve this, greater
transparency could include the scrutiny of experts, and presentations by
NGOs. This implies a theme of greater participation by members, or other
groups.

Developing country members have complained that they are excluded from
informal meetings in the WTO; also voting is avoided, and consensus used,
usually via informal ‗Green Room‘ meetings. These are dominated by the
USA, EU, Japan and Canada (the Quad). States with large market shares get
much more input into and influence with decisions. Less economically
dominant states frequently follow leaders. Taking part remains by
invitation. Most such decisions are presented at an advanced stage, with it
being too late for developing countries to participate effectively.

Greater transparency can result from representation. The European
Commission produced a strategy document about WTO reforms. A short
term proposal was an informal group to report its findings to a plenary
session, where any member could express an opinion. Another suggestion
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for developing country members is a collective voice (e.g. regional), with
more overall effectiveness. Developing country members need to increase
permanent representation in Geneva. A tiered deadline system with close
monitoring might help, due to their limited legal resources.

More

participation will be achieved.

Abuse of power can be curbed by increased transparency; there could be a
WTO strategy committee that meets periodically to assess whether some
party or parties are abusing their power in world trade.

5.2.1.2 ICJ
One proposal is that judges should not be allowed to be re-elected. So for
greater accountability, they could be elected for 9 year terms, and one-third
of the bench would be elected every 3 years. This change would require
amendments to Art 13 Court Statute and Art 2.1 Rules. The former
represents more obstacles since it has not yet been amended. Also, to
safeguard the quality of their decisions, an age cap should be introduced.
NGOs should be given the chance to be party to proceedings, especially in
cases with multilateral impacts (jurisdiction ratione personae).The ICJ is
the only international tribunal that does not permit them any status in
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contentious cases. One rationale for this is that they have acquired a legal
status in international law. For example, a state may impinge on others by
its whaling activities, and Greenpeace represents the welfare of animal
groups.

The ICJ has not revised its decades-old view of international participation.
However, political disputes between two states can have regional political
and economic impacts; consider this as evidenced by the existence of
regional bodies, such as the EU, Mercosur, the Arab League, and the
Organisation of Islamic Conference. There could be a major review of what
type or types of entity can initiate a case. This would conform to the
evolution of international law, and could happen by a change to the Statute
(Art 53.2), allowing jurisdiction ratione materiae.

One lack of transparency in the ICJ‘s rules and procedures is a deficiency in
publicly available information concerning how rules and procedures have
been or are drafted by the Court. Of the travaux preparatoires of the Court
Rules, the public only sees background notes which accompany a new
version or revision to the Rules, which do not show the main issues driving
changes. These should be publicly available. This would reinforce
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confidence in the Court‘s authority, and might lead to a greater recourse to it
in the event of a dispute. Improved compliance might also result, since the
discord in rule interpretation is potentially reduced if the discussions
surrounding rules creation are made public. This can make the Rules
perceived to be more participative than dictatory.

Analogous to the DSU discussion, is the idea of realtime access to the ICJ‘s
deliberations as the case proceeds, to modernise the ICJ‘s transparency.
Also, resistance to the court‘s authority can be curbed by increased
transparency.

Another aspect of rules and procedures for future change is that of due
process. The ICJ is enabled under Art 51 ICJ Statute to form an
investigative body for important contested data. Here, it is relevant to
consider how relatively open two regimes are, and therefore what steps
might be taken. Consider, for example, communication between the ICJ and
NGOs.

As for appeals procedures (fairness), there could be an appeals procedure
along the lines of the WTO DSU, i.e. within 60 days of the ICJ judgment.
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This will increase the desire of parties to go the ICJ when a dispute arises.

5.2.2 Implementation and processes: general
One theme is fairness in both organisations, for example weak vs. srong
countries. A strong country might implement more easily, whereas a weak
one may need some types of institutional or other support. The DSU is
considered first. From the DSU, the principles of good faith, due process
and procedural fairness are embodied in Arts 3.10, 3.7 and 4.3.

For the ICJ, one fairness theme is whether a permanent international
tribunal should be involved in any domestic laws. Should the ICJ safeguard
individual human rights where a state has not followed due process? In
LaGrand, the ICJ‘s indication of provisional measures was disregarded by
US local and federal authorities.331 To prevent such occurrences, there
should be a monitoring process to check what action the state authorities are
taking.

Another issue is that a strong state may not see fit to permit foreign
nationals full diplomatic rights to contact their embassy: the LaGrand
331
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brothers did not receive this benefit. Germany‘s only remedy was an
assurance that the US would not in future fail to provide review and
reconsideration. So, the ICJ could have a corrective function for fairness by
standing ready to correct such abuses of international law if notified by the
aggrieved party. Moreover, a number of states are not signatories to
international treaties; have not accepted the ICJ‘S jurisdiction; or have
accepted it with reservations. Because of this, scope for violations of rights
exist, e.g. of ILO conventions for immigrant workers. The Court‘s remit
should be amended to clarify to states the necessity of respecting and
protect rights such as civil, political, economic and social human rights.

In the DSU, evidence shows that traditional diplomatic processes have
become more judicialised. Overall, many disputes could be resolved
amicably and quickly by better use of these methods in early in the dispute.
Art 4.3 DSU refers to good faith in consultations. In Mexico - HFCS (Art
21.5), the AB required procedural fairness in terms via the relationship of
the respondent to the complainant‘s right to request a compliance panel.332
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Mexico – Anti-dumping investigation of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) from the United States:
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the US, 22/06/01, WT/DS132/RW.

205

However, there is no legal requirement to hold consultations in good faith,
which should be instituted as a rule change to improve procedural fairness
early in the process. For the ICJ, by contrast, there is a requirement to use
all available diplomatic methods to try to resolve the dispute, and may
explain why if these methods fail, both parties then go to the court. In the
DSU, consider the criticism that management processes are not sufficiently
monitored. This implies excessive familiarity between economically strong
members, e.g.: more informal meetings occur. At the Seattle meeting
(1999), about 60 countries, including developing ones, threatened to leave
since they were not included in the ‗Green Room.‘ One remedy would be to
institute a management board to try to include processes for all members,
including regional bodies to strengthen their identities and perception of the
DSU. This should also speed up decision-making processes. In the ICJ, it is
possible that one member is/ feels weaker than the other, and might not
fully contest the case, to retain good diplomatic relations. To remedy this,
the ICJ could offer good offices or some other process by which the weak
member might fully state its position.

Another deficiency in the DSU lies in the panel system. For example, panel
members have often been government representatives, not trade or legal
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specialists. This has fed criticism of panel decisions, e.g. in consistency and
legal judgments. Thus, it has seemed to be a closed bureaucratic system run
by officials, possibly with their own political agendas. One improvement
would be panel selection by the parties from a pool of trade experts. This
should improve efficiency, since Appellate review will then take less time.
Additionally, a number of cases have hinged on the correct interpretation of
environmental treaties or international law. DSU panellists have been
criticised for a narrow legal interpretation. There has also been no DSU
requirement for panellists to seek advice from experts. The ‗experts or
jurists‘ approach would increase transparency and improve due process,
which is part of the the public perception of fairness as well. Selecting
senior judges, law professors, and judges from international law rather than
trade officials has though been occurring since 2000-1, and should continue.
A panel should perhaps thereby develop more of the attributes of a standing
body, rather than an ad hoc facility. Comparing with the ICJ, there the
judges must have international law competence. The risk of judging issues
without relevant expertise is less likely. The WTO thus needs to address
public interest issues much more openly and broadly.

A fact about developing countries is their weaker financial position,
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preventing them from launching many DSU cases. This has fairness and
free trade implications. There could be an international pool of jurists, to be
called on if the plaintiff (or the defendant) can show a lack of financial
means. For the ICJ, sensitivity should be shown to the political setup of a
weaker country.

As regards specific sanctions in the DSU, the suspension of concessions and
other obligations has usually meant the imposition of a 100% tariff by the
aggrieved party on the offending party. But this can cause a third or further
party to be hurt by punitive retaliation. This contravenes the stated objective
of Art 3.2, which is about ‗providing security and predictability to the
multilateral trading system.‘ One future suggestion is some other, less tradedistorting corrective measure. This also impacts fairness as an international
social welfare. This was suggested by Australia in the Negotiations on
Improvements and Clarifications of the DSU (July 2002), third party/other
party compensation rights should also be respected. In the ICJ, the two
parties usually commence a case, but the Court should likewise be proactive
in deciding which other parties may be affected.

Australia also highlighted the unacceptability for third parties of no
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timeframes in bilateral compensation. Countries which are part of a regional
trading agreement will be more sensitive to such needs. Specific proposals
to streamline the DSU might include:-

1 rules to resolve conflicts of interest;
2 specialise the WTO legal department;
3 explore improving access to the DSU for all members;
4 Define processes to ensure parties can get expert pertinent information
to the panel or AB;
5 an open process for a recognised external organisation to provide
relevant information;
6 Ensure that changes to timeframes are fair to disadvantaged states.

Point 6 is also applicable in the ICJ, where the judgment should include
guidance on timeframes and implementation.

Now, onto the AB. Regarding developing countries, in EC - Sardines, it said
that interpretation should guarantee fairness to developing countries, by
ensuring that access to the DSU, where limited due to funds, should not be
prejudiced in favour of industrialised members‘ greater skill
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in tilting

procedures in their favour. 333 In the ICJ, jurisdiction derives from
international law, customary law, and treaty law. Analogously, the Court
could become alert as to whether strong states can influence processes
unfairly.

There is a need for the ICJ to differentiate between remedies for violations
of international law and the need for domestic legal or other processes to be
corrected where there has been a treaty violation. Otherwise, the Court is
stopping short of its obligations as an international tribunal. This can be
compared

with

the

DSU,

where

corrective

action

can

include

recommendations about domestic changes needed in order to comply.

5.2.2.1 WTO: specific recommendations
As shown, developing countries might need special attention. Specifically,
the initial consultation period could be extended to 60 days, and the general
consultation period limited to 30 days, to streamline the process. Art 21
(surveillance of implementation of recommendations and rulings), could be
streamlined. To improve the effectiveness of 21.5, panels or the AB should
make implementation suggestions under Art 19.1 more readily. Then,
333

EC – Trade description of sardines, 26/09/02, WT/DS231/AB/R, AB-2002-3.
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appellate review in an Art 21.5 review is faster because the AB is revisiting
the issues.

Regarding Art 21.3.(c), one proposal would be to change the DSU, such that
the parties could negotiating on the RPT as soon as the dispute settlement
report is adopted. They could ask the WTO Director General to appoint an
arbitrator 30 days after report adoption, to increase efficiency and the
likelihood of observing the stated 90 day deadline. Presently, the losing
member only has to provide a status report regularly, from 6 months into the
RPT. The reports should begin before the RPT, and the offending state be
required to state an implementation tasks timetable.

A third area for reform is Art 22 DSU, for compensation and suspension of
concessions. It would be better to calculate the nullification of impairment
at the time that the RPT is set. Then, there could be a correspondence
between the degree of wrongdoing and the time it might take to rectify it.
The calculation of correct countermeasures should be backdated to the
initial wrongdoing. This is exacerbated for developing countries, where a
delayed implementation might magnify the problems of a small export
product range, a few markets, or a few big trading partners. In 2003, Japan
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suggested an addition to Art 22. If the complaining party finds that the
offending party is not likely to implement the recommendations and rulings
within the RPT, then the complaining party can request negotiations with
the other party, with an intention to arrive at a mutually acceptable
compensation figure. The AB should oversee this dialogue, to assess what
monitoring would be required.

5.2.2.2 ICJ: specific recommendations
Provisional measures have been indicated mainly due to the urgency and
risk of irreparable prejudice to the stated rights. In LaGrand,since a
person‘s execution was imminent, an urgent request for a ruling was made.
The Court interpreted ‗examine‘ as ‗make an order,‘ without giving both
parties the audience of a hearing. Thus, the order excludes the principle
audiatur et altera pars and should at least avail itself of an emergency
power to do so, which could be written into the Court Rules.

An important issue is the current dispute might become aggravated in the
future. It would be better for the Court to track the dispute in all its historic
and recent context to establish the need for provisional measures, to prevent
aggravation of the present dispute, e.g. by drawing in neighbouring
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countries. Thus, the ICJ should state what steps need to be taken by the
parties in order to prevent the dispute becoming more damaging;
provisional measures can prevent the dispute becoming aggravated.

Much trade between large states is bilateral, so the consensus model in the
WTO might be revised. Two state initiated cases, as in the ICJ, would be
more efficient. More important than DSU consensus might be closer
compliance monitoring. Using trade experts would help. Separately, a short
term for AB members, and their desire to get reappointed, could be
remedied by updating 4-year renewable terms to longer non-renewable
ones.

Other aspects of a lack of dissent in the WTO are important. Firstly,
precedents set by the DSB can lack credibility. In January 2003, the African
Group forwarded a proposal that Arts 14.3 and 17.11 should be changed so
that panellists and AB members must issue separate opinions, or joint
opinions where 2 or more panellists agree. The DSU system of corrected
panel decisions wastes time; perhaps the panel process needs to be
subsumed within the AB. In the ICJ, other sides can be relevant, for
example as applied to declaratory judgments where a state makes a request
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to the Court based on actions of other states. The ICJ should be able to be
seised by more than two parties.

5.2.3 Jurisdiction and scope
5.2.3.1 WTO
At 19(2), the DSU prevents the AB from varying any rights or obligations
in covered agreements. Consider the US – Shrimp case.334 The complainants
accused the AB of effectively completing the analysis; a lack of panel factfinding; and that amicus curiae briefs from NGOs could not be used by a
WTO member. Thailand argued that, by seeking facts, the AB had
undermined the rights of WTO members to interpret WTO covered
agreements, so it was a contravention of treaty, and therefore, international
law. The main complainant concern was that the AB seemed more
politically then legally inclined. The future implication is that the WTO
Agreement cannot operate self-standing, but in conjunction with the VCLT
1969.

We now refer to the Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks dispute between Mexico
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United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by Malaysia,22/10/01,AB-2001-4, WT/DS58/AB/RW.
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and the USA, concerning NAFTA.335 Mexico asserted that the panel could
not decline jurisdiction under NAFTA rules, as the US wanted. The AB
found that panels have inherent powers to decide jurisdiction, including
scope. Jurisdiction in the DSU needs clarity regarding regional trade laws.
Some process is needed; a resolution whereby the AB must show
consistency if it completes the analysis. One remedy is a remand
mechanism in the DSU, which might be initiated by the DSB, if one or
more parties request it. The DSU might be amended for this, to rectify the
procedural deficiency. Since there are no higher checks on adopted reports
above the AB, an external surveillance panel could help. Also, the panel
could be chosen by the ILC, for example.

If the panel should have sought more information, and the AB finds that
such information would materially affect the outcome, it should then refer
the matter to the Secretariat (another permanent body) for a second opinion.

The next area is the jurisdiction and scope of an Art 21.5 compliance panel.
In the original panel, the scope of what claims may be raised and what
count towards measures taken to comply are restricted. For compliance,
335

Mexico – Tax Measures on soft drinks and other beverages, 06/03/06, WTDS308/AB/R, AB-2005-10.
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claims different to the original ones can be presented. However, a panel can
refuse a defendant‘s request to restrict the terms of reference, and the
plaintiff will want to broaden the scope. The issues raised are what should
be the scope of a compliance appeal, and what would be the jurisdiction?
For the future, the DSB should consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether
the original panel would do better to have a narrow or more widely
delineated scope. Also, should appellate review have greater scope in the
original panel rulings, to tackle whether a compliance panel had the correct
view of its jurisdiction? Again, perhaps more scope should be written into
the DSU to allow critical appellate reviews of panels.

Generally, according to the AB, compliance panel scope will possibly have
to assess the interaction between old and new specific agreements within
the WTO. Unlike in many ICJ disputes, there are more dynamic factors in
trade disputes, than in international law, so it might help if an original panel
could have anticipated disputes/issues included in its jurisdiction.

There is evidence of a perceived need to anticipate the intended nature of
compliance as falling within jurisdictional scope. Compliance panels would
do better to anticipate what a member‘s intended corrective action is, in
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order to better define rulings and reduce the likelihood of an appeal by the
complainant in terms of measures taken to comply.

In Australia – Salmon (Article 21.5 – Canada),336 the compliance panel
stated how broad its powers to decide the scope of its jurisdiction might be:
‗…an Article 21.5 proceeding is not limited to consistency of certain
measures with the DSB recommendations and rulings adopted as a result of
the original dispute; nor to consistency with those covered agreements or
specific provisions thereof that fell within the mandate of the original panel;
nor to consistency with specific WTO provisions under which the original
panel found violations. If the intention behind this provision of the DSU had
been to limit the mandate of Article 21.5 compliance panels in any of these
ways, the text would have specified such limitation.‘

Perhaps to increase the predictive power for WTO members, compliance
panel statements should be ratified or corrected by the AB.
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Australia – Measures affecting importation of salmon – recourse to Article 21.5 by Canada, 18/02/00,
WT/DS18/RW.
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5.2.3.2 ICJ
Generally, since both parties usually agree to take a dispute to the Court,
adjudication depends on the parties‘ shared goodwill. Compared to the
DSU‘s compulsory, exclusive jurisdiction, the ICJ‘s power could be
expanded, to avoid too much reliance on the UNSC. Consider that the ICJ
has relatively few states which have accepted its jurisdiction. In the ICJ,
within a given dispute, if a particular area of the dispute is not included in
the parties‘ submissions, then the ICJ has no jurisdiction on those points. In
the WTO, the jurisdiction applicable in a review case can easily exceed that
of the original case. This reflects that measures to comply cam imply
interrelated issues also. There is no such mechanism in the ICJ, and the
decision cannot be appealed.

Since the ICJ‘s standard of review of a case is delineated by the
protagonists, the jurisdiction is limited and therefore possibly short-sighted.
The dispute may then recur in a modified form, or the parties might collude
to resolve the preferred problems, but avoid another dispute that might
involve a weaker state, to perpetuate some other dispute to their mutual
advantage. The scope should be able to be determined by the Court. In the
DSU, the AB reviews the panel‘s jurisdiction. There is no such review

218

mechanism in the ICJ, which might also explain why few states have the
confidence to go to the Court. This could be changed. One thing the Court
could do is to emphasise relevant points in UN Charter law on the use of
force.

One specific issue about scope is when can a state commit force in selfdefence. This is associated with jurisdiction, for example whether it is short,
medium, or long-term. It matters whether there is a history of disputes, for
example in a fisheries sea dispute. Legal scholars hold that jurisdiction
might arise where the right to self-defence is triggered by an actual armed
attack by one state on another; e.g. to the extent of ending an invasion.
Jurisdiction can apply to whether the retaliating state can use force
additionally to deter a future attack. The interaction between the UN and the
ICJ could be clarified also.

One problem is that the ICJ‘s jurisdiction is not exclusive. States have opted
out, for example via the Optional Protocol to the VCCR 1963.337
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There is scope for power imbalances due to reservations, causing potential
regional or other power abuses. There should be a review mechanism
whereby reservations must be approved of, the UN General Assembly.

The scope of DSU law is economic, whereas the ICJ‘s potential jurisdiction
in non-economic areas is in principle greater. Judge Higgins has highlighted
ambiguity in this distinction; the ICJ has not always accounted for taken all
aspects of international law, e.g. Art 31(3), VCLT 1963 might refer to an
economic and commercial treaty. Competing interpretations can arise,
which should be remedied, probably in the ICJ Statute.

Significantly, constitutional amendments will be needed to formally expand
the ICJ‘s jurisdiction: to introduce worldwide compulsory jurisdiction, the
1945 UN Charter would require changes, since the ICJ draws its legal status
from that. Also, if there were more consitutionalised supervision of ICJ
processes by other empowered bodies, more states would willingly
subscribe to the ICJ‘s compulsory jurisdiction. The ICJ Statute could be
amended to permit access by, e.g. international organisations which have a
mandate to make observations about state behaviour, concerning e.g. human
rights or ecological welfare. The role of the UN Secretary General could be
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expanded to point a dispute towards the ICJ‘s jurisdiction.

Where the parties invoke different sources of law, there is a tension in
interpretation; e.g. there can be a direct contradiction between treaty and
customary law interpretations. Usually, the treaty has imposed a stricter
code of conduct, so the Court should decide more actively what conduct is
acceptable. Also, stability is a key desirable outcome, so the likely impact
of different types of interpretational rules need to be taken into account.
The ICJ can use customary law to ascertain the scope of a treaty containing
a compromissory clause, i.e. to resolve an ambiguity. Where international
law principles are being undermined by a narrow interpretation, the Court
should presume that international law takes precedence. Expanding
jurisdictional scope would tend prevent the fragmenting of international
law, rather than enable a compromissory clause to enable an escape.

5.2.4 Judicial aspects and burden of proof
5.2.4.1 WTO
One theme is justiciability, i.e. when can the case be declined on
jurisdictional grounds? Consistency is important; it would be best tackled
by the DSB. The DSU could be amended, to enable the DSB to refer such
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cases to the General Council, to be interpreted according to Art IX:2. There
is an ambiguity as to whether the AB has legal authority, or does this derive
solely from precedent. This could be clarified.

One theme that should be considered is whether the DSU has shown too
much judicial activism, i.e. whether panels and/or the AB have gone beyond
the intended remits in legal interpretations. The proponents of this view
believe that negotiated settlements are preferable to modern judicial
settlement. On justice as fairness, one change from the GATT regime to the
WTO is that the AB has stated that WTO bodies can draw evidence from
any source, not just what the parties present. The panel may decide what
weight, if any, to ascribe to external evidence, but there should be some
ranking ascribed to sources, e.g. NGOs. Lesser developed countries fear
losing out to developed countries, since such organisations are funded in
developed countries. In US - British Steel, the AB accepted information
from NGOs which the panel had rejected, because Art 17.9 DSU highlights
its authority to adopt procedural rules as long as they do not conflict with
those in the DSU or covered agreements.338
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For the future, the DSU should state that such sources can be taken if the
acceptance criteria are made clear during the case. This will be more
transparent and fairer. There should also be a fair objection procedure to
amicus briefs unless the legal justification is given. Also, if party A has
furnished information that bears on the case, then party B should have an
equal right to present (opposing) information.

A panel has a duty to be objective (DSU Art 11). This should include
helping to make all pertinent arguments properly addresses by the parties.
In general, the timetable according to which amicus briefs were accepted
during a proceeding should be public information, and be decided at the
start of the case, not incidentally. This is in line with transparency and
fairness.

One approach to inconsistency or judicial activism by panels is to move
from ad hoc to permanent panellists, a suggestion similar to extending the
appointment term of ICJ judges. Three aspects of DSU panels could be
considered. These are: judicial independence, credibility, and efficiency.
One important change would be to drop the requirement of panel consent. A
gain should be in the quality of panel rulings, which would not be
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politically pressurised to show anonymity. As regards trade law, there is
clearly scope to improve the selection criteria of panellists; this step will
reduce overturning by the AB, which is comprised of specialists. This
would carry out full support functions such as research `more in-house,'
rather than rely on the internal diplomacy required to make requests of the
Secretariat. Its nationality and geographical composition would be carefully
designed.

Also, to increase the fairness in the AB, the number of members could be
increased. Overall, the judicial offices that constitute the DSB could be
redesigned, to give them greater judicial credibility. The term of office
could be increased from 4 to possibly 6 years.

Public opinions about sanitary and phytosanitary risks have been important
in the DSU. The types of legal issues raised are: how much does SPS
jurisprudence recognise such public opinion; what is the degree of
consistency between international economic law and public international
law, including international human rights treaties and international
environmental law? Art 5.5, SPS states an obligation to avoid arbitrary or
unjustifiable distinctions in protection levels that Members find appropriate
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in different scenarios, if the consequence is discrimination or a concealed
restriction on international trade. Conversely, due to scientific uncertainty, a
member should be able to retain sanitary or phytosanitary measures because
its population does not want a certain risk. Public opinion can form a part of
such risk assessments. In the future, to balance competing interests, panels
could become involved with the scientific issues impacting a dispute. The
test is, for example, to apply Art 5.6, to ascertain whether alternative
measures would have been sufficient. For the long term improvement of
international trade law, domestic member scientific practice and
international environmental law also need to be considered in the
interpretation of the SPS Agreement.

How the burden of proof is or might be applied is a key part of the DSU.
One deficiency in the DSU is the lack of any stated rules. The jurisdiction in
the DSU is compulsory, whereas it is frequently based on the parties'
consensus in the ICJ. Thus, in the ICJ, the parties may have better prepared
arguments for proof, but not so in the DSU. The scope for unpredictable
recurrence of a related dispute is therefore more likely in the WTO, and this
consumes resources.
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To augment the DSU, more inputs could increase transparency and
consistency. For example, a panel decision should tell the parties whether
and what amicus briefs were considered, and what factors affected the final
decision. Developing countries might then improve the standard of their
submissions.

Also important is how the burden of proof is applied in a case which the
DSU hears under a specific WTO agreement, e.g. the SPS Agreement. The
burden of proof needs to consider complicated issues about scientific
knowledge, to arrive at the correct legal answer, and when to consider that
the burden of proof has shifted. This process should be clarified in the DSU.
Scientific risk assessment becomes part of case facts, so the criteria for
appointing an expert agency matter. Developing countries might need active
guidance. From Art 17.6 DSU, in an ordinary dispute, the AB may
considering only matters of law, and not facts, which only the panel can. In
an SPS dispute, it is not sensible to make the same law/facts distinction, so
the AB needs a different approach. This should be clarified in the DSU. In
such specific disputes, the panel should have some scientific experts and
legal interpretational experts. By taking a more systemic approach, the AB
will better avoid the accusation of judicial activism.
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The AB must better explain why it is or is not satisfied that the burden of
proof has (not) been shifted. When in the SPS Agreement, a panel decides
that if a measure fails to conform to an international standard, the burden of
proof under Art 3.3 then shifts to the defending party. There have been cases
where the AB has seemed to exercise judicial economy, by not considering
different SPS clauses equally. Consistency needs to be improved, with a
remand procedure, whereby the AB legally appraises the panel's decision.

In the future, the WTO will face evolving challenges. For example, it will
need to decide whether issues such as competition are rightly viewed within
the DSB's jurisdiction. The finding that the 1916 Anti-Dumping Act was
affected by Art VI GATT meant a significant impact on the burden of proof,
whereas the USA preferred competition issues outside the WTO. The DSU
may need revision, with some reference to treaty law.

Separately, the allocation of the burden of proof is not stated in the DSU.
The general principle is that the burden of proof lies is on the claimant:
actori incumbit probatio or actori incumbit onus proband (Art XX GATT).
International law offers no extra guidance. More guidance should be written
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into the DSU, since there is potential deficiency in rule completeness.

5.2.4.2 ICJ
It may be that Court judges often vote in political favour of their home
states. It may be time for the UN to reform the institution thoroughly.
Increasing tenure should reduce attachment to re-election and home-state
gratification. Another aspect is how the ICJ should perceive its future role
in addressing dispute aggravation or recurrence. A wider role implies taking
a more proactive involvement in case jurisdiction. Practices might include
regional fact-finding; revisions to outdated customary laws; and interpreting
existing treaties widely. The Court Statute could be accordingly reviewed.
One legal issue is therefore how prescriptive should the Court's be in
regulating future conduct, i.e. a greater good faith principle. The other issue
is how proscriptive should the Court be, in policing states‘ future conduct?

For the future, especially where force and loss of civilian lives are involved,
it would be better to give the good faith principle a higher standing. A fairer
retaliation principle should be included, where force was in response to
another state or states' initial act of force. Otherwise, the victim state bears
protracted losses due to political weakness. The UN Charter should clearly
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demarcate the UNSC‘s initial jurisdiction for acts of aggression involving
force, and broader legal issues arising from a 2 or multi-state conflict
should be heard thoroughly by the ICJ, including damages and reparations.

The Court should avoid excessive judicial restraint or activism. Consistency
surfaces in provisional measures cases involving force. Recalling the poorer
compliance record for these orders, the Court should weigh the future pros
and cons of not granting measures. One proposal whilst assessing measures
would be for the ICJ to use observers as verification.

One problem is the standard of proof set by the Court, before the burden
shifts. For example, Bosnia and Herzegovina needed to show, beyond any
doubt, that there was a continual supply of assistance from Serbia and
Montenegro to the Bosnian Serbs. Since the Court did not establish the
legal basis for such a high standard of proof on the complainant, this should
be changed. The complainant should be able to use recognised agencies to
establish facts. A disadvantaged state should receive assistance.

The ICJ Statute and Rules do not indicate which evidence will be valued
more or less highly; nor what level of proof a party must meet. Instead, the

229

Court apply discretion, and weighs evidence based on the nature of the
claims. This needs refining, with a pecking order established for what type
of proof has what status.

One empirical issue is indirect evidence. In the Corfu Channel case,339 the
ICJ decided if a State exercises control over a territory, that ‗has a bearing
upon methods of proof available to establish knowledge of that State as to
events. By reason of this exclusive control, the other State, the victim of a
breach of international law, is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts
giving rise to responsibility. Such a State should be allowed a more liberal
recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence…‘ 340 In the
modern world, as media forms and speeds increase, public knowledge bears
more on whether or when the ICJ will shift the burden of proof, and
whether it will draw inferences in view of public knowledge. Although the
Statute or Rules do not prevent secondary evidence sources from being
included, the Court has been reluctant to verify such sources; this should
change.

339
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Corfu Channel (United Kingdom v. Albania), Merits, Judgment of 9/4/49, ICJ Report no.4.
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The ICJ usually moves slowly. If it took faster decisions, more parties
would submit cases. Arts 79 and 80 of the Rules of Court were revised in
1978. The revision concerned counter-claims. Admissibility assessment
should be made consistent to compensate for the lack of a compulsory
hearing.

For the future, it should be possible to appeal a decision of the ICJ, for
example arguing stare decisis, if the Court is inconsistent in following its
own precedent. Instead of using discretion, it would be fairer and legally
transparent to say on what principles a decision was arrived at.

5.2.5 Compliance and enforcement
5.2.5.1 WTO
Firstly, it is important to realise that compliance may be mutually exclusive.
For example, in the case of retaliation, there is clearly no compliance with
rescinding the measure, but there may be compliance with an agreed
countermeasure, which should have an enforcement structure in place. In
putting forward ideas for improvements to the DSU, we must consider what
the ideal objective would be. Possibilities are:-

231

(1) To enforce the offending member‘s basic reversal of the measure, i.e.
how to induce compliance.
(2) To rebalance concessions in the event of a countermeasure but no
reversal of the initial measure (sanctions). Or, eventual reversal. The
evidence for sanctions inducing compliance is not good. Here,
developing countries are disadvantaged as offending members, since
they are the usual beneficiaries of trade concessions from developed
countries. The correct level of concessions for Art 22.4 arbitrators may
not be easily calculated (Art 22.6). Economic experts in calculations
would assist. Also, a good change would be to allow Art 22.6 decisions
to be appealed to the AB, for greater consistency.
(3) To punish the offending member, possibly by collective action by
affected trade partners. A number of Art 22.6 arbitrations have opposed
punishment as a rationale, citing no justification in Art 22.1, or
paragraphs 4 and 7 of Art 22 for punitive countermeasures.
(4) Other broader normative objectives.
Several

developing

countries

proposed

introducing

mandatory

compensation as part of the DSU Review. The complaining member would
nominate the sectors for compensation. Alternatively, the DSB could decide
this. Any compensation will need enforcement. According to the Uruguay
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Round principles, compensation would be on non-discriminatory basis, as
to which country to apply it to: on an MFN basis. This view is supported in
the EC - Poultry case.341 One type of retaliation that could assist developing
countries is cross-agreement (Art 22.3, DSU), especially in TRIPS. Here, if
such a country offends, then cross-retaliation, which is likely due to few
TRIPS products originating in that country, is likely to occur in goods and
services.

This will immediately affect the offending member's trade position.
Effective retaliation is limited for the less economically powerful. In the
future, arbitrators should better rationalise whether cross-retaliation is
justified, e.g. trade distorting impacts on other members should be taken
into account. Also, amicus briefs could help better assess the value of the
retaliation.

The DSU is not clear on which of the above (1) to (4) is/are the objective(s).
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Even allowing for resolution case-by-case, international law is not much
referred to.

A greater use of retrospective remedies should increase the speed of
compliance, since the greater the delay, the greater the required compliance
correction would be. As a punitive measure, the future cost of
noncompliance should carry an increasing economic cost. For the offending
member, compliance improvements may necessitate examining the trade
regime, to see what timely compliance assistance might be required.

Compensation (not usually financial) is allowed by mutual agreement
within 20 days of the expiry of the RPT. It is not a legal obligation. A new
procedure could be instituted, whereby compensation negotiations begin
earlier, to establish the level of impairment. Trade distortions and
uncooperative members would remain as issues. Another way forward is to
permit compensation in addition to retaliation, helping the relevant industry
or sector hurt to benefits. One indirect way of inducing compliance is via
private economic players, through the offending member‘s trade ministry.
Private sector members could work actively towards compliance.
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Financial compensation should also be considered. A key rationales is to
provide a financial gain for the aggrieved member‘s government, industry
(group) or industry association. It does not harm other members. One
problem is that small, developing countries may not ever expect to make a
large, well-diversified developed state pay. In its favour, from public
international law, an unlawful act enables two reactions:-

(1) Compliance, an obligation for the injured state, the international
community and the legal system.
(2) Reparation as a remedy, for the damages caused to the injured state.

Financial compensation would fit with international law. It would provide
redress for developing countries. Economic and fairness arguments are
addressed by enabling backdating, but not the adversely impacted industry.
Currently, panels or the AB have no power to award compensation, so the
DSU would need to be amended.

The present DSU remedy for non-compliance where agreement could not be
reached is trade sanctions, without backdating.
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In international law, Art 55 of the Draft Articles on State Responsibility
(2001)342 states that countermeasures should cease as soon as the
responsible state has complied. Where the action involves members of
similar political and economic strength, the threat of sanctions might
achieve good compliance. Where there is a significant difference, this is less
likely since the stronger member can turn more economic and political
screws. Additionally, there is no DSU recourse for a state that wishes to
continue with sanctions regardless. Some tool should enable the DSU to
take corrective action for the aggrieved party in this scenario.

An Art 22 sanction is widely used by the aggrieved party to get the
offending party to comply. A problem in verifying compliance arises
because post-dispute confirmation about compliance is rare. This could be
changed, by introducing a compliance review. Also, in assessing sanctions,
it is important to assess early, i.e. ex ante whether the threat has sufficient
deterrent effect. The evidence seems to indicate that this is true.
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Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001),
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf
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One distinction to emphasise is compliance and enforcement of the initial
case issues, or compliance and enforcement in the case of a non-compliance
Art 21.5 panel. The basic existing process in the latter is that the
complainant can request authorisation to suspend concessions immediately
after the DSB has adopted a negative Art 21.5 report. Art 21.5 proceedings
are broader than the original dispute. For example, in US – Shrimp,343 the
compliance panel clarified that the new US measure was acceptable as
compliance only if it was sustained in future. To improve, any member
affected by the offending measure in that market could have recourse to an
Art 21.5 proceeding, as a greater deterrent, by preventing the formation of a
new case panel. This should improve ruling adherence by members, since
there would be required to be aware of previous compliance cases.

At present, there is an ambiguity in Art 21.5 here. There is a further issue, in
that an offending member may claim compliance before an Art 21.5 panel,
but the offending measure with a different one.
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United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of
the DSU by Malaysia,22/10/01,AB-2001-4, WT/DS58/AB/RW.
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One change to Art 21.5 proceedings therefore, would allow the panel to
carry out a review of related measures instituted since the original
proceeding.

On surveillance, Art 21.5 DSU does permit compliance review, and the
losing party is required to produce status reports for the DSB, but it need
not specify specify an implementation schedule. Monitoring is thus up to
the complaining party. This is unfair. As suggested by Suzuki,344 to reduce
post-RPT compliance disputes, the DSB should allocate resources to the
surveillance of both parties, intending to oversee full compliance within the
RPT. Developing countries would lumber excessively under the present
surveillance requirement. Art 21.5 and DSU proceedings could be made
public, to improve compliance.

Suzuki also advocates a mandatory requirement on the offending party to
report the probability of non-compliance as the end of the RPT nears, so
that the aggrieved party can explore alternatives. Also, as mentioned by
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Suzuki Y., ‗Sequencing and Compliance, Recent changes and prospective development‘, 2006, Reform
and development of the WTO dispute settlement system, Georgiev D., and van der Borght, K., London,
Cameron May.

238

Bronckers and van den Broek,345 smaller and/or developing countries lack
the monitoring capability of large members, and cannot effectively apply
pressure, so larger members protract the dispute unfairly. Expensive WTO
litigation may easily be beyond members‘ means. The arbitrators saw
Ecuador‘s difficulty in achieving full suspension to retaliate against the
EC‘s Bananas regime. 346 Ecuador was given the right to retaliate under
TRIPS. Due to much trade being multiparty, remedies under international
law might be multilateral. So, collective countermeasures might better
achieve compliance. This could also counterbalancing a powerful member
or trading bloc, such as the European Union.

There is a widely held view that the DSU has contracted out of the general
economic law on state responsibility, including the rules on compensation.
This ambiguity should be resolved. Specifically, there is a contradiction of a
basic law principle: ubi ius, ibi remendium. In other words, there is not
always a remedy in WTO law, e.g. no backdated remedy, so a country can
legally undertake the economically wrong cost-benefit calculation about the
merits of initiating an unfair trade measure in trade law.
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Bronckers, M. and van den Broek N., ‗Financial compensation in the WTO: improving remedies in
WTO dispute settlement‘, 2005, Journal of International Economic Law, Vol. 8 No.1, pp.101-126.
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EC – Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas – Recourse to Arbitration by the
EC under Article 22.6 DSU , 24/03/00, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU.
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Separately, it has been argued that small developing country members are
insufficiently challenged by the WTO, and are poorly incentivised for good
compliance. One possibility would be to increase the power of the WTO
Secretariat to enforce, by prosecuting cases. A first step would be to identify
non-compliance. The next step would be how to induce (better) compliance.
Some domestic institutions and processes would be targeted. Developing
countries need to be more transparent about domestic enabling processes.
The periodic Trade Policy Review Mechanism needs to be streamlined.
This would assist with enforcement.

Finally, we discuss specific WTO Agreements. On the issue of retroactive
compensation, in Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey
Portland Cement from Mexico,347 the panel supported backdated, this time
financial recompense, but stated: ...'raised important systemic issues
regarding the nature of the actions necessary to implement

347

Guatemala - Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Grey Portland Cement from Mexico, 24/10/00,
WT/DS156/R.
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recommendations under Art 19.1 DSU, issues which have not been fully
explored in this dispute.‘

Thus, it seems that because the DSU lacks formal legal capacity, it may be
showing judicial economy. The Secretariat might provide the interpretation
for retrospective remedies. This would involve a move towards rule
oriented compliance, rather than retaliation, which has been evidenced in
recent years, as well as in specific WTO Agreements. For example, in the
SCM area, Canada suggested to the Negotiating Group on Rules on 23
March 2005, that as soon as a member initiates an antidumping or
countervail measure that the DSU rules WTO-inconsistent, the member
should be prevented from continuing with the measure. This supported
Mexico's point that an illegal measure upsets the negotiated balance of
concessions. Here, a regional pressure to improve compliance can be seen,
which the DSU could respond to.

5.2.5.2 ICJ
There is no appellate process in the ICJ. Perhaps this makes the ICJ too
cumbersome, and lacking transparency, and that detracts from its
compliance potential. Some issues have parallels with the DSU. Two basic
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types of compliance can be discerned. The first type is more enduring,
compliance with existing, e.g. customary, rules in treaties. The second type
refers to compliance with the orders of a authorised body, e.g. the ICJ. This
latter will frequently also assess compliance with the former.

Due to difficulty in parties‘ interpretation, the ICJ should be extra careful to
clarify judgments, by e.g. direct reference to acts to perform. Ambiguity
reduces compliance quality. This is excacerbated since compliance in
practice is complicated, involving various levels of governmental
enforcement, with varying degrees of compliance.

Judge Oda, once of the ICJ, observed that where parties submit to the Court
by special agreement for a specific dispute, compliance was forthcoming.
Whereas, if states unilaterally instituted a case due to the Court‘s
compulsory jurisdiction, the respondent typically objected, leading to noncompliance. He advocated a better desire by states to submit to the Court‘s
jurisdiction.

One issue arises in connection with whether UNSC Art 94(2) applies to
provisional measures orders of the Court. For example, the Permanent
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Representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina, pursuant to Art 94(2) of the UN
Charter, requested the UNSC to take immediate measures under Chapter
VII, to stop the assault and enforce the provisional order of the ICJ. The
UNSC adopted Resolution 819, taking note of the Order of the Court, but
did not state Art 94(2) as the legal basis. It should thus be clarified whether
the UNSC has enforcement authority over provisional orders of the ICJ. In
other words, Chapter VII may be the overriding legal basis. Since LaGrand,
we could argue that the authority exists since the provisional measure is
binding in international law.348

Where third parties are affected by the outcome, the other states should be
party to the dispute, for example send observers to make public whether the
alleged non-compliance is true. The Court should be aware of (unequal)
geopolitical forces, e.g. where natural resources cause states to exert undue
pressure on parties. An example would be Nigeria‘s dispute with Cameroon
over the Bakassi pensinula.349
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LaGrand (F.R.G. v. United States), 27/06/01, ICJ Report 466.
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial
Guinea intervening), (Provisional Measures), 15/03/1996.
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The UN Charter has revision powers over ICJ judgments. Art 61 of the
Court Statute gives the Court exclusive competence over anything ‗as to the
meaning and scope of the judgment. Enforcement is best considered in the
post-compliance phase, i.e. where the offending party has not carried out
the required actions, and the next step is what to do, as in the WTO DSU.
The ICJ has no remedies in the Court Statute for non-compliance, since the
UNSC enforces. From Art 94(1) and 94(2) of the UN Charter, enforcement
is a political process that falls to the UNSC, but it has chosen not to exercise
its jurisdiction to enforce ICJ decisions. One problem is that any 94(2)
action is discretionary, so there is no automatic enforcement power. This
should be increased in future, with input from members.

Where the ICJ foresees compliance problems, it could institute a procedure
that operates post-compliance. This would involve the UNSC where
breaches of the peace are concerned. Thus, in the territorial Dispute
Libya/Chad,350 the parties notified the Court of a special agreement.
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Chad received funding for the litigation from the UN Secretary General‘s
ICJ Trust fund. For financially weak countries, this would be a very
sensible idea to induce better compliance; relevant clauses should be written
into special agreements, to deter non-compliance.

As seen in LaGrand and also in Avena, a judicially activist ICJ in domestic
policy can in future lead to better compliance, by streamlining its judgments
in this way. 351 But then, opting out of jurisdiction should be made more
difficult. Learning from Avena, the ICJ should clarify the legal status of its
rulings in relation to states‘ own rules. Generally, there could be timeframes
for compliance in international law. An automatic referral or escalation
procedure to the UN would also help with enforcement, since the ICJ has no
punitive tools for non-compliance.

351
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Korea – Measures affecting government procurement, 01/05/00,
WT/DS163/R.
Mexico – Anti-dumping investigation of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS)
from the United States: Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the US,
22/06/01, WT/DS132/RW.
Turkey – Restrictions on Imports of Textile and Clothing Products (Turkey
– Textiles), 19/11/99, WT/DS34/R.
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US – Anti-dumping act of 1916, complaint by the EC, 31/03/00,
WT/DS136/R.
US – Section 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, 25/12/99, WT/DS152/R.
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